Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 24, 1998
DocketC.A. No. 97-4439
StatusPublished

This text of Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998) (Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998), (R.I. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

DECISION
Before the Court is an administrative appeal filed by plaintiff Isabell G. Glavin (the "applicant") from a decision of the Department of Human Services ("DHS"), dated August 15, 1997, which denied her medical assistance benefits as a medically needy person under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-1 et seq. The applicant contests the agency's finding that her resources included monies in a bank account she held jointly with her children and thereby exceeded the financial eligibility limit. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §42-35-15.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Upon the death of her husband in 1975, plaintiff Isabell G. Glavin acquired certain insurance proceeds which she placed in a statement savings account. At that time, she held the account jointly with one of her sons. She and her son proceeded to use the account independently of one another. In 1987, two of plaintiff's other children were added to the account as joint account holders. Each of the joint account holders thereafter had unlimited access to the account. According to plaintiff, they each used the account equally and considered the account to be for the benefit of all of them.

In October 1996, plaintiff Glavin applied to DHS for medical assistance benefits. On April 2, 1997, DHS sent plaintiff a formal written letter of denial advising her that she exceeded the $4,000 eligibility ceiling. In denying plaintiff benefits, the agency attributed to plaintiff all of the monies held in the joint account. Pursuant to DHS procedures, plaintiff then timely requested an administrative hearing. On August 15, 1997, the DHS hearing officer found that she failed to rebut the legal presumption that she owns all of the funds in the joint account. As an applicant cannot have resources in excess of $4,000 to be eligible for medical assistance benefits, and as the subject joint account had a balance of $26,316.36 as of the time of the hearing, DHS attributed all of those resources to plaintiff and denied her application for benefits.

The applicant then appealed from this decision to Superior Court. On appeal, plaintiff contends that she successfully rebutted the presumption that, as a joint account holder, she owns all of the funds in the account with evidence as to the origin and use of the funds and the intent of the joint account holders. She asks this Court, therefore, to reverse the agency's decision and deem her eligible for medical assistance benefits.

Standard of Review
This Court's review of the decision of DHS is governed by R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(g), which provides in pertinent part:

42-35-15

Section (g) of the statute reads as follows:

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

This statutory provision precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency regarding the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Technic Inc. v. Rhode Island Dept. ofEmployment and Training, 669 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 1996); Costa v.Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988). This Court's review, therefore, is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency's decision.Newport Shipyard v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights,484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984). "Substantial evidence" is that which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. at 897 (quoting Caswell v. George Sherman Sand Gravel Co.,424 A.2d 646, 647 (1981)). This standard applies even in cases where the court, after reviewing the certified record and evidence, might be inclined to view the evidence differently than the agency.Berberian v. Dept. of Employment Security, 414 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I. 1980). This Court will "reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record." Milardo v. CoastalResources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981).

ANALYSIS
To be financially eligible for medical assistance benefits, an individual must have countable income and resources within SSI limits. An applicant such as plaintiff cannot have resources in excess of $4,000 to be eligible for medical assistance benefits. DHS Policy Manual §§ 0354. A countable resource is one "available" to the applicant, and "a resource is considered to be available both when actually available, and when the applicant has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and maintenance." DHS Manual §§ 0354.30. With regard to funds in a checking or savings account, the determination of accessibility does not fall upon the individual, but depends upon the legal structure of the account. Where the applicant is a joint holder of a bank account and is legally able to withdraw funds from that account, (s)he is presumed to have unrestricted access to all of the funds in the account. DHS Policy Manual §§ 0356.15.10.10;Zona v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, C.A. No. 93-5852 (R.I. Super. May 1, 1996); Amaral v. Rhode IslandDepartment of Human Services, C.A. No. 94-5874 (R.I. Super. Dec. 6, 1995).

An applicant may submit evidence, however, to rebut this presumption. Id. To successfully rebut the presumption that all funds in a joint account are the applicant's resources, the applicant must submit all of the following evidence:

1. A statement by the applicant . . .

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Related

Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council
434 A.2d 266 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
484 A.2d 893 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1984)
Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review
414 A.2d 480 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles
543 A.2d 1307 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1988)
Technic, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Employment & Training
669 A.2d 1156 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Glavin v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 97-4439 (1998), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glavin-v-rhode-island-department-of-human-services-97-4439-1998-risuperct-1998.