IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00135-CV
GLENN BRANTLEY, Appellant v.
OAK GROVE POWER COMPANY LCC, LUMINANT GENERATION COMPANY LCC, LUMINANT AND ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP., Appellees
From the 82nd District Court Robertson County, Texas Trial Court No. 10-10-18681-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Glenn Brantley filed suit against Oak Grove Power Company LLC, Luminant
Generation Company LLC, Luminant, and Energy Future Holdings Corporation for
negligence.1 Luminant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging both traditional
1 We will collectively refer to the appellees as Luminant. and no evidence grounds. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment,
and Brantley appeals. We affirm.
Background Facts
Brantley was employed by Fluor Enterprises as an iron worker at the Oak Grove
SES Power Plant construction project in Franklin, Texas. On October 22, 2008, Brantley
was at the job site standing near a “job box” looking over blueprints and preparing for
his work that day. He was wearing denim work pants and steel toed boots. Brantley
felt a sharp stinging sensation on the inside of his left knee. He flinched upon feeling
the sting and punctured the inside of his knee on a piece of metal protruding from the
“job box.” Brantley alleges that the stinging sensation he felt was from a spider bite.
He developed an infection from the spider bite and the puncture wound.
Summary Judgment
Brantley argues in six issues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting
Luminant’s motion for summary judgment. In the first issue, Brantley contends that the
trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based upon the doctrine
of animals ferae naturae. In issues two and six, Brantley argues that the trial court erred
in granting Luminant’s motion for summary judgment based upon Chapter 95 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In issues three and four, Brantley complains
that Luminant owed an independent duty of care. In issue five Brantley argues that
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding multiple elements of Brantley’s
negligence cause of action.
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 2 We review the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When the trial court
does not specify the grounds upon which it ruled, the summary judgment may be
affirmed if any of the grounds stated in the motion are meritorious. Western
Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).
The movant for a traditional summary judgment must show there are no genuine
issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A
defendant, as movant, is entitled to summary judgment if he (1) disproves at least one
element of the plaintiff's theory of recovery; or (2) pleads and conclusively establishes
each essential element of an affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause
of action. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997).
A party may move for summary judgment on the ground there is no evidence of
one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would
have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Western Investments, Inc. v.
Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550. The court must grant the motion unless the respondent
produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on those
elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Merrell Dow Pharmacy., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,
711 (Tex. 1997).
Animals Ferae Naturae
Luminant argued in its motion for summary judgment that it did not owe a duty
to Brantley under the doctrine of animals ferae naturae. In the first issue, Brantley
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 3 argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based
upon the doctrine.
To prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must establish the
existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the
breach. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987). The threshold inquiry in
a negligence case is duty. Id. The question of duty turns on the foreseeability of
harmful consequences, which is the underlying basis for negligence. Corbin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983); Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Tex.
App.─San Antonio 1999, no writ). The existence of a duty is a question of law for the
court to decide from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Walker v. Harris,
924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996); Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 59.
The doctrine of animals ferae naturae means "animals of a wild nature or
disposition," and is a common law doctrine tracing its origins back to the Roman empire
whereby wild animals are presumed to be owned by no one specifically but by the
people generally. Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 60. The doctrine provides that wild
animals belong to the state and that no individual property rights exist as long as the
animal remains wild, unconfined, and undomesticated. Id. Unqualified property rights
in wild animals can arise when they are legally removed from their natural liberty and
made the subject of man's dominion. Id.
A landowner cannot be held liable for the acts of animals ferae naturae, that is,
indigenous wild animals, occurring on his or her property unless the landowner has
actually reduced the wild animals to possession or control, or introduced a non-
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 4 indigenous animal into the area. Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 60. Brantley contends
that the Court in Nicholson found that a landowner is not liable for the acts of animals
ferae naturae in a strict liability claim. He argues because he is pursuing a negligence
claim, Luminant owed him a duty.
In Nicholson, the plaintiff was stung by fire ants while staying at a recreational
park. The Court found that the plaintiff was attacked by indigenous wild animals in
their natural habitat, in the normal course of their existence. Nicholson v. Smith, 986
S.W.2d at 62. The defendants did nothing to cause the fire ants to act outside of their
expected and normal behavior. Id. The plaintiff was not injured while in an artificial
structure, nor was he injured where fire ants would not normally be found, nor was the
presence of the fire ants due to any affirmative or negligent act of the defendants
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12-00135-CV
GLENN BRANTLEY, Appellant v.
OAK GROVE POWER COMPANY LCC, LUMINANT GENERATION COMPANY LCC, LUMINANT AND ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP., Appellees
From the 82nd District Court Robertson County, Texas Trial Court No. 10-10-18681-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Glenn Brantley filed suit against Oak Grove Power Company LLC, Luminant
Generation Company LLC, Luminant, and Energy Future Holdings Corporation for
negligence.1 Luminant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging both traditional
1 We will collectively refer to the appellees as Luminant. and no evidence grounds. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment,
and Brantley appeals. We affirm.
Background Facts
Brantley was employed by Fluor Enterprises as an iron worker at the Oak Grove
SES Power Plant construction project in Franklin, Texas. On October 22, 2008, Brantley
was at the job site standing near a “job box” looking over blueprints and preparing for
his work that day. He was wearing denim work pants and steel toed boots. Brantley
felt a sharp stinging sensation on the inside of his left knee. He flinched upon feeling
the sting and punctured the inside of his knee on a piece of metal protruding from the
“job box.” Brantley alleges that the stinging sensation he felt was from a spider bite.
He developed an infection from the spider bite and the puncture wound.
Summary Judgment
Brantley argues in six issues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting
Luminant’s motion for summary judgment. In the first issue, Brantley contends that the
trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based upon the doctrine
of animals ferae naturae. In issues two and six, Brantley argues that the trial court erred
in granting Luminant’s motion for summary judgment based upon Chapter 95 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In issues three and four, Brantley complains
that Luminant owed an independent duty of care. In issue five Brantley argues that
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding multiple elements of Brantley’s
negligence cause of action.
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 2 We review the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When the trial court
does not specify the grounds upon which it ruled, the summary judgment may be
affirmed if any of the grounds stated in the motion are meritorious. Western
Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).
The movant for a traditional summary judgment must show there are no genuine
issues of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). A
defendant, as movant, is entitled to summary judgment if he (1) disproves at least one
element of the plaintiff's theory of recovery; or (2) pleads and conclusively establishes
each essential element of an affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause
of action. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997).
A party may move for summary judgment on the ground there is no evidence of
one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would
have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Western Investments, Inc. v.
Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550. The court must grant the motion unless the respondent
produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on those
elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Merrell Dow Pharmacy., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,
711 (Tex. 1997).
Animals Ferae Naturae
Luminant argued in its motion for summary judgment that it did not owe a duty
to Brantley under the doctrine of animals ferae naturae. In the first issue, Brantley
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 3 argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based
upon the doctrine.
To prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must establish the
existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the
breach. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987). The threshold inquiry in
a negligence case is duty. Id. The question of duty turns on the foreseeability of
harmful consequences, which is the underlying basis for negligence. Corbin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983); Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Tex.
App.─San Antonio 1999, no writ). The existence of a duty is a question of law for the
court to decide from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question. Walker v. Harris,
924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996); Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 59.
The doctrine of animals ferae naturae means "animals of a wild nature or
disposition," and is a common law doctrine tracing its origins back to the Roman empire
whereby wild animals are presumed to be owned by no one specifically but by the
people generally. Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 60. The doctrine provides that wild
animals belong to the state and that no individual property rights exist as long as the
animal remains wild, unconfined, and undomesticated. Id. Unqualified property rights
in wild animals can arise when they are legally removed from their natural liberty and
made the subject of man's dominion. Id.
A landowner cannot be held liable for the acts of animals ferae naturae, that is,
indigenous wild animals, occurring on his or her property unless the landowner has
actually reduced the wild animals to possession or control, or introduced a non-
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 4 indigenous animal into the area. Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 60. Brantley contends
that the Court in Nicholson found that a landowner is not liable for the acts of animals
ferae naturae in a strict liability claim. He argues because he is pursuing a negligence
claim, Luminant owed him a duty.
In Nicholson, the plaintiff was stung by fire ants while staying at a recreational
park. The Court found that the plaintiff was attacked by indigenous wild animals in
their natural habitat, in the normal course of their existence. Nicholson v. Smith, 986
S.W.2d at 62. The defendants did nothing to cause the fire ants to act outside of their
expected and normal behavior. Id. The plaintiff was not injured while in an artificial
structure, nor was he injured where fire ants would not normally be found, nor was the
presence of the fire ants due to any affirmative or negligent act of the defendants
bringing them upon the property or drawing them to the area where the plaintiff was
stung. Id.
The Court in Nicholson noted that the existence of a duty is a question of law for
the court to decide from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question, and the Court
did not find that the facts surrounding the occurrence in question supported the
imposition of a duty. Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 62. The Court stated:
We do not say a landowner can never be negligent with regard to the indigenous wild animals found on its property. A premises owner could be negligent with regard to wild animals found in artificial structures or places where they are not normally found; that is, stores, hotels, apartment houses, or billboards, if the landowner knows or should know of the unreasonable risk of harm posed by an animal on its premises, and cannot expect patrons to realize the danger or guard against it.
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 5 Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 63.
Brantley contends that Luminant provided building materials that had been left
in a field and were infested with spiders and spider webs and that he was in an artificial
structure. However, Brantley was at a construction site standing on a concrete slab with
a partial structure and no roof. He stated in his deposition that there were spiders
everywhere in the field at the construction site and that he was aware of their presence.
Brantley was bit by a spider in its natural habitat in the normal course of its existence.
See Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d at 62. The presence of the spiders was not due to any
affirmative or negligent act of Luminant bringing them onto the property or drawing
them to the area. See id. Luminant did not owe Brantley a duty under the doctrine of
animals ferae naturae. The trial court did not err in granting Luminant’s motion for
summary judgment. We overrule Brantley’s first issue. Because of our disposition of
the first issue, we need not address the remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AL SCOGGINS Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed November 29, 2012 [CV06]
Brantley v. Oak Grove Power Company LCC Page 6