SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
GLENDALE SHOOTING CLUB, INC., ) Opinion issued March 21, 2023 A Missouri Non-Profit Corporation, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC99701 ) WILLIAM K. LANDOLT and ) JERI F. LANDOLT, ) ) Appellants. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY The Honorable Craig E. Hellman, Judge
William K. Landolt and Jeri F. Cashin 1 (collectively, the “Landolts”) appeal the
circuit court’s entry of summary judgment for Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. The Landolts
claim the circuit court erred in dissolving a permanent injunction that placed restrictions
on Glendale’s firing range operations. Because Glendale relied exclusively on a change in
law to support its motion for summary judgment and did not assert uncontroverted material
1 Jeri Cashin’s last name was erroneously listed in this matter as Landolt. For ease of reference, the appellants are referred to as the Landolts because that is how the appellants have been referred to throughout this litigation and in prior litigation involving the dispute at issue. facts demonstrating the change in law rendered the continued enforcement of the injunction
inequitable, the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment. This Court vacates the
circuit court’s judgment and remands the case for additional proceedings consistent with
this Court’s opinion.
Background
In 1967, Raymond and Veronica Racine acquired approximately 78 acres of
property in Franklin County that included a home and outbuildings. In 1976, Glendale
acquired approximately 107 acres immediately adjacent to the Racines’ property. Glendale
acquired this property for use as a gun club and firing range. In 1983, the Racines filed a
petition in the circuit court seeking injunctive relief against Glendale. The Racines’
petition claimed Glendale utilized its land “for target practice, local, regional and national
shooting matches conducted with automatic weapons, handguns, shotguns and high
powered rifles” and that noise from Glendale’s property “on a daily basis at all hours of
the day and night” could be “plainly and loudly heard at [the Racines’] residence, even
when the doors and windows to said residence are fully closed.” Accordingly, the Racines
asked the circuit court to permanently enjoin Glendale from conducting target practice and
shooting matches on its property.
In 1987, the circuit court entered injunctive relief limiting operation of the firing
range. The court found,
“at the date of the filing of the Petition and for a period of at least five years then preceding and up to the date of trial, the use of [Glendale’s] land as described by the evidence constituted an abatable continuing temporary nuisance and that such use was unreasonable and unusual to the extent that it
2 substantially impaired the right of the [Racines] to peacefully enjoy their own adjoining land.”
The court found stray bullets or ricochets on several occasions either hit the Racines’ land
or violated their land’s airspace. The court further found “[t]he evidence presented did
convince the court that the sustained noise found by the court to be a nuisance did cause
actual inconvenience and physical discomfort to the [Racines.]” Accordingly, the court
“permanently enjoined [Glendale] from using or permitting the use of its land and facilities
… in such a manner as to constitute a nuisance.”
The court’s permanent injunction did not completely ban the operation of the firing
range as the Racines requested but limited Glendale’s shooting operations to abate the
trespass and nuisance. Pursuant to the injunction, Glendale was limited to holding only 10
shooting matches per year. Shooting or discharging firearms was restricted to certain times
during the day and certain days of the week. There were also limitations on the number of
persons shooting handguns or rifles at any given time. Both Glendale and the Racines
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment entering injunctive
relief. Racine v. Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. App. 1988).
In 1988, the General Assembly enacted section 537.294. 2 The language of the
statute purports to grant firearm ranges immunity from nuisance and trespass actions and
prohibit courts from enjoining the use or operation of firearm ranges on the basis of noise
2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise noted. Section 537.294 was last amended in 2008.
3 or sound emission. 3 In 1989, the Racines sold their property to the Landolts. In 1998,
Glendale moved to dissolve the permanent injunction. Glendale claimed the injunction
had been rendered absurd and unjust due to the enactment of section 537.294, RSMo 1994,
and also due to material modifications made to the shooting range for noise abatement
purposes. The circuit court dismissed Glendale’s motion to dissolve the permanent
injunction, and Glendale appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment. Landolt v. Glendale
Shooting Club, Inc., 18 S.W.3d 101,106 (Mo. App. 2000). The court of appeals did not
reach the merits of Glendale’s motion to set aside the injunction. Rather, it found the circuit
court erred in dismissing Glendale’s motion. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals reversed
the judgment because the circuit court erred in finding section 537.294, RSMo 1994,
inapplicable due to the injunction being entered prior to the statute’s effective date. Id. at
105-06. The court of appeals remanded the case for the circuit court to consider the effect
of section 537.294, RSMo 1994, on the enforcement of the injunction and to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the injunction was “absurd or unjust” in light of
3 Section 537.294.2 provides in full: All owners and authorized users of firearm ranges shall be immune from any criminal and civil liability arising out of or as a consequence of noise or sound emission resulting from the use of any such firearm range. Owners and users of such firearm ranges shall not be subject to any civil action in tort or subject to any action for public or private nuisance or trespass and no court in this state shall enjoin the use or operation of such firearm ranges on the basis of noise or sound emission resulting from the use of any such firearm range. Any actions by a court in this state to enjoin the use or operation of such firearm ranges and any damages awarded or imposed by a court, or assessed by a jury, in this state against any owner or user of such firearm ranges for nuisance or trespass are null and void. 4 Glendale’s modifications to the shooting range. Id. at 106. Following remand, Glendale
and the Landolts entered a settlement agreement precluding further litigation over the
injunction for a period of not less than 20 years.
After the 20-year period expired, Glendale again petitioned the circuit court to
dissolve the permanent injunction pursuant to section 537.294. The Landolts answered by
arguing that section 537.294.2 was unconstitutional as it effectuated a taking of their
property rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The circuit court sustained
Glendale’s summary judgment motion and overruled the Landolts’ counter-motion for
partial summary judgment. Thereby, the circuit court entered judgment in Glendale’s
favor, setting aside the permanent injunction. The Landolts appeal, raising a constitutional
challenge to the validity of section 537.294.2. 4
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same
criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. Summary
judgment is proper only if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to
the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Brockington v. New Horizons Enters., LLC, 654 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting
Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020)); see also Rule 74.04(c)
(requiring a motion for summary judgment to contain a statement of uncontroverted
material facts as to which the movant claims there is no genuine issue, entitling the moving
4 This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. 5 party to judgment as a matter of law). “The record below is reviewed in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is
entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Brockington, 654
S.W.3d at 880 (quoting Green, 606 S.W.3d at 116).
Analysis
In entering summary judgment, the circuit court set aside a final judgment that
imposed injunctive relief limiting the operation of Glendale’s firing range. This Court
carefully guards the principle of finality of judgments and will not casually allow a final
judgment to be set aside. See City of Normandy v. Parson, 643 S.W.3d 311, 313-14 (Mo.
banc 2022). “This concern with the finality of judgments serves several important interests,
including protecting litigants from retrying identical cases and issues, ensuring uniformity
of decisions, and promoting judicial economy.” Id. at 314 (citing Am. Eagle Waste Indus.,
LLC v. St. Louis Cnty., 379 S.W.3d 813, 825 (Mo. banc 2012)). “Most importantly, ‘there
must always be an end to litigation and a certainty as to the rights of litigants must be
achieved so that dignity and respect for judicial determinations will be maintained.’” Id.
(quoting Goldsmith v. M. Jackman & Sons, Inc., 327 F.2d 184-85 (10th Cir. 1964)). For
these reasons, this Court has provided very narrow exceptions allowing for relief from
judgment in very limited circumstances. Id. Narrow exceptions to the principle of finality
of judgments can be found in Rule 74.06. Pertinent to this case, Rule 74.06(b)(5) allows a
court to relieve a party from a final judgment when “it is no longer equitable that the
judgment remain in force.”
6 This Court recently addressed the standard for relieving a party from a final
judgment imposing permanent injunctive relief in Normandy, 643 S.W.3d 311. In
Normandy, the circuit court entered a judgment in 2016 permanently enjoining the state
from enforcing certain provisions of Senate Bill No. 5. Id. at 312-13. Passed in 2015 by
the General Assembly, SB5 limited the revenue local governments could collect through
citations charging individuals with traffic and municipal ordinance violations. Id. Certain
relevant provisions of SB5 applied only to municipalities within St. Louis County. Id. at
313. The circuit court found these provisions unconstitutional special laws justifying
enjoining the state from enforcing the laws. Id. at 312-13. This Court affirmed. Id.
Subsequently, this Court decided City of Aurora v. Spectra Communications Group, LLC,
592 S.W.3d 764 (Mo. banc 2019), another case involving a claimed unconstitutional
special law. In Aurora, this Court restored the rational basis analysis used to examine
special law claims. Id. at 780-81. In so holding, this Court recognized “[t]he [use of this]
rational basis analysis … has been diminished in recent years” and called the opinion
affirming the permanent injunction the circuit court issued in 2016 the “final misdirection”
in diminishing the use of rational basis analysis for special law claims. Id. at 778-79.
Following Aurora, the state sought relief from the 2016 permanent injunction.
Normandy, 643 S.W.3d at 312. The state argued the decision in Aurora justified
reexamining whether the challenged provisions of SB5 were unconstitutional special laws
under rational basis review. Id. at 312-13. The circuit court agreed and found the shift in
decisional law articulated in Aurora provided the basis to set aside its prior permanent
injunction. Id. This Court reversed. Id. at 317. The Court found the circuit court erred in
7 setting aside the permanent injunction because it “failed to properly weigh the equities to
determine whether it was inequitable for the 2016 judgment to remain in force” as required
by Rule 74.06(b)(5). Id. Specifically, this Court held “a change in factual or legal
circumstances alone is insufficient to warrant relief from judgment.” Id. at 316. “Instead,
there are multiple relevant considerations that go into determining whether a court should
grant a Rule 74.06(b)(5) motion.” Id. “A court of equity cannot rely on a simple formula
but must evaluate a number of potentially competing considerations to determine whether
to modify or vacate an injunction entered by consent or otherwise.” Id. In other words,
this Court in Normandy made clear that a change in fact or law on its own is insufficient to
set aside a permanent injunction. There must also be a showing of inequity demonstrating
the necessity of vacating or modifying a permanent injunction.
In Normandy, this Court provided examples of equities relevant to determining
whether to set aside the permanent injunction at issue in the case. Id. at 316-17. The Court
highlighted the importance of finality of judgments and found the circuit court failed to
weigh the extent to which the state in the original 2016 litigation could have but failed to
argue the provisions of SB5 were constitutional under rational basis review. Id. The Court
also found the circuit court failed to consider the burden vacating the injunction would
place on concerned parties due to the passage of time and reasonable reliance on the Court’s
previous ruling. Id. at 317.
In this case, Glendale moved for summary judgment to dissolve the permanent
injunction restricting its operations. In support of its motion, Glendale relied exclusively
on the enactment of section 537.294, expressly stating its motion was “based solely on
8 statutory changes since this Court entered the injunction at issue[.]” While the enactment
of section 537.294 may constitute a material fact supporting a finding that the continued
enforcement of the injunction is inequitable, Glendale did not argue or assert
uncontroverted material facts demonstrating the unjust effects of the injunction in light of
this change in law.
This Court reviews the summary judgment record “in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit
of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Brockington, 654 S.W.3d at 880 (quoting
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 116). Nothing in the circuit court’s judgment or the summary
judgment record suggests the circuit court weighed the equities at issue and determined the
continued enforcement of the injunction to be inequitable based on the enactment of section
537.294. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the Landolts and giving them
the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Court cannot assume the circuit court weighed
the equities and determined the injunction to be unjust based on the enactment of section
537.294. Because Glendale did not assert or demonstrate the change in law made the
continued enforcement of the injunction inequitable, Glendale failed to establish it “is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115).
Viewed in the same light, the record does not reflect Glendale’s motion for summary
judgment established uncontroverted material facts relating to other factors the parties
asserted that may affect the equity of the injunction. For example, in its petition, Glendale
claims there have been multiple changes to the property and operation of the shooting range
resulting in substantial noise abatement that could suggest the injunction’s continued
9 enforcement would be inequitable. Conversely, in their answer, the Landolts dispute such
changes have been made and result in substantial noise abatement. In fact, the Landolts
assert in their answer and other documents filed in the circuit court that the injunction
should remain in force because stray bullets trespass onto their property and the shooting
range causes “extreme vibrations” disrupting their privacy and the enjoyment and market
value of their property. As a result, there are numerous factual issues that appear to be
disputed and bear on the equities of continued enforcement of the injunction. As this Court
stated in Normandy, a change in factual or legal circumstances alone is insufficient basis
to set aside an injunction, and the party seeking relief from judgment must also assert and
demonstrate the change in fact or law renders the injunction’s continued enforcement
inequitable. 643 S.W.3d at 314-17. 5 Glendale failed to include any consideration of these
factors in its motion for summary judgment, much less establish corresponding
uncontroverted material facts. As a consequence, the record fails to reflect the circuit court
weighed the equities and determined the injunction to be unjust; therefore, the circuit court
erred in entering summary judgment in Glendale’s favor.
Requiring Glendale to demonstrate inequity resulting from the continued
enforcement of the injunction is consistent with this Court’s holding in Normandy and is
not contrary to this Court’s holding in Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450 (Mo.
5 While a change in decisional law was at issue in Normandy, the same rationale applies with respect to the change in statutory law at issue here. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992) (holding relief from judgment may be warranted when “statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree was designed to prevent”). 10 banc 2011). In Goerlitz, the city of Maryville operated a gun range on property adjacent
to Goerlitz’s home, and Goerlitz filed a petition in the circuit court alleging nuisance. Id.
at 452. Goerlitz asked the circuit court to award damages and enter an injunction
prohibiting the city from operating the gun range on the property. Id. The court entered
summary judgment in the city’s favor. Id. This Court affirmed, citing section 537.294,
RSMo Supp. 2009. Id. at 456. A threshold question was whether Goerlitz’s claim for
injunctive relief was governed by the law in effect when the circuit court entered judgment
or the version of section 537.294 that was in place at the time she filed her suit. 6 Id. at 453.
This Court held it was the current version of the statute rather than the version in effect on
the date Goerlitz filed her petition in the circuit court because “an injunction looks forward
by addressing what conduct or actions will be permitted in the future.” Id. This holding
poses no conflict with the holding in this case or this Court’s decision in Normandy because
the issue here is not which version of section 537.294 applies in determining whether an
injunction is warranted but whether to dissolve an injunction that was entered prior to a
change in the law.
To further justify applying the current version of section 537.294 to Goerlitz’s claim
for injunctive relief, this Court, however, quoted language from the court of appeals’ 2000
Landolt opinion that appears to have misstated the law. Goerlitz quoted Landolt as holding
“when the legislature amends the substantive law on which an injunction is based, the
injunction may be enforced only insofar as it conforms to the changed law.” Goerlitz, 333
6 During the pendency of Goerlitz’s litigation against the city, the General Assembly amended section 537.294. 11 S.W.3d at 453 (quoting Landolt, 18 S.W.3d at 105). As discussed above, the court of
appeals in Landolt reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Glendale’s 1998 motion to
dissolve the permanent injunction. 18 S.W.3d at 105. In that decision, the court of appeals
correctly recognized “a permanent injunction based on a condition subject to change may
be vacated or modified in order to avoid unjust or absurd results when a change occurs
in the factual setting or the law which gave rise to its existence.” Id. (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted). The court went on to state, however, that when there is a
change in substantive law, an “injunction may be enforced only insofar as it conforms to
the changed law” and neglected to instruct the circuit court to determine on remand if the
enforcement of the permanent injunction would be “unjust or absurd” in light of the change
in law. Id. This omission suggests a change in statutory law alone can constitute a
sufficient basis to dissolve a permanent injunction absent finding its continued enforcement
inequitable. While a change in statutory law can suffice to dissolve a permanent injunction,
the party seeking relief from the judgment must demonstrate the change in statutory law
renders its continued enforcement inequitable. To the extent Goerlitz or Landolt are
interpreted to hold that a change in statutory law can alone constitute a sufficient basis to
vacate or modify a permanent injunction without a finding the change in law results in
inequity, they should no longer be followed. 7
7 The change of law asserted in this case – enactment of section 537.294 – is the same change of law asserted in Goerlitz and Landolt, but no challenge to the constitutional validity of the statute was raised in those cases. If the circuit court finds the existing terms of the injunction are inequitable in light of section 537.294 and/or other considerations, sufficient to warrant vacating or modifying the injunction accordingly, the court can
12 In this case, the circuit court dissolved the permanent injunction restricting
Glendale’s firing range operations in the absence of any assertion of uncontroverted
material fact demonstrating the change in law rendered its continued enforcement
inequitable. Glendale, the Landolts, and the circuit court, like the parties and court in
Normandy, incorrectly assumed a change in law alone may justify relief from an injunction.
C.f. 643 S.W.3d at 314, 317. This assumption prevented the circuit court from considering
the equities to determine whether relief from the permanent injunction judgment was
warranted. For this reason, the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment for
Glendale. Accordingly, this Court vacates the circuit court’s judgment and remands the
case for proceedings consistent with this Court’s opinion. 8
___________________ W. Brent Powell, Judge
All concur.
consider the Landolts’ arguments that section 537.294.2 effectuates an unconstitutional taking of their property rights if the issue remains relevant. If changed circumstances do not warrant modifying or vacating the injunction, even assuming the change in law is valid, there is no reason to reach the constitutional question. See State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. banc 1985) (“A court will avoid the decision of a constitutional question if the case can be fully determined without reaching it.”). 8 Landolts’ Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Points Relied On by Interlineation filed on November 4, 2022 and taken with the case is sustained and had no impact on the resolution of this appeal. 13