Givens v. Moore

District Court, W.D. North Carolina·Decided September 7, 2022·No. 3:20-cv-00453·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CIVIL CASE NO. 3:20-cv-00453-MR

RAMON GIVENS,1 ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) MEMORANDUM OF vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) J.C. MOORE, et al.,2 ) ) Defendants. ) _______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Phillip Banham, Jerry Burch, Jarrid Moore, and Jeffrey Zederbaum’s [Doc. 57] and the Plaintiff [Doc. 69]. Also pending is the Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time of Dispositive Motions [Doc. 60]. I. BACKGROUND The incarcerated Plaintiff Ramon Givens, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing the circumstances

1 According to the North Carolina Department of Public Safety’s website, the Plaintiff’s first name is “Ramone.” See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do? method=view&offenderID=0604055&searchOffenderId=0604055&searchDOBRange=0 &listurl=pagelistoffendersearchresults&listpage=1 (last accessed Sept. 2, 2022); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

2 The Defendants are identified in the Complaint as “J.C. Moore” and “John Doe” #1, 2, and 3. [Doc. 1 at 1]. The Clerk will be instructed to correct their names in accordance with the Defendants’ summary judgment materials. surrounding his August 2017 traffic stop and arrest. The unverified Complaint [Doc. 1], Amended Complaint [Doc. 22], and Second Amended

Complaint [Doc. 31] passed initial review on claims that Defendants Banhan, Burch, Moore, and Zederbaum used excessive force and/or failed to intervene during his arrest. [Docs. 10, 25, 41]. The parties timely filed cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.3 [Docs.

57, 59]. The Court entered an Order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising the Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the Defendants’ summary judgment

motion and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 61: Roseboro Order]. The parties have filed Responses to the Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. 63: Defendants’ MSJ Response; Doc. 66:

Plaintiff’s MSJ Response], and Replies [Doc. 69: Defendants’ MSJ Reply; Doc. 70: Plaintiff’s MSJ Reply]. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for disposition. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

3 Because the Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment before the deadline for filing dispositive motions expired [see Doc. 43], his Motion seeking an extension of time is denied as moot. judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F. App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The parties’ forecasts of evidence show the following, which is undisputed except as otherwise noted. At around midnight on August 9, 2017, Officer Zederbaum advised other officers that the Plaintiff had conducted an apparent hand-to-hand drug

transaction from a white motor vehicle in a restaurant parking lot. [Doc. 57- 4: MSJ Ex. at 24 (Zederbaum Stmt)]. Officer Moore stopped the vehicle for a license plate violation a short time later; Tjada Cherry was the driver, the

Plaintiff was the front seat passenger, and Daisha Leggett was in the back seat. [Doc. 57-4: MSJ Ex. at 21 (Moore Stmt)]. Moore approached the vehicle’s driver side and asked Cherry for her license and registration. [Id.]. The Plaintiff was digging into his left pants pocket and said he was looking

for his identification. [Id.]. Moore asked the Plaintiff to take his hand out of his pocket; the Plaintiff did so and patted the outside of his pocket. [Id.].

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