1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSEPH GLADNEY, Case No. 22-cv-05128-JD
8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE SERVICE v. 9
10 ROSSBERG, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 14 original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff has filed an amended 15 complaint. 16 DISCUSSION 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 21 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 23 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 24 Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 27 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 1 cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 2 the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 3 omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 4 face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” 5 standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 6 must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 7 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 8 to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 10 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 11 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 LEGAL CLAIMS 13 Plaintiff alleges that he was provided inadequate lighting in his cell. “‘Adequate lighting is 14 one of the fundamental attributes of “adequate shelter” required by the Eighth Amendment.’” 15 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) 16 (quoting Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1984)). Lighting which is so poor that 17 it is inadequate for reading, causes eyestrain and fatigue, and hinders attempts to maintain basic 18 sanitation violates the Eighth Amendment. See Hoptowit, 773 F.2d at 783; see also Toussaint v. 19 McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court refuses to “constitutionalize” 20 particular expert standard for adequate lighting, but concludes that inmates in this case must be 21 afforded sufficient light to read comfortably while seated or lying on bunk). Similarly, the 22 constant illumination of an inmate’s cell, which causes him sleeping and other mental and 23 psychological problems, is unconstitutional. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090-91; see also Grenning 24 v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment where there 25 were material issues as to brightness of lighting and effect on plaintiff). 26 In a § 1983 or a Bivens action -- where employers and supervisors are not made to 27 automatically answer for the torts of their employees and subordinates -- the term ‘supervisory 1 notwithstanding, is liable only for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (finding 2 under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 3 complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly showing” that 4 top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of 5 high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely and non- 6 discriminatory explanations). 7 A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in 8 the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 9 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 10 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly 11 unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own 12 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 13 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 14 indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 15 omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable 16 actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional 17 conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 18 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 19 conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional procedures which authorized 20 unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory liability). 21 Plaintiff is a state prisoner who was detained at the West County Detention Facility. He 22 contends that for approximately twenty-two days he was provided inadequate lighting, despite 23 submitting multiple repair requests. Plaintiff states that there were only two lights in his room and 24 one light did not work and the other was extremely dim and sometimes flickered. As a result, 25 plaintiff began suffering panic attacks. He states that Lieutenant Rossberg and Sergeant Lynch 26 failed to have the lighting fixed despite his requests. The claim is sufficient to proceed against 27 these defendants due to their personal involvement.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSEPH GLADNEY, Case No. 22-cv-05128-JD
8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE SERVICE v. 9
10 ROSSBERG, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 14 original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff has filed an amended 15 complaint. 16 DISCUSSION 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 21 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 23 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 24 Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed 27 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 1 cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 2 the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 3 omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 4 face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” 5 standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 6 must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 7 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement 8 to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by 10 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was 11 committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 LEGAL CLAIMS 13 Plaintiff alleges that he was provided inadequate lighting in his cell. “‘Adequate lighting is 14 one of the fundamental attributes of “adequate shelter” required by the Eighth Amendment.’” 15 Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) 16 (quoting Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1984)). Lighting which is so poor that 17 it is inadequate for reading, causes eyestrain and fatigue, and hinders attempts to maintain basic 18 sanitation violates the Eighth Amendment. See Hoptowit, 773 F.2d at 783; see also Toussaint v. 19 McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (court refuses to “constitutionalize” 20 particular expert standard for adequate lighting, but concludes that inmates in this case must be 21 afforded sufficient light to read comfortably while seated or lying on bunk). Similarly, the 22 constant illumination of an inmate’s cell, which causes him sleeping and other mental and 23 psychological problems, is unconstitutional. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090-91; see also Grenning 24 v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment where there 25 were material issues as to brightness of lighting and effect on plaintiff). 26 In a § 1983 or a Bivens action -- where employers and supervisors are not made to 27 automatically answer for the torts of their employees and subordinates -- the term ‘supervisory 1 notwithstanding, is liable only for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (finding 2 under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 3 complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly showing” that 4 top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of 5 high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely and non- 6 discriminatory explanations). 7 A supervisor may be liable under § 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in 8 the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 9 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 10 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly 11 unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own 12 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 13 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 14 indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 15 omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable 16 actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional 17 conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 18 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 19 conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional procedures which authorized 20 unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory liability). 21 Plaintiff is a state prisoner who was detained at the West County Detention Facility. He 22 contends that for approximately twenty-two days he was provided inadequate lighting, despite 23 submitting multiple repair requests. Plaintiff states that there were only two lights in his room and 24 one light did not work and the other was extremely dim and sometimes flickered. As a result, 25 plaintiff began suffering panic attacks. He states that Lieutenant Rossberg and Sergeant Lynch 26 failed to have the lighting fixed despite his requests. The claim is sufficient to proceed against 27 these defendants due to their personal involvement. Plaintiff’s allegations that these defendants 1 presented sufficient allegations regarding the actions of defendants’ subordinates. 2 CONCLUSION 3 1. The case will go forward against Lieutenant Rossberg and Sergeant Lynch. The 4 Clerk will issue a summons and the United States Marshal will serve, without prepayment of fees, 5 copies of the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 11) with attachments and copies of this order on 6 Lieutenant Rossberg and Sergeant Lynch at the West County Detention Facility. 7 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: 8 a. No later than fifty-six days from the date of service, defendants will file a 9 motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion will be supported by 10 adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil 11 Procedure 56, and will include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the 12 events at issue. If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 13 judgment, he will so inform the Court prior to the date his summary judgment motion is due. All 14 papers filed with the Court will be promptly served on the plaintiff. 15 b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants will also serve, on a 16 separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953- 17 954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand and Wyatt notices must be 19 given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, 20 not earlier); Rand at 960 (separate paper requirement). 21 c. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, will be filed with the 22 Court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion was served 23 upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING,” which is 24 provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), 25 and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust 27 his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should take 1 note of the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which is provided 2 to him as required by Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). 3 d. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than 4 || fourteen days after the opposition is served upon them. 5 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 6 || No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 7 3. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants, or 8 defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 9 defendants or defendants’ counsel. 10 4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11 No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the 12 || parties may conduct discovery. 13 5. It is plaintiffs responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 14 || informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 15 || Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to a 16 || do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 3 17 || Civil Procedure 41(b). S 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: February 14, 2023 20 21 JAMES TO 22 United Stf/tes District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. 3 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 4 granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 6 Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- 7 that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 8 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 9 case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 10 supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 11 complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 12 interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 13 shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of 14 material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, 15 if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be 16 dismissed and there will be no trial. 17 NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION) 18 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking 19 to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. 20 You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did 21 exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations 22 (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents 23 accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other 24 sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. 25 If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it is granted, 26 your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.