UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
COLLINS LOUIS GLENN, III,
Petitioner, Civil No. 2:22-CV-12122 Honorable George Caram Steeh v.
MICHELLE FLOYD,
Respondent. ____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER HOLDING IN ABEYANCE THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING THE CASE
Collins Louis Glenn, III, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(f), and assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84. Petitioner filed a motion hold the petition in abeyance to permit him to return to the state courts to present additional claims that have not been - 1 - exhausted with the state courts and that are not included in his current habeas petition.
The petition is held in abeyance; the proceedings are stayed under the terms outlined in this opinion to permit Petitioner to return to the state courts to exhaust his additional claims. The Court administratively closes
the case. I. Background Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. People v. Glenn, No.
341721, 2020 WL 3621289 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2020); lv. den. 508 Mich. 958, 965 N.W.2d 101 (2021). Petitioner filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner
seeks habeas relief on the grounds stated in the claims that he raised in the state courts on his direct appeal. Petitioner has also filed a motion to hold the petition abeyance so that he can return to the state court to exhaust additional claims which are not
included in the petition and were never presented to the state courts and/or improperly presented due to the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
- 2 - II. Discussion A federal district court has the authority to stay a fully exhausted
federal habeas petition pending the exhaustion of additional claims in the state courts. See Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69, 77-79 (1st Cir. 2002)(holding that district courts should “take
seriously any request for a stay.”); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Bowling v. Haeberline, 246 F. App’x 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2007)(a habeas court is entitled to delay a decision in a habeas petition that contains only exhausted claims “when considerations of comity and
judicial economy would be served”)(quoting Nowaczyk, 299 F.3d at 83); see also Thomas v. Stoddard, 89 F. Supp. 3d 937, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Although a district court has the option to dismiss a fully-exhausted habeas
petition where a habeas petitioner’s unexhausted claims are pending in state court, for a federal court to justify departing from the “heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction,” there must be some compelling reason to prefer a dismissal over a stay. Nowaczyk, 299 F.3d at 82 (internal quotation
omitted); see also Bowling, 246 F. App’x at 306 (district court erred in dismissing petition containing only exhausted claims, as opposed to
- 3 - exercising its jurisdiction over petition, merely because petitioner had independent proceeding pending in state court involving other claims).
The motion to hold the petition in abeyance is granted. The outright dismissal of the petition, albeit without prejudice, could preclude the consideration of Petitioner’s claims in this Court due to the expiration of the
one year statute of limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A common circumstance that justifies holding a habeas petition in abeyance arises when the original petition was timely filed, but a second, exhausted habeas
petition would be time barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Hargrove v. Brigano, 300 F.3d 717, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2002). Other considerations support holding the petition in abeyance while
Petitioner exhausts his new claims. In particular, “the Court considers the consequences to the habeas petitioner if it were to proceed to adjudicate the petition and find that relief is not warranted before the state courts ruled on unexhausted claims. In that scenario, should the petitioner
subsequently seek habeas relief on the claims the state courts rejected, he would have to clear the high hurdle of filing a second habeas petition.” Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 942 (citing 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)). Moreover,
- 4 - “[I]f this Court were to proceed in parallel with state post-conviction proceedings, there is a risk of wasting judicial resources if the state court
might grant relief on the unexhausted claim.” Id. Moreover, this Court is currently not in a position to determine whether Petitioner’s new claims have any merit; the Court cannot say that
Petitioner’s claims are “plainly meritless.” Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943. Nor, on the other hand, can the Court at this time say that Petitioner’s new claims plainly warrant habeas relief. Id. If the state courts deny post- conviction relief, this Court could still benefit from the state courts’ ruling on
these claims in determining whether to permit Petitioner to amend his petition to add these claims. Id. Finally, this Court sees no prejudice to respondent in staying this case, whereas Petitioner “could be prejudiced by
having to simultaneously fight two proceedings in separate courts and, as noted, if this Court were to rule before the state courts, [petitioner] would have the heavy burden of satisfying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s second-or- successive-petition requirements” should he seek habeas relief on his new
claims. Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943. However, even where a district court determines that a stay is appropriate pending exhaustion, the district court “should place reasonable
- 5 - time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). To ensure that there are no delays by Petitioner
in exhausting state court remedies, this Court imposes time limits within which Petitioner must proceed with his state court post-conviction proceedings. See Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Court holds the petition in abeyance to allow Petitioner to initiate post-conviction proceedings in the state courts. This tolling is conditioned upon Petitioner initiating his state post-conviction remedies within ninety days of receiving this Court’s order and returning to federal court within
ninety days of completing the exhaustion of state court post-conviction remedies. Hargrove, 300 F.3d at 721. Petitioner’s method of properly exhausting these claims in the state
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
COLLINS LOUIS GLENN, III,
Petitioner, Civil No. 2:22-CV-12122 Honorable George Caram Steeh v.
MICHELLE FLOYD,
Respondent. ____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER HOLDING IN ABEYANCE THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING THE CASE
Collins Louis Glenn, III, (“Petitioner”), confined at the Cooper Street Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(1)(f), and assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84. Petitioner filed a motion hold the petition in abeyance to permit him to return to the state courts to present additional claims that have not been - 1 - exhausted with the state courts and that are not included in his current habeas petition.
The petition is held in abeyance; the proceedings are stayed under the terms outlined in this opinion to permit Petitioner to return to the state courts to exhaust his additional claims. The Court administratively closes
the case. I. Background Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. People v. Glenn, No.
341721, 2020 WL 3621289 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2020); lv. den. 508 Mich. 958, 965 N.W.2d 101 (2021). Petitioner filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner
seeks habeas relief on the grounds stated in the claims that he raised in the state courts on his direct appeal. Petitioner has also filed a motion to hold the petition abeyance so that he can return to the state court to exhaust additional claims which are not
included in the petition and were never presented to the state courts and/or improperly presented due to the alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
- 2 - II. Discussion A federal district court has the authority to stay a fully exhausted
federal habeas petition pending the exhaustion of additional claims in the state courts. See Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69, 77-79 (1st Cir. 2002)(holding that district courts should “take
seriously any request for a stay.”); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Bowling v. Haeberline, 246 F. App’x 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2007)(a habeas court is entitled to delay a decision in a habeas petition that contains only exhausted claims “when considerations of comity and
judicial economy would be served”)(quoting Nowaczyk, 299 F.3d at 83); see also Thomas v. Stoddard, 89 F. Supp. 3d 937, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Although a district court has the option to dismiss a fully-exhausted habeas
petition where a habeas petitioner’s unexhausted claims are pending in state court, for a federal court to justify departing from the “heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction,” there must be some compelling reason to prefer a dismissal over a stay. Nowaczyk, 299 F.3d at 82 (internal quotation
omitted); see also Bowling, 246 F. App’x at 306 (district court erred in dismissing petition containing only exhausted claims, as opposed to
- 3 - exercising its jurisdiction over petition, merely because petitioner had independent proceeding pending in state court involving other claims).
The motion to hold the petition in abeyance is granted. The outright dismissal of the petition, albeit without prejudice, could preclude the consideration of Petitioner’s claims in this Court due to the expiration of the
one year statute of limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A common circumstance that justifies holding a habeas petition in abeyance arises when the original petition was timely filed, but a second, exhausted habeas
petition would be time barred by the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Hargrove v. Brigano, 300 F.3d 717, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2002). Other considerations support holding the petition in abeyance while
Petitioner exhausts his new claims. In particular, “the Court considers the consequences to the habeas petitioner if it were to proceed to adjudicate the petition and find that relief is not warranted before the state courts ruled on unexhausted claims. In that scenario, should the petitioner
subsequently seek habeas relief on the claims the state courts rejected, he would have to clear the high hurdle of filing a second habeas petition.” Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 942 (citing 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)). Moreover,
- 4 - “[I]f this Court were to proceed in parallel with state post-conviction proceedings, there is a risk of wasting judicial resources if the state court
might grant relief on the unexhausted claim.” Id. Moreover, this Court is currently not in a position to determine whether Petitioner’s new claims have any merit; the Court cannot say that
Petitioner’s claims are “plainly meritless.” Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943. Nor, on the other hand, can the Court at this time say that Petitioner’s new claims plainly warrant habeas relief. Id. If the state courts deny post- conviction relief, this Court could still benefit from the state courts’ ruling on
these claims in determining whether to permit Petitioner to amend his petition to add these claims. Id. Finally, this Court sees no prejudice to respondent in staying this case, whereas Petitioner “could be prejudiced by
having to simultaneously fight two proceedings in separate courts and, as noted, if this Court were to rule before the state courts, [petitioner] would have the heavy burden of satisfying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s second-or- successive-petition requirements” should he seek habeas relief on his new
claims. Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943. However, even where a district court determines that a stay is appropriate pending exhaustion, the district court “should place reasonable
- 5 - time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). To ensure that there are no delays by Petitioner
in exhausting state court remedies, this Court imposes time limits within which Petitioner must proceed with his state court post-conviction proceedings. See Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Court holds the petition in abeyance to allow Petitioner to initiate post-conviction proceedings in the state courts. This tolling is conditioned upon Petitioner initiating his state post-conviction remedies within ninety days of receiving this Court’s order and returning to federal court within
ninety days of completing the exhaustion of state court post-conviction remedies. Hargrove, 300 F.3d at 721. Petitioner’s method of properly exhausting these claims in the state
courts would be through filing a motion for relief from judgment with the Wayne County Circuit Court under M.C.R. 6.502. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 2009). Denial of a motion for relief from judgment is reviewable by the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan
Supreme Court upon the filing of an application for leave to appeal. M.C.R. 6.509; M.C.R. 7.203; M.C.R. 7.302. Nasr v. Stegall, 978 F. Supp. 714, 717 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Petitioner, in fact, is required to appeal the denial of his
- 6 - post-conviction motion to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court in order to properly exhaust any claims that he would raise
in his post-conviction motion. See e.g. Mohn v. Bock, 208 F. Supp. 2d 796, 800 (E.D. Mich. 2002). III. ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the proceedings are STAYED and the Court will hold the habeas petition in abeyance. Petitioner must file a motion for relief from judgment in state court within ninety days of receipt of this order. He shall notify this Court in writing that such motion papers
have been filed in state court. If he fails to file a motion or notify the Court that he has done so, the Court will lift the stay and will reinstate the original petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Court’s active docket and will
proceed to adjudicate only those claims that were raised in the original petition. After Petitioner fully exhausts his new claims, he shall file an amended petition that includes the new claims within ninety days after the conclusion of his state court post-conviction proceedings, along with a
motion to lift the stay. Failure to do so will result in the Court lifting the stay and adjudicating the merits of the claims raised in the original habeas petition.
- 7 - To avoid administrative difficulties, the Court ORDERS the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case for statistical purposes only. Nothing in this
order or in the related docket entry shall be considered a dismissal or disposition of this matter. See Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943-944. It is further ORDERED that upon receipt of a motion to reinstate the
habeas petition following exhaustion of state remedies, the Court will order the Clerk to reopen this case for statistical purposes. SO ORDERED. Dated: September 13, 2022 s/George Caram Steeh GEORGE CARAM STEEH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on September 13, 2022, by electronic and/or ordinary mail and also on Collins Louis Glenn #427290, Cooper Street Correctional Facility, 3100 Cooper Street, Jackson, MI 49201.
s/Brianna Sauve Deputy Clerk
- 8 -