Gjovik v. State of Washington

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 28, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00807
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 ASHLEY GJOVIK, 11 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:22-cv-00807-RAJ-BAT 12 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 13 FOR EMERGENCY STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s emergency motion for a temporary 17 restraining order (TRO). Dkt. # 11. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 18 motion and determines that this action is barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, see 19 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005), and the Anti– 20 Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter 21 jurisdiction over this case and DISMISSES the action. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from enforcing an anti-harassment 24 order issued against her. Dkt. # 11. That order, issued after a hearing in King County 25 Superior Court, directs Plaintiff not to contact, surveil, or come within 1,000 feet of her 26 former co-worker at Apple, Inc. Dkt. # 1-1 at 13. The order also prevents Plaintiff from 27 making “any statements or posts” about her former co-worker on social media. Id. Plaintiff was terminated from employment at Apple on September 9, 2021, and 1 alleges that she was not informed of the reason. Dkt. # 1 (Compl.) ¶ 34. Around this same 2 time, Plaintiff complained about Apple to the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal 3 Employment Opportunity Commission, and the California Department of Fair 4 Employment and Housing relating to potential violations of labor and anti-discrimination 5 law. See Dkt. # 10 at 3-7. In defending some of these allegations, Apple claimed that 6 Plaintiff’s former co-worker made a complaint about her disclosing confidential 7 information, and that complaint formed the basis upon which Plaintiff was terminated. Id. 8 ¶ 36. 9 The relationship between Plaintiff and the former co-worker deteriorated, and both 10 began posting about each other on various social media and other channels. Id. ¶¶ 35, 40- 11 46. Ultimately, on January 31, 2022, the former co-worker petitioned for an anti- 12 harassment protection order to protect against alleged unlawful harassment by Plaintiff. 13 Compl. ¶ 51; Dkt. # 1-1 at pp. 5-10. The petition alleges that Plaintiff engaged in “targeted 14 harassment,” including “by posting defamatory content and other false statements” on her 15 Twitter account. Dkt. # 1-1 at 5-10. The petition further alleges that Plaintiff engaged in 16 “cyberstalking” and “publish[ed] personal and private information about [the former co- 17 worker] … on her Twitter account with the malicious intention of stoking her followers” 18 to continue the harassment. Id. King County Superior Court issued the anti-harassment 19 order against Plaintiff on March 1, 2022. Id. at 12-13. The Complaint makes clear that the 20 state court matter is still ongoing pending appeal. Compl. ¶¶ 210, 221, 269. 21 Plaintiff instituted the current lawsuit on June 9, 2022. Dkt. # 1. Her motion for 22 emergency relief, filed on June 21, 2022, argues that the anti-harassment order is contrary 23 to law on various constitutional and statutory grounds and asks this Court to enjoin its 24 enforcement and the state court proceedings. Dkt. # 11 at 26. Pursuant to Local Rule 25 65(b)(5), Defendants filed a notice indicating their intent to oppose the motion on June 22, 26 2022. Dkt. # 13. Defendants opposed Plaintiff’s motion within 48 hours as required by 27 Local Civil Rule 65(b)(5). Dkt. # 14. 1 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, district courts lack jurisdiction to review 4 state court judgments. The Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court 5 judgments, granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, is exclusive and “precludes a United States 6 district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise 7 be empowered to adjudicate....” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544 8 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). Plaintiff’s complaint was filed in direct response to the Superior 9 Court anti-harassment order, and is not an instance of concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 292. 10 “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in 11 federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, 12 and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th 13 Cir. 2003). The doctrine bars suits “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 14 caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 15 commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon 16 Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. The doctrine applies “not only to final judgments, but also 17 to ‘interlocutory state court decisions.’ ” Santos v. Superior Court of Guam, 711 F. App’x 18 419, 420 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 19 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001)). 20 Plaintiff’s lawsuit, which principally seeks to enjoin the King County anti- 21 harassment order and further state court proceedings, falls squarely within purview of the 22 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The constitutional issues raised in the complaint are also 23 “inextricably intertwined” with the anti-harassment order and therefore also barred by the 24 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Noel, 341 F.3d at 1157 (“[I]f the constitutional 25 claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the 26 state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding … then the district court is in essence being 27 called upon to review the state-court decision. This the district court may not do.”) 1 (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 2 (1983)). 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not Plaintiff’s only problem. The Anti-Injunction 4 Act precludes “grant[ing] an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as 5 expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 6 protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. As such, this Court may not grant 7 an injunction to stay the King County Superior Court proceedings, or issue any declaratory 8 relief “if those judgments have the same effect as an injunction.” California v. Randtron, 9 284 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2002). All of Plaintiff’s claims stem from the entry and 10 enforcement of the anti-harassment protection order in an ongoing state court matter. Such 11 requests for relief are straightforwardly barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 12 III. CONCLUSION 13 In conclusion, because the Court finds that it is divested of subject matter 14 jurisdiction, pursuant to Rooker–Feldman and the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court cannot 15 grant the relief sought by Plaintiff. As such, the Court hereby: 16 1. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 11) and 17 all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 12, 16) as moot; and 18 2. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 19 The clerk is directed to close this case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21 DATED this 28th day of June, 2022. 22 A 23 24 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 25 United States District Judge 26 27