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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1119
GLENDA ALVARADO-PAZ; J.P.A.,
Petitioners,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Argued: March 17, 2026 Decided: June 1, 2026
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review granted in part and denied in part; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Richardson joined.
ARGUED: Brendan Halvor Ekern Connors, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Linda Y. Cheng, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Zachary P. Lundgren, HOLLAND AND KNIGHT LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. George, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 2 of 20
AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Glenda Alvarado-Paz and her minor child, J.P.A., petition for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal based on the denial of their application for
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) and
withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons
below, we grant the petition in part and deny it in part, vacate the agency’s removal order,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The record developed before the immigration judge shows that Alvarado-Paz, a
native and citizen of El Salvador, fled to the United States in 2016 after her father, Fabian
Alvarado Parada (“Fabian”), threatened to kill her. Alvarado-Paz testified that Fabian is
extremely violent, having physically and psychologically abused her and her immediate
family, which included her mother, Porfiria Paz Martinez (“Porfiria”), and six siblings.
Fabian was especially violent toward Porfiria, beating her regularly and putting a machete
to her throat as he threatened to kill her and her children. After Porfiria inherited land from
her family, Fabian threatened more violence to secure her agreement to deed the property
to him. Porfiria also witnessed Fabian kill his stepfather with a machete, after which he
threatened to kill her if she told anyone.
Fabian wasn’t the only violent member of the family. In June 2016, Fabian’s foster
brother murdered Porfiria, shooting her at her home while she was caring for J.P.A. and
another child. When Alvarado-Paz learned of her mother’s death, she went to Porfiria’s
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 3 of 20
home, where law enforcement and Fabian were already on scene. Alvarado-Paz accused
Fabian of ordering his foster brother to kill her mother. Fabian told her to be quiet and
“grabbed his machete,” which Alvarado-Paz understood to mean that he “was capable of
killing me at that moment” “even though there were a lot of cops there.” J.A. 148. In the
days following her mother’s death, Alvarado-Paz and her siblings told law enforcement
about Fabian’s history of abuse and violence, as well as their mutual belief that he was
responsible for Porfiria’s murder. J.P.A.—who was four years old when she witnessed the
murder—identified Fabian’s foster brother as the person who murdered Porfiria in a photo
lineup, but the police informed Alvarado-Paz that they couldn’t rely on that identification
because of J.P.A.’s age. Despite these repeated accusations against Fabian and his foster
brother, law enforcement didn’t formally interview either man about Porfiria’s murder.
About two weeks after her mother’s death, Alvarado-Paz was approached by two
unknown masked men as she was traveling to visit her mother’s grave. The men threatened
to kill Alvarado-Paz if she continued investigating her mother’s death. Although she
couldn’t recognize the men, she believed they were connected to her father because he
“always said that he had a lot of friends, and that for $20 they would do whatever he
wanted.” J.A. 153.
Feeling “trapped” and fearing her father’s threats, Alvarado-Paz fled El Salvador
with J.P.A. J.A. 154. After they entered the United States without inspection, Alvarado-
Paz and J.P.A. were charged as removable and ordered to appear for related proceedings.
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Alvarado-Paz conceded removability but applied for asylum and withholding of
removal under the INA and withholding of removal under the CAT. J.P.A. was named as
a derivative asylum applicant. 1
Alvarado-Paz claimed eligibility for asylum and withholding under the INA based
on her past persecution and fear of future persecution arising from both her political
opinion (“opposition to violence [] in favor of the rule of law in El Salvador”) and her
membership in four alleged particular social groups (“PSGs”): (1) “females viewed as
property by virtue [of] their status in a family relationship”; (2) “Salvadoran women”; (3)
“nuclear family of Porfiria Paz”; and (4) “family members of prosecutorial witnesses.” J.A.
200. Her request for relief under the CAT rested on the death threats she received following
her mother’s murder.
After a hearing at which Alvarado-Paz testified and submitted documentary
evidence in support of her claims, the IJ found Alvarado-Paz to be credible, and accepted
the above-recounted facts as true. Even so, it denied all forms of relief.
As for Alvarado-Paz’s claims based on her political opinion, the IJ found that even
if opposing violence in favor of the rule of law qualifies as a protected political opinion,
Alvarado-Paz “failed to establish she holds such a political opinion.” J.A. 86. In short, it
found that seeking police intervention related to the death of her mother didn’t “establish
that [Alvarado-Paz] holds an anti-violence, pro-rule of law political opinion.” J.A. 87. The
IJ further determined that there was no evidence that Fabian would target her on account
1 Because J.PA.’s application depends on Alvarado-Paz’s, we do not separately analyze it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 5 of 20
of that political opinion because his motives were personal—to avoid being implicated in
Porfiria’s murder—not political.
The IJ was equally unpersuaded by Alvarado-Paz’s claims based on membership in
any of the proposed PSGs. It first concluded that Alvarado-Paz hadn’t established a nexus
between any persecution and membership in the groups “females viewed as property by
virtue of their status in the family relationship” and “Salvadoran women.” See J.A. 84–85
& n.1. Indeed, it determined that the record didn’t establish persecution on account of her
gender at all. Instead, it noted that Fabian had been abusive toward both male and female
members of his family, as evidenced by Alvarado-Paz’s testimony that Fabian had been
particularly brutal toward her brother. The IJ further observed that Alvarado-Paz had
testified that her father’s death threats occurred because she’d accused him of murdering
her mother and because she was related to him, not because she was a female or a “female[]
viewed as property by virtue of [her] status in the family.” J.A. 84; see J.A. 84–85.
The IJ next turned to Alvarado-Paz’s proposed PSG of the “nuclear family of
Porfiria Paz.” And once again, the IJ concluded that the record didn’t demonstrate a nexus
between membership in that group and any persecution. Pointing to caselaw from this
Court and the BIA, the IJ observed that a nexus requires more than the existence of the
named group and harm; rather, it requires proof that the persecutor targeted the applicant
on account of the protected characteristic. Relevant to its decision, the IJ determined that
the record suggested Fabian used “violence to exert extreme control over his entire
family”—not that he did so to inflict harm on Porfiria. J.A. 85; see also J.A. 86 (“Although
despicable, Mr. Alvarado’s abuse of his children does not appear to be an explicit attempt
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to inflict further psychological violence against Ms. Paz.”). In the IJ’s view, Alvarado-Paz
also hadn’t shown that her familial relationship to her mother would be “at least one central
reason [her father] would subject her to future persecution” if she returned to El Salvador.
J.A. 86. Instead, the IJ concluded that, based on the record, the sole reason Alvarado-Paz
had been threatened appeared to be her public accusations that her father killed her mother.
“[R]evenge, rather than [Alvarado-Paz’s] relationship to [her mother], motivated [her
father] to target her.” Id. Accordingly, the IJ concluded that the record didn’t demonstrate
the requisite nexus to support this claim.
The IJ also determined that Alvarado-Paz couldn’t base her claims on a proposed
PSG of “family members of prosecutorial witnesses” because neither she nor J.P.A. had
ever acted as a prosecutorial witness against Porfiria’s murderer. Id. Although J.P.A.
identified Fabian’s foster brother as the murderer in a photo lineup, police indicated they
couldn’t use those statements because J.P.A. was too young. Indeed, the record indicated
that police didn’t view that man as a suspect and had never arrested him nor prosecuted
him for the offense. On this record, the IJ determined that Alvarado-Paz simply wasn’t a
member of this proposed PSG.
Because Alvarado-Paz couldn’t show persecution on account of a protected ground,
the IJ denied her applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA.
Last, the IJ reviewed and denied Alvarado-Paz’s application for relief under the
CAT based on its determination that she hadn’t shown government “acquiesce[nce] to her
feared torture.” J.A. 87. The IJ didn’t view law enforcement’s failure to prosecute anyone
for Porfiria’s murder as sufficient proof that Salvadoran public officials would acquiesce
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to Alvarado-Paz’s feared torture. It noted that the investigation remained open and that
they had pursued some investigative steps after the murder. Because Alvarado-Paz pointed
to no other basis for establishing her claim, the IJ denied relief.
Alvarado-Paz appealed to the BIA and, in a single-judge decision, the BIA
dismissed the appeal. After stating that it “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]” the IJ’s decision to
deny Alvarado-Paz’s applications, the BIA indicated it was “not persuaded” by her
arguments that the IJ misapplied the law or ignored evidence supporting her applications.
J.A. 8. With respect to her claims based on membership in a PSG, the BIA stated that
Alvarado-Paz challenged the IJ’s decision to reject her claims based on “membership in []
three proposed social groups, to which she additionally adds on appeal as ‘Salvadoran
woman,’ and ‘family members of witnesses to crime.’” Id. The BIA agreed that Alvarado-
Paz hadn’t shown reversible error on the requisite nexus between her past persecution or
fear of future persecution, on the one hand, and her preserved PSGs, on the other hand. The
BIA also found “no reason to address” the merits of the two PSGs it determined that
Alvarado-Paz was asserting “on appeal in the first instance” because she hadn’t pursued
those claims before the IJ. J.A. 9. Last, the BIA rejected Alvarado-Paz’s arguments with
respect to her CAT claim, concluding that the record showed no reversible error in the IJ’s
determination that she didn’t meet her burden with respect to the Salvadoran government
instigating, consenting, or acquiescing to her being tortured.
Alvarado-Paz petitioned for review of the agency’s final order of removal, and the
Court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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II.
Alvarado-Paz first challenges the agency’s decision to deny asylum and withholding
of removal under the INA. Although they are ultimately governed by different standards,
both forms of relief share the common requirement that the applicant demonstrate
persecution “on account of” or “because of” a protected ground. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42), with § 1231(b)(3)(A). Relevant to this case, one protected ground is the
applicant’s “political opinion” and another is her “membership in a particular social
group.” § 1101(a)(42); § 1231(b)(3)(A).
The causation requirement, or “nexus” determination, requires an applicant to
demonstrate that her protected ground is “at least one central reason for” her feared
persecution. Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). This means the protected ground “cannot be ‘incidental,
tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” Id. (cleaned up). But it
also means the protected ground needn’t be the “sole or dominant motivation for her
persecution.” Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 127 (4th Cir. 2017); id. at 128 (“[M]ore than
one central reason may, and often does, motivate a persecutor’s actions.”).
We review legal questions de novo and factual determinations for substantial
evidence. Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 2018). Review for
substantial evidence means that the agency’s factual findings “are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). What’s more, the agency’s decision whether to grant relief is “conclusive
unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
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The agency abuses its discretion if it “fails to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision,”
Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 626 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Cordova v.
Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2014)), “distorts or disregards important aspects of an
applicant’s claim,” id. (quoting Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337), or “ignore[s] legally significant
evidence and base[s] [its] decision on only isolated portions of the record,” Arita-Deras v.
Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2021). Under this standard, “[e]ven if the record
plausibly could support two results: the one the [agency] chose and the one the petitioner
advances, reversal is only appropriate where the [C]ourt finds that the evidence not only
supports the opposite conclusion, but compels it.” Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 197
(4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
A.
Alvarado-Paz first asserts that the BIA mistakenly deemed her to have raised two
PSGs for the first time on appeal: “Salvadoran women” and “family members of witnesses
to crime.” That error, she maintains, led the BIA to erroneously decline to consider the
merits of her arguments regarding these PSGs as part of its review of the IJ’s decision. She
argues that this error requires reversal because the agency must properly characterize the
basis for an applicant’s claims when assessing whether to grant relief.
1.
Having reviewed the record, we agree with Alvarado-Paz that the BIA committed
reversible error when it erroneously stated that she hadn’t proffered the PSG of Salvadoran
women before the IJ and then relied on that error as the basis for not considering her merits
arguments relating to this PSG. As we have recognized, “[t]he BIA abuses its discretion if
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it . . . distorts or disregards important aspects of [an] applicant’s claim.” Cordova, 759 F.3d
at 337 (cleaned up). Here, it is undisputed that Alvarado-Paz proffered the PSG of
Salvadoran women in her filings before the IJ, and that the IJ considered this PSG and
rejected it on the merits. 2 The BIA thus abused its discretion by thrice misrepresenting that
Alvarado-Paz hadn’t raised the PSG Salvadoran women before the IJ and was instead
pursuing it for the first time on agency appeal. See J.A. 8–9.
The parties dispute whether this error matters in adjudicating Alvarado-Paz’s
petition for review. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that “[h]armless-error analysis applies in immigration cases”). But we start
from the premise that an error of this kind generally requires remand. See Cordova, 759
F.3d at 338 (“[T]he process of review requires that the grounds upon which the
administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained[, and] when a
BIA order does not demonstrate that the agency has considered an issue, the proper course,
except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” (cleaned up)); see also Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“Because the BIA order here fails to show that the agency adequately considered the issue,
we remand.”).
2 For his part, the Attorney General acknowledges this error, but asserts it is harmless because (1) the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision (which considered this PSG) and (2) the BIA expressly agreed with the IJ’s merits analysis with respect to another PSG that factored in Alvarado-Paz’s sex (“females viewed as property by virtue of their status in the family relationship”). 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 11 of 20
To be sure, remand isn’t required when an error “clearly had no bearing on the
procedure used or the substance of the decision reached.” Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 190 n.8
(quoting Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964)).
But we have no such assurance here and thus don’t depart from our usual course.
First, the BIA’s misapprehension about the posture of Alvarado-Paz’s proposed
PSG “Salvadoran women” led it to refuse to consider the merits of her arguments relating
to this PSG. J.A. 9 (“We find no reason to address the respondent’s claims about [this]
group[] that [is] raised on appeal in the first instance.”). This factual error led the BIA to
incorrectly apply legal principles of forfeiture to resolve the portion of Alvarado-Paz’s
application based on her membership in the proposed PSG Salvadoran women. Accord
Funez-Ortiz v. McHenry, 127 F.4th 498, 505 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he BIA commits legal
error if it uses the wrong standard in reviewing the IJ’s decision.”). That decision denied
Alvarado-Paz a merits-based agency appellate review of the IJ’s adjudication of this claim.
This fact counsels in favor of remand.
Second, the BIA’s purported adoption and affirmance of the IJ’s decision offers no
basis for declaring this error harmless. Put simply, because the BIA didn’t believe that the
IJ had considered the PSG Salvadoran women at all, it would be illogical to read the BIA’s
decision as adopting and affirming anything the IJ had to say about that claim. Far from
suggesting harmlessness, as the Attorney General suggests, this inconsistency in the BIA’s
decision supports remand. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 338.
Third, we routinely remand for reconsideration when the IJ or the BIA (or both)
mischaracterize an applicant’s proposed PSG, and since that’s the type of error that
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occurred here, this too counsels in favor of remand. E.g., Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d
612, 643 (4th Cir. 2021) (remanding to the BIA for reassessment after the BIA failed to
properly characterize the applicant’s proposed protected grounds); Alvarez Lagos v. Barr,
927 F.3d 236, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (labeling the IJ’s mischaracterization of a proposed PSG
a “critical legal error” that the BIA failed to correct on its review and remanding for
assessment of the applicant’s proposed PSG); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117,
125 (4th Cir. 2011) (remanding for reassessment after the BIA committed “legal error” by
rejecting the claim based on review of a PSG that differed from the one the applicant
proposed). Thus, the BIA’s consideration of a different PSG from the one an applicant
actually proposes constitutes legal error generally requiring remand.
Last, we acknowledge that the BIA rejected on the merits a different PSG that may
overlap in some respects with the one it mistakenly believed to have been raised for the
first time before it. But we aren’t convinced that the PSG “females viewed as property by
virtue of their status in a family relationship”—which the BIA rejected on the merits—
sufficiently mirrors the PSG Salvadoran women—which it didn’t—such that an analysis
of the former necessarily resolves the latter. At a minimum, that’s a call for the BIA, not
us, to make since the agency is entrusted with decisions relating to relief from removal.
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“When the BIA has not spoken on
a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands, [our] ordinary rule is to remand to
allow the BIA . . . to address the matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise.”
(cleaned up)); Nken v. Holder, 585 F.3d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Established precedent
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dictates that a court may not guess at what an agency meant to say, but must instead restrict
itself to what the agency actually did say.”).
Because the BIA committed reversible error by mistakenly treating Alvarado-Paz’s
PSG Salvadoran women as having been raised for the first time before it and then declining
to consider the merits of her arguments as a consequence, we will grant her petition for
review as to this issue only, vacate the final order of removal, and remand for further
proceedings.
We now proceed to the other claims for which we conclude no remand or
reconsideration is required.
2.
Alvarado-Paz contends a similar error occurred with respect to her proposed PSG
“family members of witnesses to crime,” which the BIA concluded hadn’t been raised
before the IJ and thus was being asserted for the first time on agency appeal. Our review
of the record shows no reversible error because the BIA correctly concluded that Alvarado-
Paz was attempting to assert a newly labeled PSG in her briefs to the BIA.
Here, the record reveals that Alvarado-Paz created the confusion she now complains
of by referring to a single proposed PSG in multiple ways before the IJ before then asserting
two distinct yet related PSGs before the BIA. Specifically, Alvarado-Paz identified only
four PSGs in the summary section of her brief to the IJ, one of which was “family members
of prosecutorial witnesses.” J.A. 200. (The other three delineated PSGs are unrelated and
irrelevant to this assessment.) Later in the same brief, Alvarado-Paz discussed this “family
members of prosecutorial witnesses” PSG using different terminology, including the
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phrase “family members of witnesses to crimes.” J.A. 208. But it’s clear from the structure
of her briefing and her arguments that these two characterizations were meant to refer to a
single proposed PSG that Alvarado-Paz repeatedly identified as “family members of
prosecutorial witnesses.” In turn, the IJ’s decision referred to this PSG as it had repeatedly
been identified, “family members of prosecutorial witnesses,” and it never referred to a
different variation, nor identified a fifth PSG, “family members of witnesses to crimes.”
J.A. 86.
Alvarado-Paz’s briefing before the BIA suggested—for the first time—that she was
treating these two groups as independent and distinct PSGs. In the heading to the relevant
section, she identified “‘family members of prosecutorial witnesses to crime’ or ‘family
members of witnesses to crime.’” J.A. 49 (cleaned up). And in the text of that section, she
refers to the PSG “family members of prosecutorial witnesses” and “the additional” PSG
“family members of witnesses to crime.” J.A. 50–51.
Critically, however, Alvarado-Paz bore “the burden of raising all particular social
groups and specifying ‘the exact delineation of any particular social group(s) to which she
claims to belong’ on the record before the immigration judge in the first instance.” Del
Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of
W-Y-C & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018)) (second emphasis added). Given
this burden and in light of the entire record, the BIA did not commit reversible error in
determining that Alvarado-Paz had solely raised before the IJ the PSG “family members
of prosecutorial witnesses to crime,” but not the PSG “family members of witnesses to
crime.” After all, Alvarado-Paz’s briefing to the IJ consistently identified the former
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formulation as the “label” for her proposed relevant PSG. Consistent with Alvarado-Paz’s
designation, that’s also how the IJ identified her proposed PSG. And in her briefing before
the BIA, Alvarado-Paz didn’t assert that the IJ had failed to consider a fifth proposed PSG
(family members of witnesses to crime). Instead, she maintained for the first time that they
were two alternative PSGs. But it was Alvarado-Paz’s burden to specify before the IJ the
precise formulation she was relying on as the basis for her claim. See id. Accordingly, the
BIA did not commit reversible error with respect to this PSG.
B.
Alvarado-Paz next contends that the agency erred in denying asylum or withholding
of removal under the INA based on her political opinion and three PSGs: (1) females
viewed as property by virtue of their status in the family relationship; (2) the nuclear family
of Porfiria; and (3) family members of prosecutorial witnesses. 3 As for her political-
opinion claim, she maintains that she persistently sought to hold her mother’s murderers
responsible under the law and through the justice system, received death threats after
expressing those opinions, and was thus persecuted on account of her political opinion.
And as for her claims based on membership in the three above PSGs, Alvarado-Paz argues
that the record shows the requisite nexus, which requires only that her PSG be a central
3 As noted with respect to the Salvadoran women PSG, despite stating that it was adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA necessarily didn’t do so. But to the extent the BIA correctly apprehended other aspects of the IJ’s decision, its own decision to adopt and affirm that analysis means that we consider both decisions on review. See Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 16 of 20
reason for her persecution. She also faults the BIA for adopting what she terms the IJ’s
flawed analysis and conclusions without engaging in its own assessment.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Alvarado-Paz failed to
show that she espoused her proffered political opinion of opposing violence in favor of the
rule of law. None of Alvarado-Paz’s arguments contradict the core problem identified by
the IJ—her advocacy on this “political” issue was limited to promoting justice for her
mother’s killer(s). That cannot by itself reflect a desire to promote the rule of law generally
as a potentially cognizable political opinion. Nothing Alvarado-Paz points to in the record
undermines, much less compels the opposite conclusion to, the agency’s assessment. See
Mulyani, 771 F.3d at 197. Accordingly, we deny Alvarado-Paz’s petition insofar as it
challenges the denial of relief based on her political-opinion claim.
Alvarado-Paz’s challenge to the BIA’s no-nexus determination that doomed her
other PSG-based claims fares no better. Her opening brief asserts only that the BIA erred
by failing to undertake an independent review of the record before dismissing her claims.
But the BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]” the IJ’s decision and concluded there was no “clear
error of fact or any error of law” relating to the IJ’s no-nexus determination. J.A. 8. And
when “conducting clear error review, the BIA may not reweigh evidence or substitute its
own judgment for that of the IJ.” Funez-Ortiz, 127 F.4th at 505 (cleaned up) (emphasis
added); cf. Cortez-Mendez, 912 F.3d at 209 (reiterating that whether a nexus has been
shown is a “question of fact entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error”). The BIA’s
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approach when reviewing the IJ’s no-nexus determination was consistent with its charge. 4
Accordingly, we deny her petition to the extent it is based on the agency’s denial of her
claims based on the PSGs (1) females viewed as property by virtue of their status in the
family relationship; (2) the nuclear family of Porfiria; and (3) family members of
prosecutorial witnesses.
III.
Last, Alvarado-Paz challenges the denial of her claim for relief under the CAT. She
asserts that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding that the record didn’t show she would be
tortured by or with the acquiescence of public officials or those acting in an official
capacity.
To qualify for relief under the CAT an applicant must show that it is “more likely
than not that [she] would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”
4 Notably, the cases Alvarado-Paz cites in support of her argument address the distinct scenario where the IJ’s initial assessment didn’t appropriately engage with record evidence, which in turn led to some error in how the BIA reviewed the applicant’s claim. E.g., Quintero, 998 F.3d at 646 (“[B]oth the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals failed to meaningfully engage with the extensive [documentary evidence] submitted by Petitioner.”); Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 630 (vacating a removal order when “both the IJ and BIA failed to provide a meaningful analysis of whether Petitioner established a well-founded fear of future persecution”). These cases are readily distinguishable because Alvarado-Paz’s opening brief took issue only with the BIA’s failure to reassess the record. It didn’t argue that the IJ failed to meaningfully engage with the evidence in the first instance. So, Alvarado-Paz has not shown that the BIA’s approach was erroneous under the circumstances presented. True, Alvarado-Paz did later assert that the IJ committed its own flawed assessment in reaching its no-nexus determination. But she didn’t do so until her reply brief. We don’t ordinarily consider arguments that are presented for the first time in a reply brief, and we won’t do so here. See United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 212 n.16 (4th Cir. 2021). 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 18 of 20
Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 637 (quoting Mulyani, 771 F.3d at 200); 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.’” Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 637 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)); McDougall
v. Bondi, 150 F.4th 637, 642 (4th Cir. 2025) (characterizing the second part of this standard
as showing that “this likely future mistreatment will occur at the hands of government
officials or with the consent or acquiescence of government officials” (cleaned up)).
“Acquiescence” requires prior awareness, i.e. “a finding of either actual knowledge or
willful blindness.” 8 C.F.R. 208.18(a)(7).
At bottom, Alvarado-Paz asks us to reassess the record evidence and reach the
opposite conclusion about whether Salvadoran officials will acquiesce in her torture upon
her return. But our “task at this juncture is not to reweigh evidence and determine which
of the competing views [of the record] is more compelling. Instead, it is to ensure that
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s judgment . . . and that unrebutted, legally
significant evidence was not arbitrarily ignored[.]” Kouyate v. Garland, 122 F.4th 132, 142
(4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). In undertaking our charge, we “presume that, in reaching
[their] conclusions, the IJ and the BIA reviewed the evidence presented to them and made
their decisions based on the relevant evidence.” Id. (quoting Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d
902, 914 (4th Cir. 2014)).
Nothing in the record or the agency’s assessment of Alvarado-Paz’s CAT claim
leads us to conclude that reversible error has occurred. Most significant to our review, we
18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 19 of 20
note that the BIA and IJ specifically considered—and rejected—Alvarado-Paz’s argument
that how the Salvadoran authorities responded to her mother’s murder demonstrated that
they would acquiesce in her torture upon her return. And that assessment is supported by
the record evidence, which includes Alvarado-Paz’s own testimony regarding the
investigation that followed her mother’s murder. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7); Zelaya v.
Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2012) (reiterating the standards for acquiescence).
In addition, while Alvarado-Paz’s country-conditions report supports that gender-
based violence sometimes goes unpunished in El Salvador, that evidence does not meet
Alvarado-Paz’s burden for relief under the CAT. See, e.g., Kouyate, 122 F.4th at 143
(reflecting that “generalized [reports of] violence and civil strife” are “insufficient to
established eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT”); Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland,
96 F.4th 670, 686 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he mere existence of a pattern of human rights
violations in a particular country does not constitute a sufficient ground for finding that a
particular person would more likely than not be tortured.” (cleaned up)).
All told, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that Alvarado-Paz is more
likely than not to be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a Salvadorian public
official or person acting in an official capacity. Accordingly, we deny the petition for
review insofar as it challenges the agency’s denial of relief under the CAT.
IV.
For the reasons stated, we grant Alvarado-Paz’s petition for review in part because
the BIA incorrectly deemed Alvarado-Paz to have forfeited agency appellate review of her
19 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1119 Doc: 51 Filed: 06/01/2026 Pg: 20 of 20
claim based on membership in the PSG Salvadoran women. But we deny her petition for
review insofar as it challenges the BIA’s resolution of her remaining arguments for asylum
and withholding of removal under the INA, and for withholding of removal under the CAT.
We thus vacate the agency’s removal order and remand to the BIA for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED