STONE, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Globe Indemnity Company, issued a liability policy to Dean Lowe (d/b/a Mankato Aero Service), owner and operator of an airplane rental business. The policy expressly covered “not only the named insured but also any person while using or riding in the aircraft * * * provided the actual use is with the permission of the named insured.” March 27,1953, Kenneth Nielsen (a licensed pilot) rented an airplane from Lowe and took up with him three passengers for a short pleasure flight. After the plane had been in the air some time, it crashed, killing all four.
There resulted various State Court suits by separate representatives of each of the passengers against Lowe and against the estate of Nielsen.
2*The Indemnity Company was not a party to any of these suits. In those passenger suits, negligence was charged against Lowe in renting an unsafe plane, and against Nielsen for negligent operation thereof. During trial, the three passenger cases were settled. One result of these settlements was that Nielsen’s estate was obligated to pay $7500.00 to be realized from certain described property.
The present action is by the Nielsen administrator against the Indemnity Company for recovery of the above $7500.00 with $2500.00 to cover expenses in these litigations. The policy coverage of Nielsen is based upon the above quoted “omnibus” provisions of the policy and such inclusion is conceded by appellant.
The theory of the petition is that a fiduciary relationship existed between Nielsen and defendant under which defendant was obligated to investigate the facts of the, accident, to acquaint Nielsen therewith and to defend the actions brought by the passengers against Nielsen; that defendant promptly made an “extensive” investigation and assumed defense of Lowe in those suits on the ground that the accident came within exclusion provisions of the policy which would result in placing legal blame upon Nielsen; that it was not until the negotiations for the settlements, during the trial, that plaintiff discovered that a policy existed covering Nielsen; that, thereupon, plaintiff immediately tendered defense of the actions and asked defendant to assume responsibility for any settlement — both of which were refused by defendant; that, because of the foregoing, defendant is estopped from denying policy
coverage
of plaintiff and reliance upon any exclusionary clause in the policy.
The amended answer pleaded violation by plaintiff of Minnesota laws and regulations and of the Civil Aeronautics Board regulations applying to aerobatics and minimum safe altitudes and also by aerobatics at a lower altitude than 1000 feet — all being excluded by the policy.
The reply denied this answer and pleaded invalidity of these exclusion provisions as “contrary to public policy”.
The case was tried to the Court, who made findings of fact and stated conclusions of law. Thereon, judgment was entered for $7500.00 with interest from the date when plaintiff tendered to de
fendant the defense of the passenger suits and for $1500.00 to reimburse plaintiff “for attorney’s fees expended” in the defense of said actions. From that judgment defendant appeals.
Appellant relies upon claimed errors as follows: (1) Certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and (2) exclusion of three specified pieces of evidence.
Findings and Conclusions.
Appellant challenges four Findings. A summary of these Findings follows: that defendant, as an “agent” of Nielsen (under the policy), was charged with investigating the accident and conducting the defense for appellee in the passenger suits and failed so to do “without justification”; that the $7500.00 settlement made by plaintiff was reasonable; that “the accident to said airplane was caused by mechanical failure, defects therein, or malfunction thereof, or by errors of judgment on the part of said Kenneth Nielsen, and not by acts deliberately and intentionally committed by him”; and that defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof of a violation of any of the exclusionary provisions of the policy.
The challenged Conclusions are, in effect, as follows: that, lender the policy, defendant was obligated to disclose to Nielsen the existence of the policy and to defend the passenger suits against his estate, which obligation was violated and the policy contract breached without justification; and that, thereby, plaintiff was entitled to recover the $7500.00 which he was obligated to pay under the settlements.
Appellant’s attack upon these specified Findings and Conclusions is stated by its counsel under three headings: “(1) The cause of the crash and its bearing upon the policy exclusions; (2) whether the settlement was binding upon defendant, and (3) defendant’s duty and relationship to the pilot’s estate as an additional assured”.
(1)
Cause of crash and its bearing upon the policy exclusions.
The vital issues are whether, at the time of the crash, Nielsen was indulging in aerobatics ; and whether the Indemnity Company is estopped to rely upon the policy exclusionary provisions. We consider these issues in this order: first as to the exclusionary provisions and next as to estoppel.
If Nielsen was then indulging in aerobatics, he was acting within the exclusion provisions of the policy and, therefore, had thereby put himself beyond its protection. It is not necessary, under Minnesota law, that the policy excluded acts caused the accident. The rule in Minnesota is clearly expressed in Giacomo v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 203 Minn. 185, 280 N.W. 653. This rule is “that where there has been no assumption of the risk by the insurer, there can be no liability is elementary”, 280 N.W. at page 655; and “The exclusion is based on contract, which excludes this risk without regard to causal connection.” 280 N.W. at page 656. Also see Riteway Carriers, Inc., v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., D.C.Minn., 114 F. Supp. 507, 510, 511.
The trial court found that this accident “was caused *' * * not by acts deliberately and intentionally committed by him [Nielsen]” (Finding XV); and that defendant (appellant) “failed to show and prove the violation by plaintiff’s decedent [Nielsen] of any of the exclusionary provisions of said policy * * *” (Finding XVI). It is the verity of these Findings which is this immediate issue.
The policy exclusions relied upon by appellant are “violation of any governmental regulation * * * applying to aerobatics * * * minimum safe alti
tudes * * * [or] performs or attempts to perform aerobatics during which the aircraft is intentionally operated at an altitude of less than 1000 feet above the terrain * * * ”.
The pertinent governmental regulations are as follows:
“ § 43.48 Aerobatic flight. No pilot shall intentionally fly an aircraft in aerobatic flight carrying passengers unless all occupants are equipped with approved parachutes.”
“60.106 Acrobatic Flight. No person shall engage in acrobatic flight:
“d. Below an altitude of 1500 feet above the surface.”
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STONE, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Globe Indemnity Company, issued a liability policy to Dean Lowe (d/b/a Mankato Aero Service), owner and operator of an airplane rental business. The policy expressly covered “not only the named insured but also any person while using or riding in the aircraft * * * provided the actual use is with the permission of the named insured.” March 27,1953, Kenneth Nielsen (a licensed pilot) rented an airplane from Lowe and took up with him three passengers for a short pleasure flight. After the plane had been in the air some time, it crashed, killing all four.
There resulted various State Court suits by separate representatives of each of the passengers against Lowe and against the estate of Nielsen.
2*The Indemnity Company was not a party to any of these suits. In those passenger suits, negligence was charged against Lowe in renting an unsafe plane, and against Nielsen for negligent operation thereof. During trial, the three passenger cases were settled. One result of these settlements was that Nielsen’s estate was obligated to pay $7500.00 to be realized from certain described property.
The present action is by the Nielsen administrator against the Indemnity Company for recovery of the above $7500.00 with $2500.00 to cover expenses in these litigations. The policy coverage of Nielsen is based upon the above quoted “omnibus” provisions of the policy and such inclusion is conceded by appellant.
The theory of the petition is that a fiduciary relationship existed between Nielsen and defendant under which defendant was obligated to investigate the facts of the, accident, to acquaint Nielsen therewith and to defend the actions brought by the passengers against Nielsen; that defendant promptly made an “extensive” investigation and assumed defense of Lowe in those suits on the ground that the accident came within exclusion provisions of the policy which would result in placing legal blame upon Nielsen; that it was not until the negotiations for the settlements, during the trial, that plaintiff discovered that a policy existed covering Nielsen; that, thereupon, plaintiff immediately tendered defense of the actions and asked defendant to assume responsibility for any settlement — both of which were refused by defendant; that, because of the foregoing, defendant is estopped from denying policy
coverage
of plaintiff and reliance upon any exclusionary clause in the policy.
The amended answer pleaded violation by plaintiff of Minnesota laws and regulations and of the Civil Aeronautics Board regulations applying to aerobatics and minimum safe altitudes and also by aerobatics at a lower altitude than 1000 feet — all being excluded by the policy.
The reply denied this answer and pleaded invalidity of these exclusion provisions as “contrary to public policy”.
The case was tried to the Court, who made findings of fact and stated conclusions of law. Thereon, judgment was entered for $7500.00 with interest from the date when plaintiff tendered to de
fendant the defense of the passenger suits and for $1500.00 to reimburse plaintiff “for attorney’s fees expended” in the defense of said actions. From that judgment defendant appeals.
Appellant relies upon claimed errors as follows: (1) Certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and (2) exclusion of three specified pieces of evidence.
Findings and Conclusions.
Appellant challenges four Findings. A summary of these Findings follows: that defendant, as an “agent” of Nielsen (under the policy), was charged with investigating the accident and conducting the defense for appellee in the passenger suits and failed so to do “without justification”; that the $7500.00 settlement made by plaintiff was reasonable; that “the accident to said airplane was caused by mechanical failure, defects therein, or malfunction thereof, or by errors of judgment on the part of said Kenneth Nielsen, and not by acts deliberately and intentionally committed by him”; and that defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof of a violation of any of the exclusionary provisions of the policy.
The challenged Conclusions are, in effect, as follows: that, lender the policy, defendant was obligated to disclose to Nielsen the existence of the policy and to defend the passenger suits against his estate, which obligation was violated and the policy contract breached without justification; and that, thereby, plaintiff was entitled to recover the $7500.00 which he was obligated to pay under the settlements.
Appellant’s attack upon these specified Findings and Conclusions is stated by its counsel under three headings: “(1) The cause of the crash and its bearing upon the policy exclusions; (2) whether the settlement was binding upon defendant, and (3) defendant’s duty and relationship to the pilot’s estate as an additional assured”.
(1)
Cause of crash and its bearing upon the policy exclusions.
The vital issues are whether, at the time of the crash, Nielsen was indulging in aerobatics ; and whether the Indemnity Company is estopped to rely upon the policy exclusionary provisions. We consider these issues in this order: first as to the exclusionary provisions and next as to estoppel.
If Nielsen was then indulging in aerobatics, he was acting within the exclusion provisions of the policy and, therefore, had thereby put himself beyond its protection. It is not necessary, under Minnesota law, that the policy excluded acts caused the accident. The rule in Minnesota is clearly expressed in Giacomo v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 203 Minn. 185, 280 N.W. 653. This rule is “that where there has been no assumption of the risk by the insurer, there can be no liability is elementary”, 280 N.W. at page 655; and “The exclusion is based on contract, which excludes this risk without regard to causal connection.” 280 N.W. at page 656. Also see Riteway Carriers, Inc., v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., D.C.Minn., 114 F. Supp. 507, 510, 511.
The trial court found that this accident “was caused *' * * not by acts deliberately and intentionally committed by him [Nielsen]” (Finding XV); and that defendant (appellant) “failed to show and prove the violation by plaintiff’s decedent [Nielsen] of any of the exclusionary provisions of said policy * * *” (Finding XVI). It is the verity of these Findings which is this immediate issue.
The policy exclusions relied upon by appellant are “violation of any governmental regulation * * * applying to aerobatics * * * minimum safe alti
tudes * * * [or] performs or attempts to perform aerobatics during which the aircraft is intentionally operated at an altitude of less than 1000 feet above the terrain * * * ”.
The pertinent governmental regulations are as follows:
“ § 43.48 Aerobatic flight. No pilot shall intentionally fly an aircraft in aerobatic flight carrying passengers unless all occupants are equipped with approved parachutes.”
“60.106 Acrobatic Flight. No person shall engage in acrobatic flight:
“d. Below an altitude of 1500 feet above the surface.”
“60.107 Minimum Safe Altitudes. Except when necessary for take-off or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes :
“a. Anywhere. An altitude which will permit, in the event of the failure of a power unit, an emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.”
Definitions.
"15.1 Acrobatic Flight. Maneuvers intentionally performed by an aircraft involving an abrupt change in its attitude, an abnormal attitude, or an abnormal acceleration.”
The Minnesota statutes, M.S.A. § 360.-075, make it a misdemeanor to engage “in acrobatic or stunt flying without being equipped with a parachute and without providing any other occupants of the aircraft with parachutes and requiring that they be worn”.
With the above Regulations and the Minnesota Statute in mind, we examine the evidence to determine whether the trial court is or is not supported by substantial evidence in deciding that the appellant failed in its burden of proof that the pilot engaged in aerobatics at the time of the accident. In so doing, we apply the rule that we do not retry matters of fact but confine ourselves to determining the question of law as to whether there is or is not any substantial evidence to support the findings of fact by the trial court — viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the Judgment. Kaiser Motors Corporation v. Savage, this Circuit, 229 F.2d 525; and see Greenspon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (and related cases), this Circuit, 229 F.2d 947.
This plane was a Cessna 170 single engine, with seats for four persons — the front seat was for the pilot (left side) and one other, immediately behind was a seat for two persons. It was the color of silver or aluminum. The plane was not equipped with any parachutes. The afternoon of March 27, 1953, Nielsen came, with three friends, and rented the plane to go “for a pleasure ride” with his friends. He was a qualified pilot. The attendant checked the gas tanks, oil and tires. He and Nielsen together walked around the plane checking and testing the "service controls”. Nielsen got into the pilot’s seat and took off at about 5:15 p. m. Sometime between 5:30 and 6:00 p. m., the plane crashed in a small grove of trees not far from the town of Minnesota Lake, killing all four occupants.
The testimony as to what the pilot was doing with the plane shortly before and immediately before the crash comes from two sources: the eyewitnesses who observed the plane and certain deductions drawn from inspection of the wrecked plane. There were three eyewitnesses to the maneuvers of the plane shortly and immediately before it crashed. They were Ernest Meyer, Charles Latusick and Erick J. Brandt. Because of the vital importance of and because the testimony of each of these three is so briefly and concisely abstracted that the essentials thereof — as bearing on this immediate issue is concerned — are best understood by setting out their testimony in full; this we do in the footnote.
The testimony based on inspection of the wrecked plane came from two witnesses: Allen W. DeVoe and Dean V. Lowe. Mr. DeYoe was an Aviation Safety Agent of the Civil Aeronautic Administration. A part of his duties was in
spection of airplane crashes. He made such inspection of this wreck on the morning following. As to this witness, the Court felt constrained, by Section 701(e) of the Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 581, to limit-his testimony “to what he
saw, his observations, but he can’t testify to opinions”. The pertinent portions of the admitted testimony as to our issue now being examined are quoted in footnote
Mr. Lowe testified he had purchased the plane (then second handed) in July, 1953, after a thorough inspection by him and by his mechanic who was “a designated C.C.A. inspector” and the “logs” of that and periodic subsequent inspections (as required by law) were introduced. He had been a pilot for eleven years, and besides running an airport, was an instructor. He arrived at the p]ace 0f the accident about two hours afterwards. The pertinent portions to our immediate issue are set forth or referred to in footnote
.
. In considering this evidence, two things must be kept in mind. The first is that much of it is concerned with the cause of the accident in the sense that there was a sharp issue as to whether the accident was caused by some failure of
or defect in the plane or was caused by some failure or misjudgment on the part of the pilot. Either or both causes might be admitted without affecting the issue we are now considering, which is whether the pilot was so operating the plane as to put him within the express exclusions of the coverage of the policy, The second thing is whether the weight of the evidence clearly is against the finding that defendant failed to sustain the burden of proof that the accident “happened as a result of or during the course of the violation of any State law
or governmental regulations applying to aerobatics or minimum safe altitudes or during the course of aerobatics while said aircraft was being intentionally operated at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet above the terrain, or of any other governmental regulation pertaining to the operation of said aircraft.”
We think there was no substantial evidence to sustain this Finding and the Court should, therefore, have found the opposite. Compare Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Guiou, 8 Cir., 86 F.2d 865.
The amended answer presents this issue clearly: “that the accident was due to the pilot’s violation of the laws and regulations of the State of Minnesota and the Civil Aeronautics Board applying to aerobatics and minimum safe altitudes and further due to his performing aerobatics at an altitude of less than 1,-000 feet, all of which are excluded from coverage under defendant’s policy.”
The policy expressly provides that it “does not apply * * * to any insured: ****•»#
“(b) who violates or permits the violation of any governmental regulations for civil aviation applying to aerobatics, instrument flying, minimum safe altitudes, repairs or alterations;
“(c) who permits, performs or attempts to perform aerobatics during which the aircraft is intentionally operated at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet above the terrain * *
The Civil Air Regulations provide:
“43:48 Aerobatic flight. No pilot shall intentionally fly an aircraft in aerobatic flight carrying passengers unless all of the occupants are equipped with approved parachutes."
The Minnesota State regulations provide prohibitions against the following:
“60.102 Careless or Reckless Operation. No person shall operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of others.
“Note: Examples of aircraft operation which may endanger the lives or property of others are:
“a. Any person who ‘buzzes’, dives on, or flies in close proximity to a farm, home, any structure, vehicle, vessel, or group of persons on the ground. * * * A pilot who engages in careless or reckless flying and who does not own the aircraft which he is flying unduly endangers the aircraft, the property of another.
“b. The operation of aircraft at an insufficient altitude endangers persons or property on the surface or passengers within the aircraft. Such flight may also constitute a violation of 60.107.
“ 60.106 Acrobatic Flight. No person shall engage in acrobatic flight:
“d. Below an altitude of 1,500 feet above the surface.
“60.107 Minimum Safe Altitudes. Except when necessary for take off or landing, no person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes :
“a. Anywhere. An altitude which will permit, in the event of the failure of a power unit, an emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.”
“15.1 Acrobatic Flight. Maneuvers intentionally performed by an aircraft involving an abrupt change in its attitude, an abnormal attitude, or an abnormal acceleration.”
The Minnesota law provides, M.S.A. § 360.075: that it is a misdemeanor to “engage in acrobatic or stunt flying without being equipped with a parachute and without providing any other occupants of the aircraft with parachutes and requiring that they be worn; * *
The undisputed evidence is as follows. There were no parachutes in this plane.
The plane, from a level flight of more than a quarter of a mile high, dived close to the ground. (See testimony of Ernest Meyer, footnote 4.) This testimony, by Mr. Meyer, covers the two successive dives. He testifies: “I kept the plane in constant view from the time I first saw it until it crashed”. The two other eyewitnesses had their attention drawn to the plane when it was flying level shortly before it made the second dive, which each of them saw. Each of the three witnesses saw the plane either strike or disappear just before striking the trees.
The testimony of each of these three as to operation of the plane engine is as follows. Mr. Meyer saw the plane flying level at about three quarters of a mile high; then dive to very near the ground; then sweep back up to about the former altitude and level off; then dive again. The further down it went in the second dive the faster. It crashed about a mile from him. He noticed “black or bluish black” smoke or dust from the rear of the plane when it started to rise from the first dive. Both dives were at a 45 degree angle. The last dive was faster. He did not hear the plane engine “as I had the motor of my car running”, which “made much noise.” Mr. Latusick testified he saw the plane flying “straight ahead” then it made a dive at a 45 degree angle. The engine was “roaring”. The plane disappeared just before it hit the trees. He did not hear the engine “during the interval of the few seconds between the time the plane disappeared and the time I heard the crash”. He was standing about three quarters of a mile from the place of the crash. Mr. Brandt was standing about one and one quarter miles from the place of the accident. From a level course northward “it made a left turn toward the west and then came back south and made a dive. * * I heard the motor during all the time that I saw it. * * * It roared all the way down.”
In addition to this eyewitness testimony there is the physical evidence that the impact of the engine with a twelve inch diameter oak tree was so terrific that it carried the tree fifty to seventy-' five feet and then rolled forty feet beyond before stopping.
Also, there is the expert opinion of Mr. Lowe that the power was operating when the engine struck the tree tops.
Considering all of the above testimony we are convinced that it shows clearly that the plane was being operated by Nielsen in violation of governmental regulations and the Minnesota law by intentional flying in aerobatic flight carrying passengers when none of the occupants were equipped with parachutes and in violating the Minnesota law by engaging in aerobatics below the lawful prescribed minimum altitudes. Such activity of Nielsen was clearly within the express exclusions of the policy. Therefore, the Court erred in his Finding that the appellant had failed in sustaining its burden of proof that Nielsen had acted within the exclusions of the policy.
Unless appellant is estopped to claim the protection of the exclusion provision of the policy, the Judgment must be reversed. Appellee urges such estoppel. The claimed pertinent factual situation is that it was the legal duty of appellant to investigate this accident; to inform appellee of the existence of the omnibus provision of the policy; and to assume the defense of the suits against Nielsen. Appellant did not so inform appellee until during the trial of those suits and, thereupon being tendered such defense, refused. Appellant had made an investigation of the accident and, being convinced therefrom that Nielsen had deliberately indulged in aerobatics, had not taken the matter up with appellee but had assumed defense of Lowe in these passenger cases. The position of the appellant is that, because of the exclusion provisions of the policy, it was under no duty to assume such defense.
The duty of an insurer to defend suits brought against the insured depends upon an obligation so to do created by the policy contract. We have not, in this record, the provision in this policy covering this obligation. However, it seems
conceded that there was such a provision since appellant raises no point as to the particular wording thereof but relies solely upon the situation that the accident occurred while Nielsen was engaged in activities within the exclusion provisions of the policy. This case was tried and determined upon that basis and we so treat it here.
Determination depends upon the law of Minnesota. It seems clear that where an insurer, with full knowledge of the facts concerning such coverage,
assumes
defense of an action against the insured, without an agreed upon reservation of its rights to contest coverage with the insured, it may be estopped to challenge that coverage thereafter.
However, the converse situation where the insurer refuses and will not accept such defense does not, of itself, create a situation ripe for an estoppel of it to deny liability to the insured for a policy excluded risk. The Minnesota law is that where the insured is sued and his acts are not within the policy coverage, the insurer is not obligated to assume the defense.
Since the situation here is that the insurer did so refuse because it deemed this insured was acting within a policy exclusion of coverage and the insurer has established that to be true, it was under no contract obligation to assume defense of the suits against the insured. Therefore, no estoppel for refusal so to do is here present.
To allow an estoppel would be to create a legal absurdity. This would arise from the situation following: under Minnesota law, the insurer with full knowledge of the fact situation as to coverage would be estopped to question such coverage if it assumed defense of the passenger suits against Nielsen; whereas the insurer is faced with a like estoppel if it refuses so to defend where it relies upon policy coverage exclusions and proves factual application of such exclusions. The Minnesota law does not thus blow hot and cold. Of course, if the insurer fails to prove the occurrence to be within the policy exclusion, it would have to respond in damages to the insured for its failure to perform its contract obligation to defend.
The plea, in the reply, that the exclusionary policy provisions involved here are “contrary to public policy and void” is directly ruled to the contrary in Giacomo v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 203 Minn. 185, 280 N.W. 653, 657.
Since what has been hereinbefore expressed disposes of this appeal, it is unnecessary to consider the other issues raised here by appellant. The judgment is reversed with directions to vacate the judgment and to enter judgment in favor of appellant-defendant with costs of this action.