Gleny Lino-Sabio v. William P. Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 23, 2020
Docket19-3820
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gleny Lino-Sabio v. William P. Barr (Gleny Lino-Sabio v. William P. Barr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gleny Lino-Sabio v. William P. Barr, (6th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0166n.06

No. 19-3820

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 23, 2020 GLENY LLESENIA LINO-SABIO; GLENY ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ROSARIO SUASO-LINO; ASHLEY ) YARELI SUASO-LINO, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW Petitioners, ) FROM THE UNITED STATES ) BOARD OF IMMIGRATION v. ) APPEALS ) WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, ) ) Respondent. )

BEFORE: GUY, THAPAR, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Gleny Llesenia Lino-Sabio and her two minor children petition this court

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily affirming the denial

of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (CAT). As set forth below, we DENY the petition for review.

Lino-Sabio and her two minor children, natives and citizens of Honduras, entered the

United States without inspection in July 2016. Shortly after their entry, the Department of

Homeland Security served Lino-Sabio and her children with notices to appear in removal

proceedings, charging them with removability as immigrants who, at the time of application for

admission, were not in possession of valid entry documents. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I),

1227(a)(1)(A). Lino-Sabio appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) and conceded removability

as charged. No. 19-3820, Lino-Sabio v. Barr

Lino-Sabio filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection

and included her children as derivative beneficiaries. Lino-Sabio asserted her fear of members of

the Mara 18 gang in Honduras and based her claims for asylum and withholding of removal on her

race, Garifuna, and on her membership in an alleged particular social group, the family of Cesar

Suazo. At the hearing on her application, Lino-Sabio testified that Cesar Suazo, her husband’s

nephew, was taken off a bus and killed by gang members in September 2013. Two years later, in

October 2015, two gang members came to Lino-Sabio’s house and asked her for money. When

Lino-Sabio did not understand the gang members because they were speaking Spanish and she

speaks Garifuna, the gang members hit her on her leg. Lino-Sabio testified that she fled with her

children to her mother’s house in another area of Honduras, where they stayed for about three

months. While Lino-Sabio was staying with her mother, gang members there asked her for money

and threatened to “kill me like they killed my nephew” if she did not pay. Lino-Sabio testified

that she is afraid that, if she returns to Honduras, gang members will kill her and her children.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ denied Lino-Sabio’s application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. With respect to her asylum claim, the IJ found that

Lino-Sabio had failed to demonstrate that the gang members targeted her on account of her

Garifuna race or her family connection to Cesar Suazo and that she was more likely “a victim of a

criminal enterprise for financial gain.” Because she had failed to satisfy the lower burden of proof

for asylum, the IJ determined, Lino-Sabio had necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent

standard for withholding of removal. As for her claim for CAT protection, the IJ found that Lino-

Sabio had failed to demonstrate that the gang members were acting in any official capacity or that

the Honduran government approved of or tolerated torture. The IJ concluded that Lino-Sabio’s

evidence fell short of demonstrating that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if

removed to Honduras. The IJ ordered that Lino-Sabio and her children be removed to Honduras.

-2- No. 19-3820, Lino-Sabio v. Barr

Lino-Sabio appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA but did not file a brief. The BIA affirmed

the IJ’s decision without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). This timely petition for review

followed.

Lino-Sabio first argues that the BIA’s streamlining procedure, which provides for summary

affirmance of the IJ’s decision without opinion, violates due process. This argument is foreclosed

by our decision in Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 729-30 (6th Cir. 2003), holding that the BIA’s

streamlining procedure does not violate a petitioner’s due process rights. Citing SEC v. Chenery

Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947), Lino-Sabio next asserts that, when an administrative action

is subject to judicial review, the agency must provide a reasoned basis for its decision. But this

argument “fails because the IJ’s opinion becomes the reasoned explanation needed for review.”

Denko, 351 F.3d at 729. Lino-Sabio further asserts that the BIA’s order does not indicate how her

case met the criteria for summary affirmance under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). However, “‘it makes

no practical difference whether the BIA properly or improperly streamlined review of [Lino-

Sabio’s] case,’ because when ‘we review directly the decision of the IJ when a case comes to us

from the BIA pursuant to [8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)], our ability to conduct a full and fair appraisal

of [her] case is not compromised.’” Denko, 351 F.3d at 732 (quoting Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328

F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003)). The BIA’s streamlining procedure did not violate Lino-Sabio’s

due process rights or administrative law principles.

Lino-Sabio next challenges the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT protection. Where, as here, “the BIA affirms the IJ without issuing its own

opinion, we review the IJ’s opinion.” Ndrecaj v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 667, 672 (6th Cir. 2008)

(citing Denko, F.3d at 723). We review the agency’s factual determinations for substantial

evidence, reversing only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

-3- No. 19-3820, Lino-Sabio v. Barr

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 293-94 (6th Cir.

2016).

Lino-Sabio, as an applicant for asylum, must demonstrate “that she meets the definition of

a ‘refugee,’ which means a person who is unable or unwilling to return to her home country

because of past persecution or a ‘well-founded fear’ of future persecution ‘on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Bonilla-

Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Lino-

Sabio must establish that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for

persecuting” her.

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