GKC Strategic Value Master Fund, L.P. v. Baker Hughes Incorporated

Court of Chancery of Delaware·Decided June 25, 2019·No. CA 2017-0769-SG·Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GKC STRATEGIC VALUE MASTER ) FUND, LP F/K/A GKC APPRAISAL ) RIGHTS MASTER FUND, LP AND ) WALLEYE TRADING LLC, )

)

Petitioners, )

)

v. ) C.A. No. 2017-0769-SG )

BAKER HUGHES INCORPORATED, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: March 20, 2019 Date Decided: June 25, 2019

Ned Weinberger and Thomas Curry, of LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Eric J. Belfi, Ira A. Schochet, and David J. Schwartz, of LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Kevin M. Coen and Sabrina M. Hendershot, of MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Arthur F. Golden, Andrew Ditchfield, and Andrew S. Gehring, of DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Respondent.

John D. Hendershot and Susan M. Hannigan, of RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Paula Anderson and Alan Goudiss, of SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, New York, New York, Attorneys for Third-Party General Electric Company.

Mark Lebovitch, of BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP, New York, New York, Attorney for Non-Party Tri-State Joint Fund.

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor

I have noted in a past decision 1 the disturbingly convincing frequency fallacy known rather jocularly as the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon. That fallacy represents the perception that, once something first comes to our attention, references to that thing appear with surprising regularity thereafter. The fallacy, of course, results not from increased frequency of the references, but from our newly-created aptitude, once aware, to pick those references out of the background noise of life. One should, therefore, not ascribe much significance to the phenomenon. Nonetheless, when as a judge I am called on to deliver multiple opinions on a formerly-dormant issue in a short period of time, I find it hard not to conclude that issue is generally of increasing relevance outside of my own docket.

Such an issue is presented in this Memorandum Opinion. The matter is before me on a challenge to the confidential treatment of pleadings and exhibits to those pleadings, filed in a settled-and-closed—now reopened—appraisal action. The exhibits, as is permitted by rule, 2 were filed confidentiality. The challenge, also by rule, 3 resulted in a duty on the original filer of the exhibits to submit, within ten days, a public version of the documents, redacting only those parts that the original filer and interested parties believe in good faith are subject to the narrow exception to the

1 Fotta v. Morgan, 2016 WL 775032, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016). 2 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(d)(2). 3 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(f).

rule that proceedings in this Court are open to public scrutiny. 4 Here, the parties seeking continued confidentiality—Baker Hughes, a GE Company LLC (“BHGE”) and Third-Party General Electric Company (“GE”) (together, the Respondents)— filed what amounts to a parody of public versions of the exhibits; documents that are pied displays of blackened rectangles against a white background, entirely unintelligible to the “reader.”

The Respondents argue that, because Non-Party Tri-State Joint Fund (“Tri-

State Fund” or the “Challenger”) has a litigation purpose instead of a “public interest”—whatever that may be—in the documents, Rule 5.1 is essentially inapplicable. Therefore, they have forgone the opportunity to file public versions containing good faith redactions under the Rule. This is a litigation tactic that the Respondents have chosen to pursue. I am sure, and nothing in this Memorandum Opinion should be read to the contrary, that the Respondents pursued this tactic in good faith; however, the choice of such a tactic has consequences. Because I determine that, under Rule 5.1, the particular reason for the challenge is irrelevant to the Respondents’ duty to produce a public version, it is clear to me that the Respondents are not in compliance with Rule 5.1.

4 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(1) (“A Document shall receive Confidential Treatment only if and to the extent that it contains Confidential Information.”).

I note that the Respondents propose that, if (as is the case) I find Rule 5.1 applicable, they should be given a second chance to file public versions of the documents containing only good faith redactions. Rule 5.1, however, requires that precise thing to have been done within ten days. The Respondents could have—but did not—seek relief from the time requirement, citing, for instance, the amount of material subject to review. Instead, the Respondents chose to attempt to keep the documents entirely from public view, despite the prior submission of the documents to the Court for review in connection with a request for judicial action. That, I find, is not contemplated by Rule 5.1. Having chosen the litigation road by which they hoped to preserve complete confidentiality, the Respondents cannot turn back; they have passed the fork that led to compliant redacted public versions of the documents at issue.

Rule 5.1 was created to accommodate a minor exception to a truism, that in a free and democratic society courts must conduct their business in the open, subject always to scrutiny by the public that these courts serve.5 In very limited situations, pleadings and exhibits thereto contain information so personal to a party, and of such tangential public interest, that the information should be withheld in the interest of

5 Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(a) (“General principle of public access. -- Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, proceedings in a civil action are a matter of public record. All pleadings and other materials of any sort, including motions, briefs, letters, affidavits, exhibits, deposition transcripts, answers to interrogatories, answers to requests for admissions, and hearing transcripts, that are filed with the Register in Chancery, provided to the Court, or otherwise part of the record in a civil action (‘Documents’) shall be available for public access.”).

justice. In such a situation, it would be a denial of justice to put the party to the Morton’s Fork of withholding confidential material from the Court—thereby forgoing justice upon a complete record—or ceding their legitimate privacy interests via a public filing. Rule 5.1 accommodates those rare instances by setting forth a procedure whereby the party interested in confidentiality may designate such matters, in which case this Court conducts a balance of the public and private interests, with a tie going to disclosure. Where litigants fail to comply with the strictures of Rule 5.1, the default—litigation in the public view—obtains.

The Respondents have failed to comply with Rule 5.1. As a result, the exhibits in contention here shall be made available to the public. This renders the issue of the continued redactions in the motions at issue moot, since they preserve only the confidentiality of information available in the exhibits. Therefore, unredacted versions of those pleadings shall be made available to the public as well. To the extent the exhibits contain privileged, as opposed to allegedly confidential, information, the confidential versions originally filed with the Court already contain appropriate redactions, and those shall continue in the public versions. To the extent the Respondents’ concern is that the information disclosed may lead—as the Challenger hopes—to a viable plenary action against the Respondents, avoidance of that consequence is not a legitimate aim of the confidentiality regime set out in Rule 5.1.

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GKC Strategic Value Master Fund, L.P. v. Baker Hughes Incorporated, (Del. Ct. App. 2019).

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