Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co.

166 N.E. 393, 31 Ohio App. 82, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 348
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 16, 1928
StatusPublished

This text of 166 N.E. 393 (Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co., 166 N.E. 393, 31 Ohio App. 82, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

Hamilton, P. J.

The Blue Ridge Lumber Com *83 pany, defendant in error, brought suit in the court of common pleas against the Globe & Eutgers Fire Insurance Company, plaintiff in error, on a policy of fire insurance. The insurance was to protect the lumber company against fire loss covering lumber on its property located at Eosedale, Tenn.

The record discloses that the lumber company had installed a mill on the property for the purpose of cutting out timber and reducing it to lumber; that it continued to saw out lumber until January, 1921, when the mill ceased to operate. The lumber sawed out was piled on the property of the lumber company. In June, 1921, the insurance policy in question was issued by the insurance company covering the lumber. The policy contained the following clause:

“Clear Space Clause.
“In consideration of the reduced rate and premium at which this policy is written, it is made a condition of this insurance that a continuous, unbroken, clear space of 100 feet shall be maintained at all times between the property herein described and any idle and/or operating and/or unused sawmill, planing mill and/or other wood working and/or manufacturing building or establishment and/or dry kiln and/or slab pit and/or refuse burner, and that said intervening clear space shall not be used for handling or piling of lumber of [or] lumber products therein or thereon for any purpose (tramways, upon which lumber is not piled, alone being excepted).
“This shall not be construed to prohibit loading or unloading within, or the transportation of lumber or *84 timber products across such clear space, between the hours of 6 A. M. and 6 P. M.
“This policy, however, shall not apply to or cover such timber, lumber or products thereof while being so transported or while in or on said clear space.
“The above stipulated clear space establishes the Yard Limits.”

On February 25, 1922, a fire occurred destroying some of the lumber. The insurance company refused payment on the ground that the insured had violated, and was at the time of the fire violating the clear space clause provided for in the policy, thereby releasing it from liability thereunder. The lumber company thereupon brought suit on the policy and recovered the judgment which is sought to be reversed in this error proceeding.

The essential facts are not in dispute. That lumber was piled in the clear space in question is conceded. If there was any “idle and/or operating and/or unused sawmill” existing at the time of the fire, there was no liability under the policy.

The clear space clause in such insurance policies has been upheld many times, and a violation of the clause prevents recovery, unless it can be shown that there was a waiver of the clause by the insurance company. Rife v. Lumber Underwriters (C. C. A.), 204 F., 32. There is no evidence of a waiver or any act on the part of the insurance company estopping it from asserting the defense. When the insurance policy was written, the distance between the mill and the piled lumber was more than 100 feet. Later lumber was piled in this clear space, and this was the situation at the time of the fire.

Some courts have held that the violation of the *85 clause suspends the policy during the continuance of the violation. Other courts hold the policy voided absolutely by the breach. Which of these rules should be applied it is not necessary to determine here, since either suspension or voidability would prevent a recovery in this case.

In the last analysis the defense .is solely that the sawmill had been abandoned at the time of the fire, and that there was, therefore, no idle or unused sawmill existing within 100 feet of the piled lumber. The case turns on this question of fact.

If there was no such idle or unused sawmill at the place in question at the time of the fire, then there was no violation of the clear space clause, notwithstanding lumber had been piled in what had formerly been the clear space. It is therefore necessary to turn to the evidence as shown by the record on this question.

The record discloses that the lumber company and the insurance company both considered in January, 1921, that a sawmill existed at the place in question, but had been shut down. In June, 1921, when the policy was written, it must have been considered that a sawmill existed, else there would have been no reason for the provision for the clear space clause. On the question as to the existence of an idle or unused sawmill at the time of the fire, we find in the record the following testimony of William W. Tar-man, who was in charge of the lumber company at Rosedale, Tenn., given on direct examination by counsel for the lumber company:

“Q. State, if you know, whether or not this' saw mill was shut down at the time of the fire? A. Yes, sir.
*86 ‘ ‘ Mr. Brumleve: That is conceded.
“Q. Will you state when it was shut down? A. Shut down some time early in January of 1921.
“Q. And will you state what was done, if anything, with the machinery at the time it was shut down? A. Dismantled the boiler and took off the water column. Took off the jet. Took off the injector. Took the governors off of the engine. The brasses out of the wrist.
“Mr. Brumleve: Not so fast.
“A. All right.
“Q. Is that what was done to the engine? A. That is what was done to the engine.
“Q. What were the governors for? A. Regulate the steam.
“Q. Can you run an engine without a governor? A. That controls the engine.
“Q. Can the engine be run without the governor? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Can it be run properly? A. No, sir.
“Q. State whether or not — What is the jet? A. The jet is a little instrument we used at the river for pushing water up to the tank where we inject it into the boiler.
“Q. Had you any other means of applying water to that boiler through the line of which the jet was brought? A. No, sir.
“Q. You had an injector, you say, which was removed. What was that? A. That draws the water out of the tub or tank and forces it into the boiler.
“Q. Did you have any other means of getting water in that boiler while it was in operation than by this injector? A. None whatever.
*87 “Q. Of course, the boiler wouldn’t run without water, would it? A. Not likely.
“Q. What about this water column you talked about? A.

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Related

Rife v. Lumber Underwriters
204 F. 32 (Sixth Circuit, 1913)

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Bluebook (online)
166 N.E. 393, 31 Ohio App. 82, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 348, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/globe-rutgers-fire-ins-v-blue-ridge-lumber-co-ohioctapp-1928.