Glimcher Partners v. Teachers Ret. Sys., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2003)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 20, 2003
DocketNo. 02AP-1115 (REGULAR CALENDAR)
StatusUnpublished

This text of Glimcher Partners v. Teachers Ret. Sys., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2003) (Glimcher Partners v. Teachers Ret. Sys., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2003)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glimcher Partners v. Teachers Ret. Sys., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2003), (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

DECISION
{¶ 1} This case involves an appeal from a final judgment entered by the trial court declaring that all of the prerequisites for effective termination of a certain lease entered between defendant-appellant, The Board of the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio ("STRS") and plaintiff-appellee, Glimcher Properties Limited Partnership ("Glimcher"), had been proven by a greater weight of the evidence during the course of a lengthy trial to the court.

{¶ 2} A review of the record in this matter supports the detailed findings of fact issued by the trial court, and we have attached them as an appendix to this opinion. For these reasons and those that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of appellee Glimcher.

{¶ 3} STRS has assigned five assignments of error which follow:

{¶ 4} "1. The Trial Court erroneously construed Section 22 of the subject lease (the "Lease") as granting Plaintiff-Appellee Glimcher Properties Limited Partnership ("Glimcher") a contractual right to terminate the Lease when, as a matter of law, Section 22 of the Lease merely establishes a condition precedent to Glimcher's pursuit of a common law claim of constructive eviction to obtain termination of the Lease.

{¶ 5} "2. Even if Section 22 of the Lease had granted a contractual right to terminate the Lease, the Trial Court erroneously failed to determine whether or not the alleged defaults were material and, as a matter of law, the alleged defaults unequivocally were not material.

{¶ 6} "3. The Trial Court erroneously admitted and relied upon evidence of events occurring after January 18, 2002 in determining that the Lease was terminated as of January 18, 2002.

{¶ 7} "4. The Trial Court erroneously determined that Glimcher issued a legally sufficient notice of default under Section 22 of the Lease.

{¶ 8} "5. The Trial Court's decision is manifestly against the great weight of the evidence."

{¶ 9} We will treat these assignments together except as to assignment of error number four.

{¶ 10} The lease premises, during the course of Glimcher's occupancy, constituted parts of the second and third floors of the building known as the Galleria. The lease ran from March 24, 1994 through March 31, 2004, calling for an annual rental of $550,935, subsequently modified by an amendment which increased the total annual rent to $576,987. The lease contained, in paragraphs 22 and 23, the following terms addressing default, cure, waiver, and termination:

{¶ 11} "22. Landlord's Default. If Landlord shall default in the performance or observance of any agreement or condition on its part to be performed or observed under this Lease and Landlord shall fail to cure said default within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice thereof from Tenant or if the same cannot with due diligence be cured within such thirty (30) day period then Landlord shall fail to promptly commence to cure the same within thirty (30) day period and diligently pursue such cure to completion, Tenant, at any time thereafter, Tenant may pursue of any of Tenant's rights or remedies available to Tenant at law or in equity, including, but not limited to, termination of this Lease. If Tenant makes any expenditures or incurs any reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements, in instituting, prosecuting or defending any action or proceeding, such sums paid or obligations incurred and costs, plus interest at the Default Rate from the date of such expenditure to the date of setoff, shall be paid to Tenant by Landlord on demand. If Landlord fails to pay any sum required to be paid hereunder within thirty (30) days after demand is made therefor by Tenant, or if Landlord is contesting the same then within thirty (30) days after the issuance of a final arbitration decision or a final court order requiring such payment, Tenant shall be entitled to set off such expenditure against the next due installment(s) of Base Rent or terminate this Lease.

{¶ 12} "23. Waiver of Default or Remedy. (a) No waiver of any covenant or condition or of the breach of any covenant or condition of this Lease shall be taken to constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach of such covenant or condition nor to justify or authorize the nonobservance on any other occasion of the same or of any other covenant or condition hereof, nor shall the acceptance of rent by Landlord at any time when Tenant is in default under any covenant or condition hereof be construed as a waiver of such default or of Landlord's right to terminate this Lease on account of such default, nor shall any waiver or indulgence granted by Landlord to Tenant be taken as an estoppel against Landlord, it being expressly understood that if at any time Tenant shall be in default in any of its covenants or conditions hereunder an acceptance by Landlord of rental during the continuance of such default or the failure on the part of Landlord promptly to avail itself of such rights or remedies as Landlord may have, shall not be construed as a waiver of such default, but Landlord may at any time thereafter, if such default continues, terminate this Lease or assert any other rights or remedies available to it on account of such default in the manner hereinbefore provided.

{¶ 13} "(b) No waiver of any covenant or conditions by Tenant or of the breach by Landlord of any covenant or condition of this Lease shall be taken to constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach by Landlord of such covenant or condition nor to justify or authorize the nonobservance on any other occasion of the same or of any other covenant or conditions hereof, nor shall any waiver or indulgence granted by Tenant to Landlord be taken as an estoppel against Tenant, it being expressly understood that if at any time Landlord shall be in default in any of its covenants or conditions hereunder the failure on the part of Tenant promptly to avail itself of such rights or remedies as Tenant may have, shall not be construed as a waiver of such default, but Tenant may at any time thereafter, if such default continues, assert any other rights or remedies available to it on account of such default in the manner hereinbefore provided."

{¶ 14} The trial court's findings of fact, which are supported by the record, among other things reflect the following problems on the lease premises: (a) substantial amounts of insect infestation and a continuing problem with rodents on the lease premises throughout Glimcher's tenure; (b) a continuing problem with the elevator serving the lease premises, which involved a potentially lethal situation and caused great fear to the secretarial staff; (c) offensive odors which permeated the lease premises; and (d) a continuing problem regarding water leakage throughout the building, with water running down the walls, deterioration of the plaster, and cracks in the walls, generally interfering with the functions of the office and causing damage to the furnishings owned by Glimcher on the lease premises.

{¶ 15} Appellant argues that the problems noted above were immaterial breaches. We disagree. The aforementioned problems were surely material breaches by the lessor and, in this court's view, can hardly be viewed as immaterial particularly when taken as a whole.

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Bluebook (online)
Glimcher Partners v. Teachers Ret. Sys., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2003), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glimcher-partners-v-teachers-ret-sys-unpublished-decision-5-20-2003-ohioctapp-2003.