Gloria Conway, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Patricia Harris

586 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7805
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 13, 1978
Docket78-1473
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 586 F.2d 1137 (Gloria Conway, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Patricia Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gloria Conway, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Patricia Harris, 586 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7805 (7th Cir. 1978).

Opinion

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Gloria Conway appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was unlawfully denied assistance and service benefits provided by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601, et seq. (Uniform Relocation Act or URA).

The facts of this case are not contested. The plaintiff was a tenant in a small apartment building in Waukesha, Wisconsin, and on March 15, 1977, she and other tenants received a 60-day eviction notice from their landlord. On March 30, 1977, the tenants received another letter from another private party, Architektur-80, advising them that this firm had optioned the property on which the tenants’ residences were situated and that financing for the development of a senior citizens’ housing project had been approved. Apparently Architektur-80 and the Wisconsin Housing Finance Agency *1138 (HFA) had already signed an agreement, which was later approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), wherein the parties contracted that the new owner would receive Section 8 housing assistance payments following completion of the new housing construction. Some time after the plaintiff moved, the apartment building was taken down and a new 43-unit, Section 8 housing project for the elderly was constructed.

Counsel for plaintiff requested in a May, 1977, letter to the Milwaukee Area Department of Housing and Urban Development that full URA benefits be granted the tenants who were being displaced by construction of the Section 8 project. Shortly thereafter the HUD Milwaukee Area Director responded that persons displaced due to a private Section 8 project were not eligible to receive benefits under the Uniform Relocation Act.

The Section 8 program was established by Congress as part of the omnibus Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq., and was created to alleviate the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for lower income families. To fulfill the mandate of this Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide financial assistance 1 to owners 2 or prospective owners who agree to construct or substantially rehabilitate housing for lower income families.

Relying on the recommendations of HUD, Congress designed the Section 8 program to provide a profit incentive for private developers to participate in the construction and management of lower income housing by using monthly housing assistance payments. 3 S.Rep.No.93-693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 4273, 4275. One means, and the one used here, by which HUD furnishes rental subsidies directly to housing owners on behalf of the tenants is contracting with a State Housing Finance Agency (HFA) for the HFA to administer the program throughout its jurisdiction. The intermediary HFA then contracts with private owners.

In the district court plaintiff sought declaratory relief establishing her right to relocation assistance and services under the Uniform Relocation Act. She also asked for injunctive relief enjoining defendants from following those provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations which precluded the plaintiff from receiving benefits under URA. Contending that the purposes of the Uniform Relocation Act were contravened, plaintiff specifically objected to the regulations set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 880.113(b) and 24 C.F.R. § 883.210(b) which require that relocation and assistance payments be provided if the owner of a new project is a Public Housing Authority (PHA). The regulations, however, contain no comparable requirement in the case of either a privately owned project or a private owner/PHA project.

Relying on statutory construction, legislative history, and case law, the district court, found that persons displaced by real property acquisition undertaken by private parties for projects which receive federal assistance are not entitled to the benefits established in the Uniform Relocation Act. We affirm.

On appeal the issue presented is whether a person dispossessed from real property by a private acquisition, which leads to the construction of a Section 8 housing project *1139 that upon completion is aided by federal financial assistance through rent subsidy payments, is a “displaced person” under 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) entitled to Uniform Relocation Act benefits.

I.

In 1971, Congress enacted the Uniform Relocation Act and declared:

The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.

46 U.S.C. § 4621. In following that far-reaching policy statement, plaintiff urges that we afford her benefits 4 as a “displaced person” who in 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) is defined as “any person who moves from real property . . . as a result of the acquisition of such real property . . . or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance . . . .” 5 Under this section plaintiff claims that she was forced to move from her apartment as a result of the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken either by a federal agency or with federal financial assistance. We disagree with the plaintiff as we cannot disregard the plain meaning of the Act’s operational sections that govern the scope of eligibility.

The Eighth Circuit in Moorer v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 561 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
586 F.2d 1137, 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gloria-conway-individually-and-on-behalf-of-all-other-persons-similarly-ca7-1978.