Gloucester Housing Authority v. Brittany Maragni.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 22, 2023
• Docket: 22-P-0647
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-647

GLOUCESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY

vs.

BRITTANY MARAGNI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Brittany Maragni (tenant) appeals from an order denying her

third successive motion to vacate an amended judgment that

awarded possession to the Gloucester Housing Authority (GHA)

along with monetary damages.1 The tenant, acting pro se, makes

numerous arguments, but we address only those with cited legal

and factual support. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as

appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).2 Specifically, we address

1 The amended judgment is not before us; the tenant did not list it in the notice of appeal. See Mass. R. A. P. (3) (c) (1) (A) (ii), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1624 (2019). See also West Springfield v. Olympic Lounge, Inc., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924 (1998) (notice of appeal from postjudgment motion not treated as appeal from underlying judgment). 2 While "some leniency is appropriate in determining whether pro

se litigants have complied with rules of procedure, the rules nevertheless bind pro se litigants as all other litigants." Brown v. Chicopee Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1710, IAFF, 408 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.4 (1990). three of the tenant's arguments: (1) the Housing Court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the tenant was not provided

sufficient notice; and (3) the Housing Court committed treason.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Background. The tenant was served a thirty-day notice to

quit on August 27, 2021, and was served a summons and complaint

on October 4, 2021. The tenant represented herself in all

matters. A bench trial occurred on February 15, 2022, and the

Housing Court issued findings of fact and rulings in GHA's favor

on March 29, 2022. The tenant proceeded to file three motions

to vacate the judgment on April 29, 2022, May 16, 2022, and May

23, 2022. Each motion made similar arguments concerning

jurisdiction and due process and all were denied. On June 3,

2022, the judge denied the tenant's motion for relief from the

judgment but granted tenant's motion to stay execution. On the

same day, the tenant filed this notice of appeal.

Discussion. When reviewing the decision of a trial judge

in a summary process action, "we accept [the judge's] findings

of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous," but "we

scrutinize without deference the legal standard which the judge

applied to the facts" (citation omitted). Andover Hous. Auth.

V. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 (2005). We review de novo the

denial of a motion to vacate brought on the ground that the

2 judgment is void. See Dumas v. Tenacity Constr. Inc., 95 Mass.

App. Ct. 111, 114 (2019).

1. Subject matter jurisdiction. The tenant's first

argument is that the Housing Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over this case. "Subject matter jurisdiction is

jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief

sought" (quotation omitted). Cambridge St. Realty, LLC V.

Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 128 (2018). Here, the Housing Court had

proper subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process

action under G. L. c. 185C, § 3. See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC,

supra at 127 ("There is no question that summary process

eviction actions generally fall within the Housing Court's

jurisdictional grant").

2. Service. The tenant next makes several claims that she

did not receive proper service of either the notice to quit,

summons and complaint, or notice of motion hearing. She claims

that this lack of service both prevented the Housing Court from

having personal jurisdiction over her and denied her of her due

process rights. The tenant is correct that "the plaintiff bears

the burden of establishing the validity of service of process."

Dumas, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 114. The record, however, indicates

that the GHA has met its burden. The record indicates that the

court had before it forms, each signed by the constable, stating

that the tenant had been served with the notice to quit and the

3 summons and complaint. This was more than sufficient for the

judge to find the court had personal jurisdiction over the

tenant. Additionally, the docket entry of the motion hearing

was sufficient to permit the judge to find that the tenant was

given notice of the hearing as a party to the case. Finally, we

find no other evidence on this record that the tenant's due

process rights were violated.

3. Treason. The tenant's last argument is that the

employees of the Housing Court and the judge committed treason.

The tenant cites to a case decided by the Supreme Court of the

United States to support her position that a court acting

without jurisdiction might "be treason to the constitution."

United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216 n.19 (1980). It

appears clear, however, that the use of the word in that context

is legally distinct from the criminal act of treason under

art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and G. L.

c. 264, § 1. The tenant points to no evidence or law or fact to

support that the court committed the criminal act of treason.

Additionally, as stated previously, the Housing Court did have

4 both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the tenant.

Order dated June 3, 2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Wolohojian & Walsh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: May 22, 2023.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.