Glinder R. Brooks v. King County, Department of Development & Environment Services

133 F.3d 925, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40108, 1997 WL 813150
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 17, 1997
Docket97-35202
StatusUnpublished

This text of 133 F.3d 925 (Glinder R. Brooks v. King County, Department of Development & Environment Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glinder R. Brooks v. King County, Department of Development & Environment Services, 133 F.3d 925, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40108, 1997 WL 813150 (9th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

133 F.3d 925

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Glinder R. BROOKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KING COUNTY, Department of Development & Environment
Services, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-35202.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted December 15, 1997.**
Decided Dec. 17, 1997.

Before: SNEED, LEAVY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

Glinder R. Brooks appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment in favor of King County Department of Development and Environmental Services ("DDES") in Brooks's action alleging he was improperly terminated on account of his race, age, disability, and veteran status. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Although the parties did not raise the question of our jurisdiction, we have an obligation to consider jurisdictional issues sua sponte. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). We have jurisdiction over only final orders of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Without the district court's certification, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), see Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen, Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir.1985), orders dismissing some but not all of the claims are not appealable final orders, see Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.1986).

The district court's January 8, 1997 order granting summary judgment on Brooks's claim that he was terminated on account of his race, is not a final order. The district court did not dispose of Brooks's claims of discrimination based on age, disability, and veteran status, which were included in his October 3, 1994 complaint. See Unioil, 809 F.2d at 554. A review of the record shows that there is no Rule 54(b) certification. See Frank Briscoe Co., 776 F.2d at 1416. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

DISMISSED.

**

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller
104 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.
809 F.2d 548 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 F.3d 925, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40108, 1997 WL 813150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glinder-r-brooks-v-king-county-department-of-devel-ca9-1997.