Glenn Harden v. Absolute Home Mortgage Corp

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-2009
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2009 __________

GLENN HARDEN, Appellant

v.

ABSOLUTE HOME MORTGAGE CORPORATION; CALIBER HOME LOANS INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS (MERS); MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC; ICE MORTGAGE TECHNOLOGY; NEWREZ LLC; SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-10402) District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 20, 2026 Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 26, 2026) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Glenn Harden appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his

complaint. We will affirm.

In November 2024, Harden sought to file an in forma pauperis (“IFP”) complaint

related to the defendants’ alleged failure to provide him with notices and disclosures for

the mortgage on his New Jersey property. He brought claims under the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, and various criminal statutes. The District Court granted his IFP motion, screened

the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and dismissed the claims brought under the

criminal statutes, concluding that they were frivolous because the statutes that Harden

cited did not provide a civil cause of action. The defendants then moved to dismiss the

remaining claims. Harden filed responses that opposed the motion and requested

reconsideration of the District Court’s order dismissing his claims brought under the

criminal statutes. The District Court denied Harden’s motion for reconsideration and

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that each of the remaining claims

was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. This appeal ensued.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over

the District Court’s dismissal orders. See Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir.

2022), Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). A claim is frivolous where it

depends “on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ or a ‘clearly baseless’ or ‘fantastic or

delusional’ factual scenario.” Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citations omitted). Dismissal for

failure to state a claim is appropriate where a complaint has not alleged “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

2 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). We may affirm a District Court’s order on any basis supported by the

record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

We agree with the Appellees that Harden has forfeited any argument regarding his

claims that were dismissed based on the statute of limitations. See In re Wettach, 811

F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that litigants forfeit claims that they fail to develop in

an opening brief). And we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Harden’s other

claims, which were based on criminal statutes that he cited at the end of his complaint,

were frivolous. See generally Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,

511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (refusing to infer a private right of action from a “bare criminal

statute”).

To the extent that Harden has argued that the District Court should have liberally

construed the complaint to include a civil RICO claim, we discern no error. Harden’s

complaint contained no plausible factual allegations that the defendants here were

engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, and his vague pleadings under the criminal

RICO provision at the end of his complaint failed to set forth the elements of a civil

RICO claim. See generally Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 355–67 (3d Cir. 1989)

(discussing the specificity necessary to plead civil RICO claims).

Harden has failed to develop any argument regarding the District Court’s

dismissal of his claims with prejudice and the District Court’s denial of his request for

reconsideration. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d at 115. In any event, we discern no abuse

of discretion here. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010)

3 (discussing the standards governing a motion for reconsideration); Shane v. Fauver, 213

F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that amendment of a complaint would be futile

if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted”) (citation modified). Harden argues that the District Court should not have

canceled an oral hearing on the motion to dismiss, but we conclude that the District Court

properly ruled on the motion after affording Harden the opportunity to file two written

responses. See Dougherty v. Harper’s Mag. Co., 537 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1976).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.1

1 We grant the Appellees’ motion to supplement the appendix. 4