Gloria Ann Shontz, as administrator of the Estate of Shirley Kay Gomez, Andrea Marie Bell, Kristina Christian Lincoln, and Kim Marie Kerr v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc., and Amareshwar Chiruvella, M.D.

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 25-0755
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 25–0755

Submitted February 19, 2026—Filed April 3, 2026

Gloria Ann Shontz, as administrator of the Estate of Shirley Kay Gomez, Andrea Marie Bell, Kristina Christian Lincoln, and Kim Marie Kerr,

Appellants,

vs.

Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc. and Amareshwar Chiruvella,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Patrick A.

McElyea, judge.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of a medical malpractice action. Affirmed.

May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

Nicholas C. Rowley and Dominic F. Pechota of Trial Lawyers for Justice,

P.C., Decorah, for appellants.

Frederick T. Harris and John A. Maschman of Lamson Dugan & Murray

LLP, West Des Moines, for appellees. 2

May, Justice.

This is the plaintiffs’ second civil action arising from the same alleged

negligence by the same defendants. In the first action, the district court denied

a motion to dismiss, and then our court granted interlocutory review. Ultimately,

we issued an opinion reversing and remanding with specific instructions “for

entry of an order dismissing th[e] action with prejudice.” Shontz v. Mercy Med.

Ctr.-Clinton, Inc., No. 23–0719, 2024 WL 2868931, at *2 (Iowa June 7, 2024)

(per curiam). The district court obeyed those instructions by dismissing with

prejudice. But the plaintiffs filed two different dismissals without prejudice, one

before and one after the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. Then, later, the

plaintiffs refiled their negligence claims in this second action. The district court

then dismissed this second action. And the plaintiffs now appeal from that

dismissal.

We find no grounds for reversal. Our mandate in the prior appeal required

dismissal of the first action “with prejudice.” Id. The plaintiffs’ efforts to dismiss

the first action without prejudice were contrary to our mandate and, therefore,

ineffective. The district court’s dismissal of the first action with prejudice was

consistent with our mandate and, therefore, effective. That dismissal was also a

final judgment on the merits in the first action, which involved the same parties

and claims as this second action. Therefore, claim preclusion bars this second

action. The district court was correct to dismiss it. We affirm.

I.

Shirley Gomez had surgery on September 4, 2020. She died on

September 16. On August 26, 2022, her estate and children filed a civil action

against the surgeon and the hospital. 3

The defendants moved to dismiss. They argued that the plaintiffs had

failed to meet the certificate of merit affidavit requirements imposed by Iowa Code

section 147.140(1) (2022). Therefore, dismissal with prejudice was required

under section 147.140(6).

The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendants then

sought interlocutory review. We granted their request.

We issued our opinion on June 7, 2024. We determined that the district

court had erred by declining to grant the motion to dismiss. Our opinion

concluded with these words: “[W]e reverse the district court’s ruling that denied

the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and we remand this case for entry of an order

dismissing this action with prejudice . . . .” Shontz, 2024 WL 2868931, at *2.

Soon after, there was a flurry of activity in the district court:

• On June 17, the plaintiffs filed a supposed dismissal without prejudice.

(We say “supposed” dismissal because—as will be explained—we

conclude that it was not effective.)

• On June 20, the district court entered a dismissal with prejudice.

• On July 9, our court issued procedendo.

• Also on July 9, the plaintiffs filed another supposed dismissal without

prejudice.

Then, on July 18, the plaintiffs filed this second action under a different

case number. The parties here are the same as the first action. And the same

claims are being asserted.

The defendants moved to dismiss this second action based on res judicata

as well as the statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion. The

plaintiffs appeal. 4

II.

In their opening brief, the plaintiffs contend that the district court’s

dismissal cannot be upheld on statute of limitations grounds or on the basis of

res judicata. Because the district court seems to have relied on res judicata, we

begin our analysis there. Our review is for correction of errors at law. Crall v.

Davis, 714 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 2006).

“The doctrine of res judicata includes both claim preclusion and issue

preclusion.” Pavone v. Kirke, 807 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Iowa 2011). Here the parties

agree that our analysis should focus on claim preclusion. “The general rule of

claim preclusion holds that a valid and final judgment on a claim bars a second

action on the adjudicated claim or any part thereof.” Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d

356, 361 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Pavone, 807 N.W.2d at 835); accord Lemartec

Eng’g & Constr. v. Advance Conveying Techs., LLC, 940 N.W.2d 775, 779

(Iowa 2020). Claim preclusion bars the second action if three requirements are

met:

1. “the parties in the first and second action were the same,”

2. “the claim in the second suit could have been fully and fairly

adjudicated in the prior case,” and

3. “there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action.”

Lambert v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 804 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Iowa 2011) (quoting

George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Iowa 2009)).

The first two elements are met here because the parties and claims in this

second action are the same as those in the first action. See id. The third element

is the battleground. The defendants argue that this element is met because the

district court’s June 20 dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment on the

merits in the first action. The plaintiffs respond that the June 20 dismissal was 5

ineffective for multiple reasons, starting with the fact that the dismissal was

entered before the issuance of procedendo on July 9.

We agree with the defendants. It is true that after our court has issued an

opinion and the time for rehearing has passed, our court then issues a document

called “procedendo.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.1208(1). Ordinarily, procedendo ends our

jurisdiction and notifies the district court “that the case is transferred back to

that court” for any further proceedings. In re M.T., 714 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Iowa

2006). Sometimes, though, after we issue an opinion, the parties will go ahead

and resume district court action immediately, that is, before procedendo issues.

We have said that this can amount to consent to district court jurisdiction and

a waiver of procedendo. See State v. Henderson, 243 N.W. 289, 290 (Iowa 1932);

State v. Knouse, 33 Iowa 365, 367 (1871) (holding that the absence of procedendo

does not impact “jurisdiction over the subject-matter”; rather, it goes to

“jurisdiction over the parties,” which may be conferred by consent). This does

not mean, of course, that parties may not exhaust their rights to seek rehearing

before being required to proceed again in district court. See Iowa Rs. App. P.

6.1204–6.1205. They certainly may. See, e.g., State v. Lovell, No. 13–1895, 2014

WL 4631366, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2014), vacated on other grounds, 857

N.W.2d 241 (Iowa 2014) (per curiam). But here the plaintiffs—the parties who

lost on appeal—were the logical candidates to seek rehearing. And they chose

not to. They chose instead to move forward in the district court through the filing

of their supposed dismissal on June 17. Through those choices, the plaintiffs

waived the necessity of procedendo. We therefore reject the plaintiffs’ argument

that the June 20 dismissal with prejudice was ineffective because procedendo

had not yet issued. See also Becker v. Becker, 50 Iowa 139, 140 (1878) (stating

that procedendo is “not necessary . . . to give the court below jurisdiction,” and 6

when “a case is reversed, and the parties cause it to be re-docketed in the court

below, the court may proceed”).

But the plaintiffs theorize that their supposed dismissal(s) without

prejudice somehow stripped the district court of power to carry out our express

direction that the plaintiffs’ action must be dismissed with prejudice. We cannot

agree. The plaintiffs’ theory is foreclosed by the mandate rule.

The mandate rule is “a fundamental rule of law,” essential to the

“multitiered judicial system” created in article V of the Iowa Constitution. City of

Okoboji v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 744 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2008). The mandate rule

requires the district court “to honor and respect the rulings and mandates by

appellate courts in a case.” Id. This honor and respect must take the form of

strict compliance. When the appellate court remands “for some special purpose,”

the district court “is limited to do the special thing authorized by th[at] court in

its opinion, and nothing else.” Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Persinger, 154 N.W.2d

860, 864 (Iowa 1967)). Again, the district court “has no power or jurisdiction to

do anything except to proceed in accordance with the mandate.” Kuhlmann, 154

N.W.2d at 864; accord State v. Plain, 969 N.W.2d 293, 296–97 (Iowa 2022); City

of Okoboji, 744 N.W.2d at 331. And any “proceedings contrary to the mandate

must be treated as null and void.” Glenn v. Chambers, 56 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Iowa

1953) (quoting 3 Am. Jur. Appeal and Error § 1234 (1936)).

It follows that once we issued our opinion with its special instructions to

dismiss the plaintiffs’ first action with prejudice, a dismissal with prejudice was

the only permissible ending for that action. Conversely, a dismissal without

prejudice would have been contrary to our mandate. Therefore, any effort by the

plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice was impermissible and ineffective. 7

As the plaintiffs emphasize, though, rule 1.943 generally permits plaintiffs

to dismiss without prejudice “at any time up until ten days before the trial is

scheduled to begin.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. And so, if the language of rule 1.943

were taken wholly out of context, that rule might seem to provide the sort of

almost-unlimited right that could have somehow allowed the plaintiffs to dismiss

the first action without prejudice (because—of course—no trial was even

scheduled when the plaintiffs filed their supposed dismissals).

Like all civil procedure rules, though, rule 1.943 must be read in context

with the other rules and statutes that govern civil litigation. Read in that context,

certain limits become clear.1 See, e.g., id. r. 1.271(1)(a) (disallowing voluntary

dismissals absent court approval where the court has certified a class). Relevant

here, the right to voluntarily dismiss claims without prejudice cannot—and does

not—permit a plaintiff to elude a ruling that has already disposed of those claims.

To be sure, we have consistently allowed plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss

claims before a court has ruled on a pending dispositive motion. See Victoriano v.

City of Waterloo, 984 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 2023) (holding that voluntary

dismissal without prejudice was effective where a plaintiff dismissed his petition

the day before the district court’s hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss);

Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 420–21

(Iowa 2023) (same where a plaintiff dismissed her petition the same day the

defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Iowa Code section 147.140(6));

Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 164, 166 (Iowa 1994) (same where a plaintiff

1Although our cases have said that rule 1.943 provides an “absolute” right, we have clarified that this refers to the rule’s “self-executing” nature, that is, the fact that it authorizes parties to dismiss claims on their own and without “a court order.” Ronnfeldt v. Shelby Cnty. Chris A. Myrtue Mem’l Hosp., 984 N.W.2d 418, 422–24 (Iowa 2023). 8

filed a voluntary dismissal after the defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment but “[b]efore the court could rule”).

But the plaintiffs have not cited—and we have not found—any case in

which a plaintiff was allowed to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice after an

adverse dispositive ruling was entered. Nor would that make any sense. For

instance, surely a plaintiff could not dismiss without prejudice after a district

court has dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice through a grant of

summary judgment under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981. Otherwise,

rule 1.981 could not have its normal effect. Likewise, a plaintiff could not dismiss

without prejudice after a district court has granted a motion to dismiss with

prejudice under Iowa Code section 147.140(6). Otherwise, the statute’s direction

for “dismissal with prejudice” would have no effect. Id. Similarly, Iowa Rule of

Civil Procedure 1.943 cannot allow a dismissal without prejudice after our court

has issued a mandate commanding dismissal with prejudice. Otherwise, the

mandate rule would have no effect. That cannot be the law. See Rudolph v. Davis,

30 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Iowa 1948) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff could not defeat the

mandate of this court by a dismissal of his attachment action.”).

We recognize, of course, that there is a technical distinction between an

order that dismisses claims with prejudice and an appellate opinion, like the one

in the plaintiffs’ first action, which commanded the dismissal of the plaintiffs’

claims with prejudice. But this distinction makes no practical difference here.

Once we issued that opinion, the plaintiffs’ claims were no longer viable. Indeed,

under our rule concerning remands, when a district court “judgment is reversed

for error in overruling a motion and granting the motion would have terminated

the case in favor of the appellant,” our court “may enter or direct the district

court to enter final judgment as if such motion had been initially granted.” Iowa 9

R. App. P. 6.1206 (emphasis added). But whether we enter the final judgment

ourselves or direct the district court to do so on our behalf, the result is the

same: termination of the case in favor of the defendants, whose motion to dismiss

with prejudice should have been granted in the first instance.

Finally, we have considered the plaintiffs’ suggestion that because our

opinion in the first action was based on the plaintiffs’ violation of

section 147.140(1), the resulting dismissal with prejudice was merely technical

or procedural and, therefore, it was not a dismissal on the merits for claim

preclusion purposes. We disagree. Rule 1.946 provides that “[a]ll dismissals not

governed by rule 1.943 or not for want of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall

operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify otherwise.” Iowa R.

Civ. P. 1.946. And the June 20 dismissal with prejudice was not “governed by

rule 1.943,” was not a dismissal for “want of jurisdiction or improper venue,”

and did not “specify” that it was not an adjudication on the merits. Id. Therefore,

the June 20 dismissal was a final dismissal on the merits for claim preclusion

purposes. See id.; Lambert, 804 N.W.2d at 257.

III.

Because the requirements of claim preclusion were met, the district court

was right to dismiss this action. We affirm on those grounds. We need not, and

therefore do not, consider whether this action was also barred on statute of

limitations grounds.

Affirmed.