Gladney's, Inc. v. Louisiana Magazine

156 So. 659
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 3, 1934
DocketNo. 1371.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 156 So. 659 (Gladney's, Inc. v. Louisiana Magazine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gladney's, Inc. v. Louisiana Magazine, 156 So. 659 (La. Ct. App. 1934).

Opinion

LE BLANC, Judge.

The Louisiana Chamber of Commerce, a purely civic association devoted to the advancement of the industrial, commercial, and agricultural welfare of the state of Louisiana, published as its official organ a magazine called “Louisiana.” Prior to January, 1930, Herbert Bayliss who was the general manager of the association, appears to have been the publisher of the magazine, but on January 13, 1930, there was an agreement entered into between himself, representing the association as its manager, and one Matthew J. O’Neil, under which the latter was given the exclusive right of publication under certain terms and conditions therein fully set out.

After this contract with O’Neil had been entered into, the services of the plaintiff herein, as printers, were secured to print the magazine, and the May, 1930, and a special issue in August of that same year were gotten out, for which plaintiff rendered bills in due time, addressed to “Louisiana Magazine, Mr. M. J. O’Neil, Business Manager, Baton Rouge, La.” The bills, aggregating the sum of $1,377, were never paid, and this suit was instituted as a result thereof.

The suit is directed against the Louisiana Chamber of Commercfe, Herbert Bayliss, and *660 the Louisiana Magazine, the latter alleged to have been a commercial partnership composed of Harley A. W. Howeott and Matthew J. O’Neil, and judgment is asked for against all of these defendants in solido.

In its petition, plaintiff alleges that, in consummating the contract of January IS, I9S0, O’Neil was acting for an undisclosed partnership (that just referred to) created for the purpose of publishing and circulating the magazine, for buying and selling advertising space therein, and generally to carry out the terms of the contract he had entered into with the Louisiana Chamber of Commerce. The petition then sets out certain acts performed by Harley Á. W. Howeott which definitely identified him as O’Neil’s partner. It is further alleged that, whether the contract of January 13, 1930, was originally intended for the benefit of the undisclosed ¡partnership or not, or was thereafter assigned to it, the members of the said partnership, in assuming the obligations thereunder and in receiving and appropriating its benefits, are estopped from denying such obligations, and particularly the one herein sued on.

Shortly after the filing of the suit, Harley A. W. Howeott died, and his heirs, Harley B. Howeott and Miss Mary Howeott, were made parties defendant in his stead. O’Neil, it appears, has entirely disappeared from the scene, his whereabouts being unknown. The other defendants apparently have 'been dropped from the proceeding, and the contest is now narrowed down to one between plaintiff and the two heirs of Mr. Howeott. The defense of these two is a denial of the alleged partnership between their late father and O’Neil and a denial of any act or conduct on his part which may have constituted a partnership by estoppel.

From a judgment rejecting its demand, the plaintiff has taken this appeal.

It may be appropriate at this time to state that, in a supplemental petition, plaintiff made allegations, in the alternative, to the effect that, irrespective of the existence of the partnership -as set out in its original petition, Harley A. W. Howeott was personally and individually interested in the operation of the business he had designated “Louisiana Magazine,” and the contract entered into in the name of O’Neil was in truth and in fact made for his personal and individual account, and all obligations contracted by the business were his personal obligations for which he was individually responsible. Claiming that the allegations of this supplemental petition were inconsistent with those of an undisclosed partnership as set out in the original petition, defendants filed a motion to have the court order plaintiff to elect on which ii would stand in prosecuting its claim against them. The court sustained the motion to elect, and plaintiff chose to stand upon its allegations of partnership. Counsel for plaintiff reserved a bill, and in this court complains of the ruling.

We are of the opinion that counsel’s complaint is well founded. While the legal conclusion reached, as appears by the demand in the respective petitions, is different, they are both more or less based on the same state of facts. Whether the obligations incurred under, and the benefits derived from, the contract, related to Harley A. W. Howeott personally from his individual connection therewith or as a result of the alleged partnership,, the result would be the same, under the theory advanced by the plaintiff. Besides, the demand in the supplemental petition is made in the alternative. We think that the language of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilzell Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd., v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138, is appropriate to the situation that is here presented. We quote the following excerpts from the body of page 279 of 120 La., 45 So. 138, 140:

“Nor is the exception of inconsistency better founded. The petition does no more than draw alternative legal conclusions from certain facts that are stated, and we can see no objection to this being done. It is no more than doing in one suit what might be done in two. * * *

“Cases might arise where joining two alternative demands in one petition, instead o-f urging them by separate suits, might cause complications, or confusion, or useless expense or delay; but in a case like the present, where the parties and the facts are the same on both demands, and the alternative theories are resorted to merely for the purpose of adapting the demand to the view which the court may take of the matter, we see no reason why the litigation should not be settled in one suit. * * *

Under its ruling on the motion to elect, the lower court necessarily restricted the testimony to the question of the alleged partnership and, ordinarily, a reversal of the ruling might require a remand of the case to admit testimony on the alternative demand. Counsel for plaintiff has stated in his brief, however, that he feels that the evidence submitted shows the personal interest of Harley A. W. Howeott in the enterprise and his individual assumption of the debt sued on, and *661 it is therefore unnecessary to order a remand. Taking our cue from counsel’s statement, we now proceed to consider and decide the case on the merits as though all available testimony were in the record.

There are two issues presented, involving mainly questions of fact, on both of which the plaintiff carried the burden of proof: First, did a commercial partnership composed of Harley A. W. Howcott and Matthew J. O’Neil exist as a fact for the purposes set out in plaintiff’s petition, and did that partnership carry out these purposes? And, second, if there was no such partnership existing as a fact, did Harley A. W.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Brandin Slate Co. v. Bennett
190 So. 342 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1939)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
156 So. 659, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gladneys-inc-v-louisiana-magazine-lactapp-1934.