Glascock v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.

131 S.W. 779, 140 Ky. 720, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 352
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedNovember 23, 1910
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 131 S.W. 779 (Glascock v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glascock v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co., 131 S.W. 779, 140 Ky. 720, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Settle

Affirming;.

In attempting to alight from one of appellee’s passenger trains as it approached Williamstown and while it was in motion, appellant was thrown upon a side-track and his arm fractured. For the injuries thereby sustained he brought. this action against appellee and its conductor to recover damages. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellees and the refusal of the circuit court to grant appellant a new trial gave cause for this appeal.

On Sunday, November 17th, 1907, appellant and S. M. Billiter, a companion, desiring to go to Somerset, each, purchased of appellee’s ticket agent, at Williams-town, a one-day, round trip, reduced rate ticket, to Science Hill and return. The tickets were good for that day only on a train that ran from Cincinnati to Science Hill and return, stopping at Williamstown each way. Science Hill is four miles north of Somerset,consequently the train for which the tickets in question were purchased by appellant and his companion ran no further, than Science Hill, and could not take appellant and Billiter to Somerset, and no train which ran from Somerset to Cincinnati that day made a stop either at Science Hill or Williamstown; all of which was known to appellant and Billiter by explanation from appellee’s agent at Williamstown at the time of their purchase of the tickets.

After riding from Williamstown to Lexington on the Science Hill train appellant and Billiter, in order to reach Somerset, there left it and took a fast train which would pass through and stop at Somerset in going south, and upon this train they arrived at Somerset about 12:30 o’clock, using their tickets purchased at Williamstown to ride to Science Hill and paying fare from the latter place to Somerset.

At 6:30 p. m. of the same day they left Somerset upon a fast train bound for Cincinnati which would net, as they knew, stop at Science Hill or Williamstown. Upon getting on the train they entered the dining car for the purpose of eating their dinner and were soon [722]*722approached by the .train conductor who demanded their tickets; whereupon the two tickets purchased by appellant and Billiter at Williamstown that morning and upon which they were entitled to ride on a different train from Wi-lliamstown to Science Hill and return, were handed the conductor by the latter. The conductor having examined the tickets, informed appellant and Billiter that .they were not good on his train and he could not tato them, and would not do so, as the train could not be stopped at Williamstown; but upon Billiter’s assurance that he would, upon the train’s reaching Lexington, get permission from appellee’s road superintendent there for the train to stop at Williamstown, or fading in this that he and appellant would leave the train at some necessary stop before reaching Williamstown, or continue on to Cincinnati and pay the regular fare from Williamstown thereto, the conductor was induced to retain the return tickets and accept them in payment of appellant’s and Billiter’s passage as far as Williamstown, and to likewise accept from them the cash fare of each from Somerset to Science Hill.

Upon tha arrival of the train at Lexington, Billiter went to the office of appellee’s superintendent, but not finding him, was unable to g'et permission for the train to stop at Williamstown. However, before leaving Lexington, Billiter made an arrangement with the engineer whereby the latter agreed to so reduce the speed of the train in passing Williamstown, without stopping it, that appellant and Billiter could alight therefrom at that place. This arrangement Billiter said was communicated to' appellant by him and he expressed his satisfaction with same.

Before reaching Wiliamstown appellant and Billiterplaced themselves in the coach next to the baggage car, and the latter informed the train porter and conductor of the agreement with the engineer and further told the conductor that he “intended to get off at Williamstown if he had to pull the emergency bell,” to which the conductor replied “For Christ’s sake don’t do that, you will break all the dishes on the'dining room table.”

When the train got within a half mile of Williams-town the engineer began to reduce its speed as promised, but to just what rate is not clear. It appears, however, to have been running slow enough for both appellant and [723]*723Billiter to believe it safe for them to jump off, as they did so, while the porter, who had opened the door for them, held a lantern in such a way as to enable .them to see where to alight. Billiter took the lead in jumping from the train and before doing so informed appellant, who stood on the car steps behind and near him, that the speed of the train was rather fast but that he would “chance it,” and advised appellant to jump as he saw him do, but further told him that if afraid to attempt to alight it would be safer for him to remain on the train. Appellant, however, followed him in jumping from the train but instead of alighting on his feet as Billiter had done, he fell and fractured his arm.

Appellant denied hearing the conversation in the dining car between Billiter and the conductor when the tickets were handed the latter by Billiter, also the conversation had by himself and Billiter with appellee’s ticket agent at Williamstown when the tickets were purchased; but admitted that he knew of Billiter’s attempt to see the road superintendent when the train reached Lexington and of his object in doing so, denying, however, that Billiter told him of the arrangement he had made with the engineer for reducing the speed of the train to enable them, to get off at Williamstown.

Billiter who seemed to be a wholly disinterested witness testified as to the conversation with both the ticket agent and conductor and that appellant was present at and heard both conversations. The ticket agent corroborated Billiter as to the conversation that took place when the tickets were purchased, but the conductor, though offered as a witness by appellees, was objected to by appellant and not permitted by the court to testify for the reason that, being himself a party to the action, appellees’ counsel had erroneously introduced other witnesses before offering his testimony.

Admitting, as he did, his presence at the time of the conversations referred to and in view of his connection with the subject matter of each conversation, it is incredible that appellant should have failed to hear what was said; but independently of those conversations, it was patent from the wording of his ticket and' the admissions of his reply as to the conditions under which it was purchased, that appellant knew it entitled him to be returned to Williamstown only on the train for which it was sold [724]*724and which, on its way back that afternoon from Science Hill to Cincinnati, would stop at Williamstown. Added to this knowledge of his rights under the ticket, was the further information undoubtedly given him by Billiter of the arrangement with the engineer of the train upon which they were returning for “slowing” it at Williams-town that they might get off there. These facts clearly show that appellant knew- the train upon which he was returning from Somerset would not stop upon its arrival at Williamstown and that in attempting to alight from it there he would have to do so while in motion and after some reduction of its speed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
131 S.W. 779, 140 Ky. 720, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glascock-v-cincinnati-new-orleans-texas-pacific-railway-co-kyctapp-1910.