Gladstone v. Owens

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 1, 2025
• Docket: 25-1345
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-1345 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 1, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court STEPHEN THEODORE GLADSTONE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-1345 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-02519-RTG) JUDGE REED OWENS; JUDGE KAREN (D. Colo.) ANN ROMEO,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Stephen Gladstone appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for

injunctive relief. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm.

I.

On August 13, 2025, Gladstone filed pro se a civil complaint. In his complaint,

Gladstone alleged that two Colorado state judges deprived him of his constitutional

rights by ruling against him in several state court proceedings. Specifically, he

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1345 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2

alleged that the first judge, who presided over a child custody proceeding, violated

Gladstone’s due process rights and right to equal protection by (1) issuing a no-

contact order without clear evidence; (2) disregarding evidence that Gladstone was a

fit parent; (3) participating in a coordinated effort to sever the father-child

relationship by, among other things, suppressing exculpatory evidence and allowing

perjury; and (4) coercing Gladstone into therapy with providers who had conflicts of

interest. He alleged that the second judge, who presided over proceedings involving

property ownership, violated his right to a jury trial by taking “a series of improper

procedural actions.” ROA at 12.

Gladstone filed a contemporaneous Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

and Preliminary Injunction (“TRO/PI Motion”) with his complaint. In his TRO/PI

Motion, Gladstone asked the district court to (1) “suspend enforcement of the

January 31, 2025 unconstitutional no-contact parenting order . . ., entered without

due process and causing ongoing harm to the parent-child relationship and the

emotional well-being of the minor child” and (2) “stay any partition proceedings,

including orders of sale or division of property, until the unjust

enrichment/fraudulent ownership claim is resolved by jury verdict.” Id. at 19.

Gladstone later filed an Emergency Motion to Remove Improper ACP

Enrollment (“ACP Motion”), in which he requested the immediate removal of his

child and his child’s mother from the Colorado Address Confidentiality Program

(“ACP”) and reinstatement of reunification therapy.

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On August 27, 2025, the district court issued an order (“Order”) denying

Gladstone’s TRO/PI Motion. The court found that Gladstone had not shown a

substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits on any of his claims. It provided

three rationales for its conclusion. First, it reasoned that Gladstone’s claims

challenging the state court proceedings may be barred by the abstention principles of

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Second, it reasoned that, if Gladstone sought

to overturn final state court orders and judgments, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

precluded the district court from adjudicating Gladstone’s claims challenging the

constitutionality of those orders. Third, and finally, the court reasoned that

Gladstone’s claims, which were asserted against two state judges, were barred by the

doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.

On August 28, 2025, the district court issued a minute order (“Minute Order”)

denying Gladstone’s ACP Motion. Noting that the ACP Motion “appear[ed] to

request injunctive relief,” the court denied the motion “for the same reasons as set

forth in the Court’s August 27, 2025 [Order].” ROA at 88.

Gladstone filed two motions seeking reconsideration. Before the district court

ruled on those motions, Gladstone timely filed this appeal from the district court’s

denial of his motions for injunctive relief in the Order and the Minute Order. 1

Following this court’s abatement, the district court denied the motions to reconsider.

1 Gladstone does not appeal the district court’s ruling on his request for a TRO. Indeed, a district court’s denial of a TRO is ordinarily not appealable. See Tooele Cnty. v. United States, 820 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Temporary restraining orders are not ordinarily appealable, but preliminary injunctions are appealable.”); 3 Appellate Case: 25-1345 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4

Gladstone moved for a stay pending appeal in both the district court and many

times before this court. Each motion was unsuccessful. He has four motions pending

before this court: (1) “Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF

No. 28); (2) “Second Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF

No. 29); (3) “Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF

No. 35); and (4) “Motion for Judicial Notice of Post-Record Agency Conduct

Relevant to Ongoing Constitutional Harm” (ECF No. 31).

II.

Before addressing the merits of Gladstone’s arguments, we first clarify which

district court decisions are before us on appeal. The relevant timeline is as follows:

August 27, 2025: district court issues the Order denying Gladstone’s TRO/PI Motion August 28, 2025: Gladstone files a motion to reconsider the district court’s Order August 28, 2025: district court issues the Minute Order denying Gladstone’s ACP Motion August 28, 2025: Gladstone files a motion to reconsider the district court’s Minute Order September 2, 2025: Gladstone files a notice of appeal September 9, 2025: Tenth Circuit court files an order abating Gladstone’s appeal pending the district court’s disposition of Gladstone’s motions for reconsideration

Caddo Nation of Okla. v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 877 F.3d 1171, 1173 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017) (“It is well established that absent extraordinary circumstances a litigant may not appeal a district court’s denial of a temporary restraining order.”).

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September 11, 2025: district court issues an order denying motions for reconsideration We treat Gladstone’s motions for reconsideration as motions to alter or amend

the district court’s judgments under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining

that a motion for reconsideration is treated as a 59(e) motion if it is filed within

Rule 59’s filing deadline); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (providing that Rule 59 motions

must be filed within 28 days of the district court’s entry of judgment). Under Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, “[a] party intending to challenge an order disposing

of [a Rule 59 motion] . . . must file a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal

. . . within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the entry of the order

disposing of the last such remaining motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). “Put

differently, [w]hen an appellant challenges an order ruling on a [Rule 59 motion], a

new or amended notice of appeal is necessary.” Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am.,

80 F.4th 1136, 1160 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Gladstone filed a notice of appeal before the district court ruled on his

motions for reconsideration, and he did not file “a new or amended notice of appeal”

after the district court ruled on those motions. See id. Therefore, the district court’s

order denying Gladstone’s motions for reconsideration is not before us on appeal.

The only district court rulings we consider on appeal are the Order and the Minute

Order denying Gladstone’s requests for injunctive relief.

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III.

This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary

injunction for abuse of discretion. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo, 427 F.3d 1253, 1258

(10th Cir. 2005). “The standard for abuse of discretion is high.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it issues a ruling that is “based

on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the

evidence,” or acts in a manner that is “arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.” Amoco

Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

The grant of a preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule.”

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urb. Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007)

(quotation marks omitted). Because “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1258.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show (1) he “is substantially

likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) he “will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction

is denied,” (3) his “threatened injury outweighs the injury the opposing party will

suffer under the injunction,” and (4) “the injunction would not be adverse to the

public interest.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d

1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009).

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Construing Gladstone’s pro se brief 2 liberally, as we must, we discern four

challenges to the district court’s rulings denying Gladstone’s TRO/PI Motion and

ACP Motion.

First, Gladstone argues that the district court incorrectly applied the law in its

orders denying Gladstone’s motions for injunctive relief. Specifically, he argues that

the court erred by failing to apply the four-factor test set out in Winter v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). This argument lacks merit.

Winter provides that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish

that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. In the Order, the district court

correctly identified this four-part test and applied it to Gladstone’s motions,

concluding that Gladstone was not entitled to injunctive relief because he did not

show “a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits in this proceeding.” 3 ROA

2 Together with Gladstone’s opening brief, we also consider his Notice of State Exhaustion, which he filed with this court on November 5, 2025. In this filing, Gladstone provided additional arguments related to the merits of his underlying claims. 3 Although the court did not analyze all four factors of the Winter test, this was not legal error. Because a movant must satisfy his burden as to each preliminary injunction factor, Gladstone’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits is fatal to his requests for injunctive relief. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Denver Homeless Out Loud v. Denver, 32 F.4th 1259, 1277 (10th Cir. 2022) (“An injunction can issue only if each factor is established.” (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24)). Thus, the district court did not err by declining to reach the latter three factors of the test.

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at 75. Accordingly, there is no merit to Gladstone’s argument that the district court

incorrectly applied the law in denying his requests for injunctive relief.

Second, Gladstone argues that the district court erred by failing to conduct a

separate Winter analysis in the Minute Order, which denied Gladstone’s ACP Motion

“for the same reasons as set forth” in the Order denying his TRO/PI Motion. ROA

at 88. Gladstone asserts that the ACP Motion “must be adjudicated independently”

because the ACP harms him “independently of any custody order.” Appellant’s Br.

at 10–11. But, as explained above, the district court concluded in its Order that

Gladstone failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Because

Gladstone failed to satisfy the first prerequisite for injunctive relief, the district court

did not need to reach the question of whether Gladstone would suffer injury unless

the injunction issues. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

disposing of Gladstone’s ACP Motion in the Minute Order without analyzing the

purported harmful effects of the ACP.

Third, Gladstone argues that the district court erred by failing to state the

findings of fact it relied on in denying his motions for injunctive relief, as required

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). Rule 52(a)(1) states that “[i]n an action

tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts

specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” The requirements are the same

for interlocutory injunctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). Under the rule, “a district

court must sufficiently indicate the factual basis for its conclusions as to ultimate

facts, indicate the legal standard against which it has measured the evidence, and

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broadly cover all material issues.” Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d

769, 782 (10th Cir. 2009).

But here, the district court did not resolve any issues of fact in considering

Gladstone’s motions for injunctive relief. Rather, the court’s analysis was based

entirely on questions of law: namely, whether Gladstone’s claims were barred by the

Younger abstention doctrine, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the doctrine of

absolute judicial immunity. And the district court denied Gladstone’s motions not

because it made findings of fact adverse to Gladstone, but because it found that the

court lacked jurisdiction to consider Gladstone’s claims. Thus, the district court was

not required to enter formal findings of fact under Rule 52(a). See Tyson Foods,

565 F.3d at 782 (explaining that Rule 52(a) requires findings only as to the “ultimate

facts” supporting the court’s conclusions of law); see also Featherstone v. Barash,

345 F.2d 246, 250 (10th Cir. 1965) (“[I]f there is no dispute between the parties

about the facts, allegations of the complaint may be accepted as true, thus eliminating

the necessity of formal findings.”); Beacon Hill CBO, II, Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset

Mgmt. LLC, 314 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that Rule 52(a)

does not require factual findings when a court’s consideration of a preliminary

injunction motion “was based entirely on legal questions, accepting the facts as

alleged in the complaint”).

Fourth, and finally, Gladstone challenges the district court’s conclusion that he

failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Gladstone’s merits

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argument rests on his assertion that neither the Younger abstention doctrine nor the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes his claims.

The Younger abstention doctrine requires a district court to abstain from

hearing a plaintiff’s claims when

(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.

Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks

We agree with the district court that these requirements are satisfied in this

case to the extent that Gladstone’s custody and property proceedings in Colorado

state court remain ongoing. 4 Such proceedings undoubtedly implicate important state

interests. See Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-

established that federal courts lack jurisdiction over ‘the whole subject of the

domestic relations of husband and wife, and parent and child.’” (quoting

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)); see also Bank of N.Y. v.

Mehner, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (D.N.M. 2005) (“Federal courts are reluctant to

4 It is not clear from the record whether Gladstone’s state proceedings are “ongoing” for Younger purposes. In his complaint, Gladstone indicates that these proceedings are ongoing. But in his Notice of State Exhaustion, Gladstone states that “all available state judicial and administrative remedies have been fully pursued and exhausted.” ECF 36 at 2–3. However, we need not resolve this question because, as explained below, if the proceedings are not ongoing, Gladstone’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 10 Appellate Case: 25-1345 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11

get involved in local real estate matters, which are generally state matters.”). Further,

the Colorado state court proceedings offer Gladstone an adequate opportunity to

litigate any federal constitutional issues that may arise; indeed, Gladstone concedes

that he has raised such issues in the Colorado state proceedings.

Gladstone does not dispute that these requirements are satisfied. Instead, he

argues that the Younger doctrine does not apply because this case does not fit into

one of the “three ‘exceptional’ categories” of cases that warrant Younger abstention.

Appellant’s Br. at 11. We disagree. This court has recognized that the Younger

abstention doctrine applies to three categories of state cases: (1) “state criminal

prosecutions,” (2) “civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceedings

involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to

perform their judicial functions.” Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC,

953 F.3d 660, 670 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)). We have held that the third category is present when a

federal case “involve[s] requests to directly or indirectly thwart state court

compliance processes.” Id. at 671. In other words, Younger abstention is required

“when the relief requested from the federal court would enjoin or otherwise interfere

with” ongoing state proceedings. Id. at 672. Here, Gladstone asked the district court

to vacate the no-contact parenting order issued in his state child custody proceeding

and stay the partition proceedings pending before the state court. Assuming that these

proceedings are ongoing, Gladstone’s requested relief would unquestionably interfere

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with ongoing state proceedings. We therefore conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that Gladstone’s claims may be barred by Younger.

Next, Gladstone argues that the district court erred by concluding that, if

Gladstone’s state proceedings have concluded, “the Court lacks jurisdiction to

adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims challenging the constitutionality” of final orders and

judgments issued by the state courts under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See ROA

at 75–76. Gladstone argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar his claim

because he “asserts an independent federal claim” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Appellant’s Br. at 11.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “federal district courts lack

jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” K. A. v. Barnes,

134 F.4th 1067, 1074 (10th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In other words, Rooker-Feldman “bars a losing party’s claim that the state

judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Importantly, the fact that a plaintiff asserts an independent federal

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not preclude application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. “It is well-settled . . . that an unsuccessful state litigant cannot challenge an

adverse state judgment and circumvent the rule of Rooker-Feldman simply by

bringing a constitutional claim under the civil rights statutes.” Atkinson-Bird v. Utah,

Div. of Child & Fam. Servs., 92 F. App’x 645, 647 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal

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quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is most frequently

applied in the context of civil rights actions.” Id.

In this case, Gladstone explicitly asked the district court to vacate orders

entered against him by Colorado state courts, asserting that those orders deprived him

of his constitutional rights. Since “an action to void a state-court judgment is a

quintessential case for application of Rooker-Feldman,” K. A., 134 F.4th at 1074, the

district court was correct in concluding that, if the state court proceedings have

concluded, the district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Gladstone’s claims. The

fact that Gladstone asserts an independent federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does

not change this analysis. At bottom, adjudicating Gladstone’s claims would require

the district court to relitigate the various issues reached in Gladstone’s state court

proceedings and consider whether to reverse or modify the state court judgments.

Cf. Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff’s § 1983 challenge alleging that a

child custody decision violated his constitutional rights because the “lawsuit

essentially [sought] to undo the custody decision of the Colorado state court”).

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

Gladstone’s claims may be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion

that Gladstone failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 5

5 We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that “the claims asserted against [state court judges] are barred by absolute judicial immunity.” ROA at 76. 13 Appellate Case: 25-1345 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 14

IV.

Because Gladstone has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his motions for injunctive relief, we affirm. We deny as moot Gladstone’s

“Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF No. 28), his “Second

Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF No. 29), and his

“Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal” (ECF No. 35). We

also deny his “Motion for Judicial Notice of Post-Record Agency Conduct Relevant

to Ongoing Constitutional Harm” (ECF No. 31). Although government records are

generally an acceptable source for taking judicial notice, High Desert Relief, Inc. v.

United States, 917 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2019), Gladstone did not provide such

records in his motion. Instead, he provided a copy of a demand letter he wrote

requesting certain official records from a state agency. This is not a source “whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge

“[J]udicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984). In the instant case, Gladstone seeks only injunctive relief against the state court judges, not monetary damages, so his claims are not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See id. But because we agree with the district court that Gladstone’s claims are barred by the Younger or Rooker-Feldman doctrines, this error is harmless. 14