Glasser v. Douglas Autotech Corp.

781 F. Supp. 2d 546, 190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2556, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, 2011 WL 586238
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 9, 2011
Docket1:10-mj-00674
StatusPublished

This text of 781 F. Supp. 2d 546 (Glasser v. Douglas Autotech Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glasser v. Douglas Autotech Corp., 781 F. Supp. 2d 546, 190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2556, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, 2011 WL 586238 (W.D. Mich. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

ROBERT J. JONKER, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or the “Board”) Petition for Injunction Under Section 10® of the National Labor Relations Act (docket # 1). The Court has heard oral argument on the petition and received further briefing in light of the oral argument (docket ## 40, 41, 42). The Court has thoroughly reviewed the record and carefully considered the applicable law. The petition is ready for decision.

Background

The parties’ long history of collective bargaining.

Douglas Autotech Corporation (“DAC”), a Delaware corporation, is a more than 100 *549 year old business now owned by Fuji Kiko Company, Ltd. (ALJ Decision, docket # 2-3, at 6.) DAC manufactures parts for vehicles and industrial applications, and it maintains manufacturing facilities in Hopkinsville, Kentucky and Bronson, Michigan. (Id.) Since 1941, Local 822 of the UAW (the “Union”) has represented a bargaining unit of employees at the Bronson facility. 1 (Id. at 7.) The Union exists solely to represent this bargaining unit. (Id.) At the time the events giving rise to this dispute occurred, the bargaining unit included at least 114 active employees. (Id.) Throughout the past seventy years, DAC and the Union have negotiated and entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements. (Id.) Their most recent collective bargaining agreement expired on April 30, 2008. (Id.) By January of 2008, the parties had opened the door to early discussions about a new collective bargaining agreement. (Id. at 7-8.)

Tough negotiations in a hard business environment eventually lead to strike.

The negotiations began in the midst of a challenging business environment for the auto industry. According to a key management participant, Paul Viar, DAC was in “ ‘horrific financial shape, really bad financial shape, going into the negotiations.’ ” (Id. at 8.) Mr. Viar described management’s position: “ ‘we needed concessions. We needed systemic across-the-board improvement on how we did business to keep the doors open.’ ” (Id.) In management’s view, the Union took a hard stance against management’s own position, even when faced with the risk that the company might fail. (Id.) On February 19, the Union’s lead negotiator, Phillip Winkle, delivered a 60-day notice required under Section 8(d)(1) to Mr. Viar, notifying him that the Union proposed to terminate the parties’ CBA upon its expiration date. (Id.) At the time he asked his secretary to prepare the 60-day notice, Mr. Winkle also requested that she file a 30-day notice with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) as required under Section 8(d)(3). (Id.) His secretary neglected to file the required notice. (Id.) The parties negotiated in apparent good faith throughout January, February, March and April of 2008, but they reached “no significant agreement!] ... on any topic.” (Id.) With the expiration of the CBA imminent, the parties met on April 28, 29 and 30, and the Union declined a contract extension. (Id. at 9.)

Just before midnight on April 30, Mr. Winkle and two other Union officials delivered a written notice to Mr. Viar formally notifying DAC that the Union would be on strike effective 12:01 on May 1, 2008. (Id.) The notice came as no surprise to Mr. Viar, who “reported that he was present in his office at that late hour, because T had to prepare for the very real possibility of a walkout that night at midnight.’ ” (Id.) Upon meeting with the Union leaders and receiving the notice, Mr. Viar alerted other managers that the Union would be on strike. (Id.) There is no dispute that the strike was an economic strike through which the Union sought, in Mr. Winkle’s words, “ ‘to put leverage on the Company to get our just demands.’ ” (Id.)

The strike continued throughout May 1 and 2. (Id.) The Union maintained a picket line, and management implemented its plans to continue operations in the event of strike. (Id.) Specifically, management recruited a replacement workforce including “salaried staff, workers referred by an employment agency, persons referred by the salaried staff, and local candidates for employment who appeared at the plant.” (Id.) The facility’s operations continued without interruption. (Id.)

*550 The Union discovers that the strike is illegal and offers to return to work.

On the afternoon of May 2, Mr. Winkle received a call from a union official that caused him to question whether the 30-day notice had been filed. (Id.) Mr. Winkle consulted with his secretary, and they realized that the 30-day notice had not been filed. (Id.) Mr. Winkle understood that failure to file the required 30-day notice rendered the current strike illegal. (Id.) On May 3, Mr. Winkle met with other Union officials to alert them to the situation and determine how to proceed. (Id.) They decided to ask the Union’s membership to agree to cease the strike immediately by unconditionally offering to return to work. (Id. at 10.) On May 4, the Union membership voted to do so. (Id.)

Early on May 5, Mr. Winkle proceeded to the Bronson facility, bringing with him “the entire complement of day shift employees.” (Id.) Mr. Winkle attempted to hand deliver to Mr. Viar a letter informing DAC that “ ‘our membership UAW Local 822, your employees, are immediately returning to work unconditionally.’ ” (Id.) A security guard stopped Mr. Winkle and informed him that Mr. Viar would not accept any documents. (Id.) Mr. Winkle had the letter faxed to DAC’s human resource department, where it arrived soon after 7:00 a.m. (Id.) Shortly after that, DAC’s counsel, Bruce Lillie, called Mr. Winkle and inquired whether the bargaining unit members sought to return to work. (Id.) Mr. Winkle replied, “ ‘[y]es, we’ve offered an unconditional offer to come back to work.’ ” (Id.) Mr. Lillie advised that he would respond to Mr. Winkle later. (Id.) By 8:00 a.m., the Union filed the 30-day notice with the FMCS. (Id.) Around 10 or 11:00 a.m., Mr. Lillie contacted Mr. Winkle and requested that the bargaining committee meet with management that evening. (Id.)

DAC responds with a lockout.

In the hours before the evening meeting with Union representatives, Mr. Viar, Mr. Lillie, and another company representative, Glen Kirk, met to formulate a response to the Union’s offer to return to work. (Id.) They began to question whether the 30-day notice had been filed, and soon realized that they could not find a copy of the notice. (Id.)

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781 F. Supp. 2d 546, 190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2556, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, 2011 WL 586238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glasser-v-douglas-autotech-corp-miwd-2011.