Glover v. Acme Brick Co.

153 So. 2d 102, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1622
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 3, 1963
DocketNo. 5849
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 153 So. 2d 102 (Glover v. Acme Brick Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glover v. Acme Brick Co., 153 So. 2d 102, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1622 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

LANDRY, Judge.

Plaintiff herein, Royal Glover, alleging total and permanent disability resulting from rheumatoid arthritis in his right knee purportedly precipitated by a nail puncture of his right foot, instituted this action against his employer, Acme Brick Company, praying for judgment for maximum workmen’s compensation benefits for the period of disability, not to exceed 400 weeks. Trial in the court below resulted in judgment in favor of defendant employer rejecting and dismissing plaintiff’s demands. From the aforesaid adverse judgment, plaintiff has appealed.

It is conceded plaintiff sustained ail accident during the course and within the scope of his employment by defendant. The sole issue before the court is the causal connection, if any, between the accident and the' aforesaid disabling condition which developed several months thereafter.

The parties are in agreement that on May 31, 1960, while acting within the scope and during the course of his employment by defendant, plaintiff-appellant stepped on a nail injuring his foot. There is disagreement, however, as to whether plaintiff’s left or right foot was involved in the accident. Plaintiff maintains his right foot was thus injured while appellee contends the injury occurred to appellant’s left foot.

On the day of the accident, plaintiff, a common laborer 42 years of age, was engaged in helping one Merlin Nevels rebuild kiln cars (a contrivance on which bricks are stacked). The cars in question were being provided with new metal tops which were installed by burning the old tops off with a torch and welding new metal tops thereto. In the course of such work, plaintiff stepped on a large nail which penetrated his shoe and inflicted rather serious injury to his foot. Plaintiff immediately reported the accident to Nevels who upon examining the wound, (after requiring plaintiff to remove his shoe), directed plaintiff to report, to the company office for treatment. Plaintiff immediately proceeded to the office, disclosed his injury to William G. Malone, Plant Superintendent, and was sent to .the office of Dr. Robert Matthews where plaintiff received an anti-tetanus “shot”. Plaintiff was then returned to defendant’s plant where he remained until the end of the work day at which time he left for his home. May 31, 1960 was a Tuesday. Plaintiff returned to work the following Monday, June 6, 1960, on which day he was allowed to perform light work only. Thereafter, plaintiff continued in defendant’s regular employ, doing the same work in which he was engaged prior to his injury, until' November, 1960. It is conceded that from [104]*104the date of his injury until November, 1960, plaintiff sought no further medical aid but treated the injured member at home by daily soaking the wound in a saline solution and applying iodine thereto. In or about early November, 1960 (the record does not indicate with certainty) plaintiff’s right knee commenced to trouble him and for relief therefrom plaintiff consulted a Dr. Smith whom plaintiff visited on several occasions. It appears Dr. Smith was unavailable to testify upon the trial of this matter considering he was no longer a resident of this state. The treatment prescribed by Dr. Smith did not alleviate plaintiff’s condition which worsened to such extent plaintiff ultimately became unable to walk. On November 19, 1960, plaintiff, in a wheel chair, consulted Dr. R. E. Dupre, Physician and Surgeon, who, upon examination, found plaintiff to be suffering from a badly infected and inflamed right knee. Dr. Dupre tentatively diagnosed plaintiff’s condition as rheumatoid arthritis and immediately confined plaintiff to a hospital. Plaintiff remained hospitalized under Dr. Dupre’s care until December 3, 1960, on which date he was discharged as improved inasmuch as he was then ambulatory.

Although plaintiff maintains the injury was to his right foot, the evidence clearly preponderates in favor of defendant’s contention the wound occurred on appellant’s left foot. As previously stated, plaintiff’s immediate superior, Nevels, testified he was present when the accident occurred. He required plaintiff to remove his shoe and noted the wound was to plaintiff’s left foot. Defendant’s plant manager, William G. Malone, stated he interviewed plaintiff following the accident, made out the report on plaintiff’s injury and recalled the injury was to appellant’s left foot. Ralph Bene-field, an assistant foreman at defendant’s plant, testified he met plaintiff in the plant on the day of the accident following plaintiff’s return from Dr. Matthews’ office and plaintiff showed him the hole in plaintiff’s left shoe through which the nail entered plaintiff’s foot. In addition, the statement of Dr. Matthews appearing of record indicates that, predicated upon the records of his office, the injury in question was to plaintiff’s left foot.

Defendant’s position, succinctly stated, is simply that plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden incumbent upon him of establishing by a fair preponderance of evidence that the injury to appellant’s foot caused, activated or “triggered” the rheumatoid arthritic condition of appellant’s right knee which developed approximately six months following plaintiff’s injury. On the contrary, learned counsel for appellant maintains the medical testimony adduced herein establishes with reasonable certainty, that the arthritic condition of plaintiff’s right knee was “triggered” by the accident of May 31, 1960, and the aforesaid injury is, therefore, compensable.

The testimony of Dr. Robert Matthews (taken in response to interrogatories propounded in lieu of his personal appearance) indicated plaintiff was seen by the witness on May 31, 1960, at which time plaintiff was suffering from a puncture wound of the left foot due to appellant having stepped on a nail. Dr. Matthews administered tetanus antitoxin, prescribed a drug known as Madribon (to combat infection) and suggested daily soaks to keep the wound open in order to permit drainage of any foreign material which may have lodged therein. Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Matthews only on this one occasion.

Dr. R. E. Dupre, called on behalf of appellant, stated he first saw plaintiff November 19, 1960, on which date plaintiff’s condition was such that plaintiff was unable to walk. Plaintiff was brought to his office in a wheel chair and after examining plaintiff, he immediately confined plaintiff to a hospital. Dr. Dupre found plaintiff to be suffering from a badly infected right knee which, in addition to being greatly inflamed and swollen, was painfully sore and sensitive even to touch. Plaintiff’s condition was tentatively diagnosed as rheumatoid arthritis. During plaintiff’s hospitalization, Dr. [105]*105Dupre prescribed antibiotics, rest and application of heat to the affected knee. After having treated plaintiff for several days, Dr. Dupre concluded plaintiff’s trouble was definitely due to rheumatoid arthritis which is a cartilage disease. According to Dr. Dupre, the etiology or cause of rheumatoid arthritis has never been determined and is, therefore, unknown to medical science. It is, however, a disease believed to be primarily caused by infection, either local or general, although it is also the consensus of medical opinion that it may also be caused by trauma. If activated or triggered by trauma, it generally makes its first appearance at the seat of the trauma, whereas, if occasioned by infection, the rheumatic condition may erupt in any bodily joint irrespective of whether the causitive infection is general or local. In essence, Dr. Dupre was of the opinion plaintiff’s condition was due to infection.

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Bluebook (online)
153 So. 2d 102, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 1622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glover-v-acme-brick-co-lactapp-1963.