Glymph v. CT Corporation Systems

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 23, 2024
Docket2:21-cv-01704
StatusUnknown

This text of Glymph v. CT Corporation Systems (Glymph v. CT Corporation Systems) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glymph v. CT Corporation Systems, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 LAFFON GLYMPH, 9 Case No. 2:21-cv-01704-JHC Plaintiff, 10 ORDER v. 11 CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS1 and 12 COMPUCOM2, 13 Defendants. 14 This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Laffon Glymph’s “Motion for 15 16 Recusal or Disqualify Judge Under 28 USC 455.” Dkt. # 45. The Court has reviewed the 17 materials submitted in connection with the motion, the remainder of the file, and the governing 18 law. Being fully advised, for the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion. 19 “Whenever a motion to recuse directed at a judge of this court is filed pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455, the challenged judge will review the motion papers and decide 21 whether to recuse voluntarily.” LCR 3(f). “If the challenged judge decides not to voluntarily 22 23 24 1 On June 10, 2022, this Court dismissed CT Corporation Systems, Defendant’s registered agent, 25 from the case. Dkt. # 19. 2 Pro se Plaintiff Laffon Glymph listed Defendant CompuCom Systems, Inc. simply as 26 “CompuCom” as a defendant in this matter. 1 recuse, he or she will direct the clerk to refer the motion to the chief judge, or the chief judge’s 2 designee.” Id. 3 A judge of the United States must recuse from any proceeding in which their impartiality 4 “might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Federal judges must also disqualify 5 themselves in circumstances when they have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or 6 7 personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 8 455(b)(1). “[A] judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.” United States v. 9 Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 10 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (“To warrant recusal, judicial bias must stem from an extrajudicial 11 source.”). 12 Plaintiff does not present any argument giving rise to a legitimate question of the 13 undersigned judge’s impartiality. First, she does not point to any “extrajudicial source” of bias, 14 15 such as some sort of connection with a party. Second, she bases her argument on adverse rulings 16 by the Court. But “adverse rulings do not constitute the requisite bias . . ., even if they were 17 erroneous[.]”3 United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983). 18

19 3 Plaintiff points to the Court’s dismissal of her FMLA claim. Dkt. # 45 at 2. The Court initially 20 dismissed this claim without prejudice for failure to allege causation and the willfulness required to have a longer limitations period apply. Dkt. # 19. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend. Id. Because 21 Plaintiff apparently misconstrued this order and failed to file a timely amended complaint, the Court granted her additional time to amend. Dkt. # 21. She then filed her amended pleading. Dkt. # 22. 22 Defendant again moved to dismiss. Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. See generally Dkt. The Court again dismissed the FMLA claim based on a failure to sufficiently allege causation and 23 willfulness to render the claim timely. Dkt. # 24. Plaintiff appealed. Dkt. # 25. (She did not appeal the earlier dismissal of her ADA claim at Dkt. # 19.) The court of appeals reversed, citing precedent with 24 respect to inferring causation from timing but not with respect to inferring willfulness. Dkt. # 29. Defendant petitioned for rehearing, emphasizing the distinction between causation and willfulness. Ninth 25 Circuit Case No. 22-35735, Dkt. # 27. The panel denied the petition. Id. at Dkt. # 29. The Court respects the ruling of the court of appeals, yet submits that its earlier ruling, Dkt. # 24, given the authority 26 cited above, cannot serve as a basis for recusal under Section 455. 1 The undersigned makes rulings in each case based on the issues presented by the parties 2 Hor on sua sponte review and has no personal bias or reason to be partial to one side or the other ; in this matter. Plaintiff has not shown that a reasonable person could question this Court’s impartiality. The undersigned will not recuse himself voluntarily from this case.

6 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion. Also, the Court further DIRECTS the Clerk 7 || to refer the motion to Chief Judge David Estudillo for further review. 8 DATED this 23rd day of January, 2024. 9 0 CJok. A) Chas JOHN H. CHUN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 □

ORDER - 3

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Related

United States v. Clarence Christian Nelson
718 F.2d 315 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)
United States v. Ruth Studley
783 F.2d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Findley v. Fagen (In re Findley)
993 F.2d 7 (Second Circuit, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
Glymph v. CT Corporation Systems, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glymph-v-ct-corporation-systems-wawd-2024.