Glenn v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Glenn v. State

241 S.E.2d 447, 144 Ga. App. 557, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1682

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 4, 1978

Docket54768

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 241 S.E.2d 447 (Glenn v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Glenn v. State, 241 S.E.2d 447, 144 Ga. App. 557, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

Birdsong, Judge.

Appellant Glenn was convicted of the sale of heroin in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. In his sole enumeration of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s motion to dismiss. Held:

Appellant appears to argue that due process bars prosecution whenever a defendant suffers prejudice as a result of pre-arrest delay. Prejudice is alleged here as a result of appellant’s fading powers of recollection after a fifteen month pre-arrest, pre-indictment interval.

While the due process clause plays a limited role in protecting against oppressive delay, the primary guarantee against prosecution of overly stale criminal charges is provided by predictable, legislatively enacted statutes of limitation. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307 (92 SC 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971). The United States Supreme Court has held that"... to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” United States v. Lovasco, — U. S. — (97 SC 2044, 52 LE2d 752, 763) (1977). Where, as here, the investigating officer delayed the arrest due to a lack of sufficient identifying information, no due process violation appears. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Webb, J., concur.

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Birdsong, Judge.

Appellant Glenn was convicted of the sale of heroin in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. In his sole enumeration of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant’s motion to dismiss. Held:

Appellant appears to argue that due process bars prosecution whenever a defendant suffers prejudice as a result of pre-arrest delay. Prejudice is alleged here as a result of appellant’s fading powers of recollection after a fifteen month pre-arrest, pre-indictment interval.

While the due process clause plays a limited role in protecting against oppressive delay, the primary guarantee against prosecution of overly stale criminal charges is provided by predictable, legislatively enacted statutes of limitation. United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307 (92 SC 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971). The United States Supreme Court has held that"... to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” United States v. Lovasco, — U. S. — (97 SC 2044, 52 LE2d 752, 763) (1977). Where, as here, the investigating officer delayed the arrest due to a lack of sufficient identifying information, no due process violation appears. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Webb, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

241 S.E.2d 447, 144 Ga. App. 557, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 1682, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glenn-v-state-gactapp-1978.

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