Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank

Fifth Circuit

Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank

108 F. App'x 204

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 20, 2004

Docket04-20031

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 108 F. App'x 204 (Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 F. App'x 204 (5th Cir. 2004).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

Bernard H. Glatzer appeals from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his parental rights. Glatzer alleged that Thomason, while acting as a temporary judge, conspired with his ex-wife and issued without jurisdiction an order in California proceedings affecting custody and child support. He further alleged that the defendants improperly seized his assets in New York based on the order. Glatzer sought damages and an injunction to stay separate proceedings that he initiated in New York state court. The district court dismissed the suit under the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine as a collateral attack on the California order. In the alternative, to the extent that state court proceedings were still pending, the district court dismissed the suit based on the Younger 2 abstention doctrine.

Glatzer argues that the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was erroneous because the California order was jurisdietionally void and his claims are based on the defendants’ independent constitutional violations. We conclude after reviewing the record and the briefs that Glatzer’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court order and the district court did not err. See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir.1994); Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.1994). Glatzer also argues that the district court erroneously applied the Younger abstention doctrine. We conclude, however, that the district court’s alternative ruling was correct. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Wightman v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1996). Thomason’s motion to file a sur-reply brief and Glatzer’s motion to file a sur-sur-reply brief are DENIED.

AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).

2

. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

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PER CURIAM: *

Bernard H. Glatzer appeals from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his parental rights. Glatzer alleged that Thomason, while acting as a temporary judge, conspired with his ex-wife and issued without jurisdiction an order in California proceedings affecting custody and child support. He further alleged that the defendants improperly seized his assets in New York based on the order. Glatzer sought damages and an injunction to stay separate proceedings that he initiated in New York state court. The district court dismissed the suit under the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine as a collateral attack on the California order. In the alternative, to the extent that state court proceedings were still pending, the district court dismissed the suit based on the Younger 2 abstention doctrine.

Glatzer argues that the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was erroneous because the California order was jurisdietionally void and his claims are based on the defendants’ independent constitutional violations. We conclude after reviewing the record and the briefs that Glatzer’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court order and the district court did not err. See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir.1994); Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.1994). Glatzer also argues that the district court erroneously applied the Younger abstention doctrine. We conclude, however, that the district court’s alternative ruling was correct. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Wightman v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1996). Thomason’s motion to file a sur-reply brief and Glatzer’s motion to file a sur-sur-reply brief are DENIED.

AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED.

*

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

1

. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).

2

. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

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108 F. App'x 204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glatzer-v-chase-manhattan-bank-ca5-2004.

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