Glendon B. Sturgill, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 21, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-602
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 21 2018, 10:34 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Paul J. Podlejski Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Glendon B. Sturgill, Jr., November 21, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-602 v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Warner Appellee-Plaintiff. Sims, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 48C01-1708-F4-1952 48C01-1604-F5-776

Robb, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 1 of 9 Case Summary and Issue [1] Following a jury trial, Glendon Sturgill, Jr., was convicted of dealing in

methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, and sentenced to eight years in the

Indiana Department of Correction with three years suspended to probation.

Sturgill appeals his conviction, raising one issue for our review: whether the

trial court committed fundamental error in admitting evidence Sturgill claims

was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Concluding

Sturgill has not demonstrated fundamental error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Over a period of several weeks in 2016, Detective LeeAnn Dwiggins of the

Madison County Drug Task Force received multiple reports that

methamphetamine was being cooked at a particular residence in Madison

County. Detective Dwiggins identified Sturgill and his girlfriend, Melissa

Bowman, as the occupants of the residence and determined they each had made

multiple purchases of pseudoephedrine and had been blocked from making

further purchases on several other occasions.1

1 Although there was no specific time frame given for the purchases, Officer Dwiggins testified that Sturgill had made seventy-one purchases of pseudoephedrine and had been blocked from purchasing pseudoephedrine on an additional eighteen occasions. Bowman had made eighty-six purchases and had been blocked on fifteen occasions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 2 of 9 [3] On April 13, 2016, Detective Dwiggins, who had been monitoring the logs of

pseudoephedrine purchases, noticed Bowman had made a purchase of

pseudoephedrine that day. Around 9:00 p.m., Detective Dwiggins,

accompanied by three other officers, went to the residence. As Officer

Dwiggins walked around the house trying to get to an unobstructed door to

knock and talk with the occupants, she noticed a strong chemical odor she

knew from her training and experience to be associated with the manufacture of

methamphetamine. As she returned to the front of the house to tell the other

officers what she had found, she encountered Sturgill in the driveway,

immediately handcuffed him, and asked if anyone else was on the property.

Sturgill said Bowman was in the detached garage and his daughter was inside

the house. Officers entered the residence and the garage to evacuate the

occupants. While in the garage, Detective Dwiggins observed

methamphetamine actively cooking. Sturgill and Bowman were advised of

their rights and gave their verbal and written consent to a search of the

property. The search yielded items associated with the manufacture of

methamphetamine.

[4] The State charged Sturgill with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony,

and attempted dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony.2 Sturgill filed a

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his property,

2 Additional counts of possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of methamphetamine, all Level 6 felonies, were dismissed by the State prior to trial.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 3 of 9 including physical evidence and statements he made to the officers during the

search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the police had a

legitimate reason to be on the property and the chemical odors they

encountered once there created exigent circumstances supporting further action.

At Sturgill’s request, the trial court certified its order denying the motion to

suppress but this court denied Sturgill’s motion to accept jurisdiction over an

interlocutory appeal. At Sturgill’s jury trial, when the State offered various

items of evidence from the search into evidence,3 Sturgill affirmatively stated he

had no objection to admission of the exhibits. The jury found Sturgill guilty on

both counts. The trial court entered judgment of conviction only on the Level 4

felony attempted dealing in methamphetamine charge and sentenced Sturgill to

eight years with three years suspended to probation. Sturgill now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [5] Sturgill contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized during the

search of his property and the statements derived therefrom because the search

was conducted in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. A trial

court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence.

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An

3 The exhibits included twenty-two photographs in and around the garage, a vial of methamphetamine oil, and lab results.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 4 of 9 abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the

logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Id. “A contemporaneous objection at

the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for

appeal, whether or not the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress.”

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of the

contemporaneous objection rule is to allow the trial judge to consider the

evidentiary issue in light of any “fresh developments and also to correct any

errors.” Id.

[6] Here, Sturgill acknowledges that, despite his pretrial motion to suppress, he did

not object to the admission of the evidence or statements at trial. See

Appellant’s Brief at 9 (noting Sturgill’s trial counsel “failed to raise an objection

to the admission of the evidence . . . throughout the course of the trial”). In

fact, not only did Sturgill fail to object to the trial court’s admission of each

piece of evidence he now attempts to challenge on appeal, he affirmatively

stated that he had “no objection” to admission. See Transcript, Volume II at

214 (photographs of the property); Tr., Vol. III at 55 (items recovered from the

property); 73 (lab report on vial of oil); and 75 (vial of methamphetamine oil).

To avoid waiver of the issue, Sturgill contends the trial court committed

fundamental error in allowing admission of the evidence. The fundamental

error doctrine is an exception to the general rule that failure to object at trial

constitutes procedural default precluding consideration of the issue on appeal.

Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 5 of 9 The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

II. Fundamental Error [7] Our supreme court has held that fundamental error is not available when the

defendant affirmatively states he has no objection to proffered evidence because

in such a case, the defendant has invited the error in its admission. Halliburton

v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678-79 (Ind. 2013) (“The appellant cannot on the one

hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and

thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.”). “A finding of

fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred . . . by not acting

when he or she should have, even without being spurred to action by a timely

objection.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (internal citation

omitted); see also Winston v. State, 165 Ind.App. 369, 376, 332 N.E.2d 229, 233

(1975) (noting in cases in which fundamental error is found, “the error involved

the mistake or misconduct of the trial judge in the exercise of his own

affirmative duties”). Without a contemporaneous objection, a trial court has no

cause to reconsider its earlier evidentiary ruling. See, e.g., Brown, 929 N.E.2d at

207. And upon the defendant’s express declaration of “no objection,” the trial

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 6 of 9 court has no obligation to interject itself on a defendant’s behalf and determine

for itself whether the introduction of a particular piece of evidence was in the

defendant’s best interests. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 679; see also Brewington, 7

N.E.3d at 975 (noting that fundamental error and invited error are closely

related and that “fundamental error gives us leeway to mitigate the

consequences of counsel’s oversights, but invited error precludes relief from

counsel’s strategic decisions gone awry”). Thus, Sturgill has not shown any

error by the trial court in not acting when it had a duty to do so.

[8] Moreover, in Brown v. State, our supreme court concluded that a claim of error

premised on admitting evidence that was the product of an unconstitutional

search and seizure, without more, does not assert fundamental error where

there is “no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance” on the part

of the investigating officers or where there is no claim the “evidence is not what

it appears to be.” 929 N.E.2d at 207. Sturgill does not allege that evidence was

fabricated or that the challenged evidence is not what it appears to be. He does

assert that Dwiggins’ conduct was willful malfeasance because she knew she

did not have probable cause that Sturgill was engaged in any illegal activity

when officers entered the property. See Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.

[9] “Malfeasance” is defined as:

Evil doing; ill conduct. The commission of some act which is positively unlawful; the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful and unlawful; the doing of an act which person ought not to do at all or the unjust performance of some act which the party had no right or which he had contracted not to do.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 7 of 9 Black’s Law Dictionary at 956 (9th ed. 2009). The trial court has already

addressed Sturgill’s claim that the evidence was unlawfully seized because

officers should not have entered his property and determined during the motion

to suppress proceedings that the officers had acted reasonably in entering the

property and conducting the search. Sturgill’s argument on appeal does not

allege anything further that would rise to the level of malfeasance, willful or

otherwise. Even if the officers had been mistaken in their assessment of the

circumstances, this does not rise to the level of willful malfeasance. See Mamon

v. State, 6 N.E.3d 488, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting claim of fundamental

error where defendant argued officer misunderstood the traffic law that formed

the basis for a stop but did not dispute the truth of the officer’s testimony or

exhibits). In Brown, the court noted that admission of evidence as the result of

an improper seizure is not per se fundamental error: “because improperly

seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, its admission ordinarily does not

cause us to question guilt.” 929 N.E.2d at 207.

[10] For these reasons, Sturgill’s claim does not allege fundamental error and we

decline to review Sturgill’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence. See id.

at 208 (explaining that it is not necessary to resolve the issue of whether a

search was lawful where the defendant had failed to preserve the issue at trial

and where there was no fundamental error).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 8 of 9 Conclusion [11] Because Sturgill affirmatively consented to the admission of the evidence he

now challenges as improperly admitted and because his claim is premised on an

admission of evidence from an allegedly unconstitutional search, without more,

his claim is not reviewable for fundamental error, and his conviction is

affirmed.

[12] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 9 of 9