Glick v. Greenleaf
This text of 403 N.E.2d 947 (Glick v. Greenleaf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiff has brought this action against her father in a Probate Court. From the judge’s findings of fact, we learn that the defendant and Jean Bruce Greenleaf, the plaintiff’s mother, were divorced on December 21, 1966, in Connecticut. A separation agreement, the material portion of which is set forth in the margin,1 was executed [607]*607by Jean Bruce Greenleaf and the defendant and incorporated into the judgment of divorce. At the time of the divorce, the defendant was employed by Morris Alper & Sons, Inc., which maintained a profit sharing retirement plan and trust in which the defendant was a participant. The defendant left Morris Alper & Sons, Inc., on or about December 21, 1966. Despite demands made on the defendant to make payments under clause 5(c) of the separation agreement, he failed to do so. On April 22, 1974, the defendant authorized the withdrawal of $18,570.41, his total share, from the profit sharing retirement plan and trust. With this amount he purchased a retirement deferred pension annuity contract from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, designating his attorney, Frank Mongillo of Connecticut, the primary revocable beneficiary. The plaintiff and her brother, the defendant’s son, are named contingent revocable beneficiaries. The annuity is assignable and it can be surrendered [608]*608for its cash value at any time. Jean Bruce Greenleaf died on September 14, 1976.
From a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $9,285.20, which is precisely one half the amount transferred from the profit sharing retirement plan and trust, the defendant appeals. He argues that the judge erred in his construction of the separation agreement and in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter. We agree with the defendant’s jurisdictional contention and hence we do not reach his grievance about the judge’s exegesis of the agreement.
The plaintiff seeks to recover money due her under a contract in writing. This classically calls for an action at law. The Probate Court has no jurisdiction of actions at law. See Prahl v. Prahl, 335 Mass. 483, 484 (1957). The plaintiff’s invocation of G. L. c. 215, § 6, is misplaced. See Charney v. Charney, 316 Mass. 580, 582-583 (1944). This is not an action between spouses to secure the wife’s separate property (see Gahm v. Gahm, 243 Mass. 374, 376 [1923]); nor an action concerning the estate of an infant (see Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79, 80 [1976]). This is not an action to enforce a trust. Coffey v. Rady, 267 Mass. 301, 303-304 (Í929). Mongillo, named as trustee in the separation agreement, is not joined in this action. This is an unadorned action in contract which is not cognizable under the general or statutory equity jurisdiction which reposes in the Probate Court. The plaintiff’s remedy at law is plain and complete as well as adequate within the meaning of G. L. c. 214, § 1A.
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been allowed. The judgment is reversed and a judgment is to be entered dismissing the, action.
So ordered.
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403 N.E.2d 947, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 606, 1980 Mass. App. LEXIS 1124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glick-v-greenleaf-massappct-1980.