Giurca v. Bon Secours Charity Health Sys.

Opinion

23-200 Giurca v. Bon Secours Charity Health Sys. et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3 26th day of January, two thousand twenty-four. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 7 MYRNA PÉREZ, 8 SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 Dr. Dan Giurca, 13 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 v. No. 23-200 17 18 Bon Secours Charity Health System, Westchester 19 County Health Care Corporation, Good Samaritan 20 Hospital, 21 22 Defendants-Appellees. * 23 ________________________________ 24 25

*

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.

2

1 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN (Jonathan R. Goldman, on 2 the brief), Sussman & Goldman, Goshen, NY. 3 4 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: MICHAEL J. KEANE (Gillian Barkins, on the 5 brief), Garfunkel Wild, P.C., Great Neck, NY. 6 7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

8 New York (Seibel, J.). 9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 10 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 11 Plaintiff-Appellant Dan Giurca seeks review of two district court rulings in favor of 12 Defendants-Appellees Good Samaritan Hospital (“Good Samaritan”), Bon Secours Charity 13 Health System (“Bon Secours”), and Westchester County Health Care Corporation 14 (“WMCHealth”) 1: (1) dismissal of his religious discrimination and failure to accommodate 15 claims under Title VII; and (2) summary judgment on his retaliation claim under Title VII. 16 For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court did not err in 17 dismissing Giurca’s claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 18 procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to 19 explain our decision to affirm. 20 I. Religious Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate 21 First, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting the Hospital Defendants’ 22 motion to dismiss. 23 “To survive a motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege sufficient 24 facts, taken as true, to state a plausible claim for relief.” Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 25 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). The

1 Defendants-Appellees will hereinafter be referred to as the “Hospital Defendants.”

3

1 Court is not required to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 2 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 3 U.S. at 555). The Court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 4 See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). 5 “Under Title VII, an employer cannot discriminate against any employee on the basis of 6 the employee’s religious beliefs unless the employer shows that he cannot ‘reasonably 7 accommodate’ the employee’s religious needs without ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the 8 employer’s business.’” Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985) 9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). A plaintiff claiming discrimination under Title VII must first 10 “make out a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id.

11 A plaintiff in a [Title VII] case makes out a prima facie case of religious 12 discrimination by proving: (1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that 13 conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of 14 this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting 15 employment requirement. 16 17 Id. (quoting Tupen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)).

18 Here, dismissal was appropriate because Giurca fails at the very first step. Even 19 accepting the sincerity of his religious beliefs, Giurca’s Amended Complaint does not adequately 20 plead a conflict between his Orthodox Christian faith and the alleged employment requirement— 21 that Giurca agree that his employment be “subject to” and services be “provided in accordance 22 with” the Ethical and Religious Directives of the Roman Catholic Church (“ERDs”). Joint 23 App’x at 22. 24 In discussing an offer of employment with Bon Secours in 2017, Giurca was presented 25 with two contracts. The Professional Services Contract provided:

4

1 1.2 Standards. Physician agrees to ensure that the Services shall be provided in 2 accordance with: (i) the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 3 Services promulgated by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, as 4 interpreted by the Sisters of Bon Secours . . . .

5 Joint App’x at 47. The Per Diem Contract provided:

6 Your employment is subject to the policies, procedures and guidelines of the PC 7 and Hospital, including but not limited to . . . the Ethical and Religious Directives 8 of the Roman Catholic Church.

9 Id. at 37 ¶ 4. 10 However, Giurca’s Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts plausibly alleging that 11 signing either contract, and therefore agreeing that his employment would be “subject to” or that 12 he would provide services “in accordance with” the ERDs, would actually conflict with his 13 personal religious beliefs. Without sufficient allegations of an actual conflict, Giurca has not 14 stated a “plausible claim for relief” as to his religious discrimination and accommodation claims. 15 Johnson, 711 F.3d at 275 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). 16 II. Retaliation 17 We further conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on 18 Giurca’s claim for retaliation under Title VII. 19 On appeal, a court will affirm a grant of a motion for summary judgment only if, 20 construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine 21 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 22 R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 23 a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 24 Like a grant of a motion to dismiss, the Court conducts a de novo review of a district court’s 25 grant of summary judgment. See Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012).

5

1 Retaliation claims are analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 2 framework. See Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing 3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973)). The first step of the 4 McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 5 retaliation. See id. at 844. “Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of 6 retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 7 for the [adverse] employment action.” Id. at 845. If the defendant carries this burden, the 8 plaintiff must then present evidence demonstrating that retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the 9 adverse action. Id. at 845. 10 Here, summary judgment was appropriate because, even if Giurca had adequately 11 established a prima facie case of retaliation, the Hospital Defendants presented legitimate, non- 12 retaliatory reasons for their decision to not hire Giurca, and Giurca failed to carry his burden of 13 demonstrating that retaliation was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action. 14 A. Legitimate, Non-Retaliatory Reasons 15 The Hospital Defendants clearly identified “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason[s]” for 16 declining to hire Giurca. Zann Kwan, 737 F.3d at 845. When Giurca inquired about 17 employment with Good Samaritan in March 2019, the hospital was not considering applications 18 for the consultant liaison position in which he expressed an interest. Colavito—the recruiter with 19 whom Giurca had been communicating—then learned that Giurca had lied during his interview 20 about being presently employed at another hospital, despite having been terminated “due to 21 bizarre behavior.” Joint App’x at 1218. Due to his lack of candor, Colavito chose not to 22 consider Giurca for subsequent job openings. In July 2019, after Giurca interviewed for a 23 consultant liaison position, the only position he expressed an interest in, at WMCHealth, Bartell

6

1 and Ferrando—the decisionmakers—recommended against hiring Giurca because he did not 2 have the necessary experience or certifications. 3 B. But-For Cause 4 Because the Hospital Defendants met their burden at the second step of the McDonnell 5 Douglas framework, the burden then shifted to Giurca to demonstrate that retaliation was a but- 6 for cause of their failure to hire him. But Giurca failed to do so. 7 First, the record does not support Giurca’s assertion that the proffered reasons for hiring 8 another candidate for the consultant liaison position at Good Samaritan are pretextual. By the 9 time Giurca inquired about the position in March 2019, Good Samaritan had already extended an 10 offer of employment to Afful and his contracts were under review. 11 Second, Giurca’s challenge to WMCHealth’s conclusion that he was unqualified for the 12 consultant liaison position is similarly unavailing. Although Afful was not board-certified when 13 offered the consultant liaison position at Good Samaritan, the consultant liaison position for 14 which Giurca was deemed unqualified was an entirely separate position at an entirely different 15 hospital. The record does not suggest that the position for which Afful was hired and the 16 position from which Giurca was rejected required the same qualifications, much less that the 17 Hospital Defendants chose to enforce qualifications for one position but not the other. 18 Finally, in the absence of other evidence of a retaliatory motive, the temporal proximity 19 between Giurca’s allegedly protected activity and the adverse employment action is insufficient 20 to support an inference of retaliation. See Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 72 21 (2d Cir. 2015) (“‘[T]emporal proximity’ between a protected complaint and an adverse 22 employment action ‘is insufficient to satisfy [plaintiff’s] burden to bring forward some evidence 23 of pretext . . . .” (quoting El Sayed v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per

7

1 curiam))). We therefore conclude that Giurca failed to present sufficient evidence from which a 2 reasonable jury could conclude that retaliation was the but-for cause for the decision to not hire 3 Giurca.

4 * * * 5 We have considered Giurca’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

6 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

7 8 9 FOR THE COURT: 10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court