Gist-Reed v. Alpha Analytical Laboratories, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 LAURYN GIST-REED, individually, and No. 2:24-cv-03282-DJC-CSK on behalf of all others similarly 12 situated, 13 Plaintiff, ORDER

14 v.

LABORATORIES, INC., a California 16 corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18

19 20 Under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), a defendant to a class action 21 lawsuit can remove the suit from state court to federal court if certain federal 22 jurisdiction requirements are met. Here, Defendant Alpha Analytical Laboratories, Inc. 23 did so, but after a delay of several months. Plaintiff Lauryn Gist-Reed asks this Court to 24 remand the case to the state court, arguing that Alpha Analytical filed outside CAFA’s 25 statutory time frame for remand, and that even if the removal was proper, there is an 26 applicable CAFA exemption. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that 27 Defendant’s removal under CAFA was proper and that the local controversy 28 1 exemption to CAFA does not apply. Accordingly, the Court declines to remand the 2 case to state court. 4 Plaintiff Lauryn Gist-Reed is a resident of Tennessee,1 who, from approximately 5 October 2023 to November 2023, worked as an hourly-paid, nonexempt Lab 6 Technician for Defendant Alpha Analytical Laboratories, Inc. (“Alpha Analytical”) in 7 California.2 (ECF No. 1, containing First Amended Complaint (Ex. I), hereinafter “FAC,” 8 ¶¶ 8, 14.) On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed her original complaint bringing seven 9 employment-related claims against Defendant. (ECF No. 1, containing original 10 Complaint (Ex. A), ¶ 2.) On June 10, 2024, she filed a First Amended Complaint, 11 adding two additional claims against Defendant.3 (See generally, FAC.) Neither 12 complaint contained a specified damages amount or an amount in controversy. On 13 November 25, 2024, Defendant removed the case to this Court under CAFA. (ECF 14 No. 1, containing Petition for Removal.) On February 19, 2025, the parties stipulated 15 to waive oral argument, and the matter was deemed submitted. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) 17 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 18 United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 19 defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district . . . where such 20 action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under CAFA, federal courts have original 21

22 1 In her FAC filed June 10, 2024, Plaintiff asserts that she is a resident of California. But, Defendant provides evidence that Plaintiff moved to Tennessee on June 5, 2024. Defendant attaches copies of 23 internet posts indicating that Plaintiff permanently moved to Tennessee on that date. (See ECF No. 1, containing Declaration of Kelly Ann Buschman, Exs. A and B.) Plaintiff does not meaningfully rebut this 24 evidence. Because Plaintiff moved five days before the filing of the FAC, the Court accepts that she is not a resident of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (citizenship of the proposed plaintiff is pegged 25 to the filing date of the operative complaint).

26 2 Plaintiff states that she worked for Defendant’s Sacramento location (FAC ¶ 8) and Los Angeles location (FAC ¶ 14). 27 3 In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff states there are ten causes of action. (ECF No. 14 at 2.) However, 28 the FAC lists only nine causes of action. (See generally, FAC.) 1 jurisdiction over class actions in which the parties are minimally diverse, the proposed 2 class has at least 100 members, and the aggregated amount-in-controversy exceeds 3 $5 million dollars. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5), (d)(6), hereinafter “CAFA.” 4 A defendant removing a class action filed in state court pursuant to CAFA need 5 only plausibly allege in the petition for removal that the CAFA prerequisites are 6 satisfied. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014). If the 7 plaintiff contests the alleged amount in controversy, however, the defendant bears the 8 evidentiary burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 9 amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. See id. at 88 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1446(c)(2)(B)); see also Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 978, 11 982 (9th Cir. 2013). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district 12 court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1447(c); see Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme 14 Court has advised, however, “that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking 15 CAFA” in part because the statute was enacted “to facilitate adjudication of certain 16 class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89 (citations and quotations 17 omitted); see Ibarra v. Manheim Investments., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) 18 (“Congress intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.”). 20 Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly removed this suit under CAFA. For 21 the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees and finds that Defendant’s removal 22 of this case was properly effectuated under CAFA. The Court also finds that Plaintiff 23 has not met her burden of proof to establish that the local controversy exemption 24 applies. 25 A. Defendant Properly Removed This Suit Under CAFA 26 Typically, removal under CAFA must be initiated “within 30 days after receipt by 27 the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 28 forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1446(b)(1). Then, three jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied: (1) the parties 2 must be diverse, (2) the proposed class must be over 100 members, and (3) the 3 aggregated amount-in-controversy must exceed $5 million dollars. Id. § 1332(d)(2), 4 (d)(5), (d)(6). If the initial documents do not facially satisfy the elements of removal, a 5 defendant is able to remove a suit within thirty days “from which it is ascertainable that 6 the case is removable.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1124 7 (9th Cir. 2013); see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 8 1. The Removal Was Timely 9 The threshold question the Court must address is whether Defendant timely 10 removed the suit under CAFA. It did. While Defendant’s removal of the case came 11 substantially after the initial thirty-day window from when Plaintiff filed her FAC, 12 Plaintiff’s FAC failed to facially satisfy the elements of removal. Plaintiff’s FAC did not 13 specify that the parties were diverse, failed to identify the number of potential class 14 members, and did not include an alleged amount in controversy, thereby requiring 15 Defendant to independently assess the viability of removal under CAFA. Defendant 16 plausibly alleges that its removal of the case came after it independently became 17 aware that the parties are diverse. (See ECF No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, 18 ¶ 48.) This discovery regarding diversity between the parties, which was not facially 19 apparent from Plaintiff’s operative filing, combined with Defendant’s need to 20 otherwise assess its own records to identify a potential class size and amount in 21 controversy, supports the Court’s finding that Defendant properly removed the matter 22 within thirty days of determining that it could properly do so. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 23 1124. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to assess whether the three elements of 24 federal jurisdiction under CAFA are met. 25 2. The Requirements of CAFA Are Met 26 The first element of federal jurisdiction under CAFA is diversity between the 27 parties. The parties in this case are diverse. Defendant is a California corporation. 28 (See ECF No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, ¶ 43.) And while Plaintiff asserts she 1 is a citizen of California, Defendant has demonstrated via the inclusion of online posts 2 that Plaintiff had moved to Tennessee prior to the filing of her FAC and removal to this 3 Court. (ECF No. 1, containing Declaration of Kelly Ann Buschman, hereinafter 4 “Buschman Decl.”, Exs. A and B;) see Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 5 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A person's domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with 6 the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.”). Defendant offers evidence 7 that Plaintiff herself indicated she worked in Tennessee commencing in June 2024. 8 (See Buschman Decl. Exs. A and B.) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff was a 9 citizen of Tennessee at the filing of her FAC. Because one party is a California citizen 10 and the other a Tennessee citizen, the parties are diverse. 11 The second element of federal jurisdiction under CAFA is a proposed class of 12 over 100 members. Plaintiff’s FAC does not identify the number of prospective class 13 members, nor whether the ultimately determined number would be greater than 100. 14 Therefore, it is not unreasonable — and indeed, it is common — for the removing 15 defendant to have to assess their own employment records to determine this 16 information. Defendant appropriately ascertained its own employment records and 17 the allegations in the FAC to determine that Plaintiff’s proposed class size would 18 consist of at least 123 members, satisfying the 100-member threshold. (See ECF No. 19 1, containing Petition for Removal, ¶ 51.) 20 The third element of federal jurisdiction under CAFA is an amount in 21 controversy over $5 million. Plaintiff’s FAC gives no indication that the amount in 22 controversy for the class exceeds or is expected to meet that threshold amount. 23 Accordingly, the Defendant has the burden to establish the amount in controversy. 24 Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (“When plaintiffs . . . have prepared a complaint that does not 25 assert the minimum in controversy . . . if a defendant wants to pursue a federal forum 26 under CAFA, that defendant . . . has the burden to put forward evidence showing that 27 the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.”). Defendant does so here, arguing 28 that Plaintiff’s FAC puts $13,373,101.20 in controversy, based solely on the alleged 1 wage and hour violations. (ECF No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, at 10.) Plaintiff 2 rejects this number, arguing that the amount is “plucked from thin air.” (ECF No. 14 at 3 9, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, hereinafter “Mot.”) A plaintiff, as here, can challenge a 4 defendant’s assertion of the amount in controversy. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. But, 5 when doing so, a plaintiff must then submit their own proof to the court, and the court 6 will then consider the evidence from both sides and decide whether the amount-in- 7 controversy has been met. Id. 8 Here, Plaintiff does not offer any evidence that the amount in controversy is 9 below the necessary $5 million. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that Defendant’s 10 number is wrong. While a defendant’s proposed controversy calculations “need some 11 reasonable ground underlying them,” Plaintiff must do more than contest that validity: 12 Plaintiff must instead offer her own numbers and supporting evidence. See id. at 13 1197, 1199. And while Plaintiff plausibly argues that Defendant’s arrival at its 14 approximately $13 million number is on shaky ground (i.e., Defendant relies on a 15 hypothesis of a very high rate of violations across the prospective class), Plaintiff offers 16 no data, affidavits, nor evidence for the Court to consider in the alternative. See Perez 17 v. Rose Hills Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) (“And if [Plaintiff] believed that 18 some other assumption would have been more reasonable, she was free to propose 19 that rate.”); see also Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 20 2019) (“An assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 21 threshold is not defeated merely because it is equally possible that damages might be 22 less than the requisite amount.”) (internal quotations omitted). 23 The Court therefore has no other number to turn to except for Defendant’s 24 asserted value. The Court assesses each of Defendant’s proffered calculations in turn 25 to see if they are justified by the allegations made in the Complaint. See Perez, 131 26 F.4th at 809 (violation rates must be justified). These calculations include: (1) failure to 27 pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to 28 provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest breaks; (5) failure to 1 timely pay final wages at termination; and (6) failure to provide accurate itemized 2 wage statements. The Court concludes that most of the numbers proffered by 3 Defendant are reasonably supported by the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC. While 4 Defendant’s numbers are clearly calculated in a way to maximize the amount in 5 controversy, they are, for the most part, consistent with the general language used by 6 Plaintiff in describing the frequency of alleged violations and are thus permissible. 7 1. Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages 8 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay minimum and straight time wages 9 in violation of California Labor Code sections 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197. (FAC 10 ¶ 32–41.) Plaintiff describes these violations as occurring during “all relevant times” 11 and notes that “[b]y failing to keep adequate time records . . ., Defendants have made 12 it difficult to calculate the full extent of minimum wage compensation due Plaintiff and 13 the Class.” (Id. ¶¶ 34, 38.) In its briefing, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s allegations 14 put $2,996,693.28 at controversy for these alleged violations, after imputing the most 15 frequent legally permissible occurrence calculations and the employees’ wage. (ECF 16 No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, at 9.) 17 This number is based on calculations that Defendant owes restitution in the 18 amount of 4 minutes (0.07)4, multiplied by $22.00 per hour (average hourly wage for 19 putative class members), multiplied by 123 putative class members, multiplied by 260 20 workdays per year, and multiplied by 4 years (the window for the alleged violations), 21 equaling $196,996.80 total. (Id.) The total number also includes liquidated damages 22 under Labor Code section 1194.2, which is the amount equal to wages unlawfully 23 unpaid and interest thereon, calculated at $196,996.80 (baseline) plus 10% interest of 24 $19,699.68, equaling $216,696.48. Finally, the total number includes penalties under 25 Labor Code section 1197.1, which are $100 per initial violation for each employee and 26 $250 for each subsequent pay period violation for each employee. (Id.) These total 27 4 Defendant derives the 4 minutes calculation from Troester v. Starbucks, 5 Cal. 5th 829 (2018), in which 28 the California Supreme Court viewed that threshold as permissible (i.e., not de minimis). 1 $100 (statutory initial violation penalty) multiplied by 123 prospective class members, 2 equaling $12,300.00 for the initial violations, plus $250 (statutory subsequent violation 3 penalty) multiplied by 123 prospective class members, multiplied by 21 subsequent 4 pay periods each year, and multiplied by 4 for the number of years (the window for 5 the alleged violations), which, according to Defendant’s calculations, totals 6 $2,583,000.00. 5 (Id.) All together, this yields the amount of $2,996,693.28. 7 Nothing in the FAC contradicts these calculations. In describing the violations, 8 Plaintiff utilizes broad language such as “at all relevant times,” and notes the difficulty 9 of deducing exact calculations. (FAC ¶¶ 34, 38.) Plaintiff also notes that while she was 10 “typically scheduled to work at least five days in a workweek and at least eight hours 11 per day, . . . [she] regularly worked more than eight hours in a workday and/or more 12 than forty (40) hours in a workweek.” (Id. ¶ 14.) There is no limiting language 13 attached to “regularly.” (Id.) While it is true that other, less generous valuations could 14 be consistent with a “regular” practice, or one that occurred “at all relevant times,” the 15 Defendant need only show that its interpretation is a reasonable one. Perez, 131 F.4th 16 at 809. The Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s allegations that the violations occurred at 17 “all relevant times” and that Plaintiff worked “regularly” forecloses the possibility that 18 the violation happened at every opportunity that arose, and thus, Defendant’s 19 calculations are in line with the described violations. See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. 20 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s proffered amounts are reasonable and 21 justified by the Complaint. 22 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages 23 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay overtime wages in violation of 24 Labor Code Sections 1194 and 1198. (FAC ¶¶ 42–50.) Plaintiff describes these 25 violations as occurring during “all times relevant” and notes that “[b]y failing to keep 26

27 5 The Court observes that Defendant’s proffered final number does not include the $12,300 initial violation. The Court accepts Defendant’s lower number, but notes that ultimately, any discrepancy is 28 immaterial as the amount in controversy greatly exceeds the $5 million threshold. 1 adequate time records . . ., Defendants have made it difficult to calculate the full 2 extent of minimum wage compensation due Plaintiff and the Class.” (Id. ¶¶ 46, 48.) In 3 its briefing, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s allegations put $5,052,967.92 in 4 controversy for these alleged violations. (ECF No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, 5 at 9.) 6 This number is based on calculations that Defendant owes restitution in the 7 amount of 4 minutes as a minimum permissible threshold plus 30 minutes for missed 8 meal periods, allegedly causing overtime of 34 minutes per day (0.57/day), multiplied 9 by an overtime rate of $33/hour (average overtime rate for putative class members), 10 multiplied by 123 putative class members, multiplied by 260 workdays per year, 11 multiplied by 4 years (the window for the alleged violations), totaling $2,406,175.20. 12 (Id.) The total number also includes liquidated damages under Labor Code section 13 1194.2, which is the amount equal to wages unlawfully unpaid plus interest, calculated 14 at $2,406,175.20 (baseline) plus 10% interest of $240,617.52. (Id.) However, Plaintiff 15 does not claim liquidated damages here, so the Court will omit those calculations. 16 (See Mot. at 15;) see also Arreola v. Finish Line, No. 14-CV-03339-LHK, 2014 WL 17 6982571, *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (“[A] plaintiff [is] the master of the claim and may 18 avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading different facts.”) (internal quotations omitted). 19 Altogether, this yields a total amount of $2,406,175.20. 20 Nothing in the FAC contradicts these calculations. In describing the violations, 21 Plaintiff utilizes broad language such as “at all times relevant,” and notes the difficulty 22 of deducing exact calculations. (FAC ¶¶ 46, 48.) As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges 23 that while she was “typically scheduled to work at least five days in a workweek and at 24 least eight hours per day, . . . [she] regularly worked more than eight hours in a 25 workday and/or more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.” (Id. ¶ 14.) And similar to 26 the claim related to the Failure to Pay Minimum and Straight Time Wages, there is no 27 limiting language attached to “regularly.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s allegations that the violations 28 occurred at “all times relevant” and that Plaintiff worked “regularly” does not foreclose 1 the possibility that the violation happened at every opportunity that arose, and thus, 2 Defendant’s calculations are in line with the described violations. See Perez, 131 F.4th 3 at 809. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s proffered amounts, after the 4 Court’s modification, are reasonable and justified by the Complaint. 5 3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide meal periods in violation of 7 Labor Code section 226.7. (FAC ¶¶ 51–54.) Plaintiff describes this violation as 8 occurring “regularly, but not always.” (Id. ¶ 17.) In its briefing, Defendant states that 9 Plaintiff’s allegations put $1,039,350.00 in controversy for these alleged violations. 10 (ECF No. 11, containing Petition for Removal, at 9.) 11 This number is based on calculations that Defendant owes employees for one 12 hour of pay each meal period missed at $22 (average hourly wage for putative class 13 members), multiplied by 123 putative class members, multiplied by 250 meal periods 14 per year, multiplied by 4 years (the window for the alleged violations), equaling 15 $2,706,000.00. (Id.) Defendant also posits that there may be liquidated damages or 16 penalties in the amount of $50 per each initial violation per employee, calculated at 17 $6,150.00. (Id.) This is added to the subsequent violations of $100 multiplied by 123 18 employees, multiplied by 21 pay periods per year, multiplied by 4 years, equaling 19 $1,033,200.00, for a minimum amount of $1,039,350.00. (Id.) 20 These calculations are not justified by the Complaint. In the FAC, Plaintiff 21 makes allegations that Defendant “regularly, but not always” required the class 22 members to work through their meal and rest breaks. (FAC ¶ 17.) Yet, Defendant 23 calculates a one-hundred-percent meal and rest break violation rate. (ECF No. 1, 24 containing Petition for Removal, at 9.) The limiting language of “but not always” is 25 incompatible with Defendant’s proposed one-hundred-percent violation rate, and 26 therefore, these calculations are not reasonable. See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. 27 Accordingly, the Court will strike these calculations from the total amount. 28 //// 1 4. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods 2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to authorize and permit rest periods in 3 violation of Labor Code section 226.7. (FAC ¶¶ 55–58.) Plaintiff describes this 4 violation as occurring “regularly.” (Id. ¶ 18.) In its briefing, Defendant states that 5 Plaintiff’s allegations put $2,706,000.00 in controversy for these alleged violations. 6 (ECF No. 16 at 15.) 7 This number is based on calculations that Defendant owes $22 per hour 8 (average hourly wage of putative class members) for each rest period missed, 9 multiplied by 123 putative class members, multiplied by 250 rest periods per year, 10 multiplied by 4 years (window for the alleged violations), totaling $2,706,000.00. 11 Nothing in the FAC contradicts these calculations. In describing the violations, 12 Plaintiff utilizes broad language such as “regularly.” (FAC ¶ 18.) There is no limiting 13 language attached to “regularly.” (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff specifically alleges that 14 “Defendants made it impossible or impracticable to take these uninterrupted rest 15 periods. (FAC ¶ 57.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s proffered amounts 16 are reasonable and justified by the Complaint. 17 5. Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination 18 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to timely pay final wages at termination in 19 violation of Labor Code sections 201 through 203. (FAC ¶¶ 59–65.) Plaintiff avers that 20 Defendant’s violation “was not a single, isolated incident.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The penalty for 21 this violation is calculated as the continuation of wages for up to 30 days. Cal. Labor 22 Code § 203(a). In its briefing, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s allegations put 23 $649,440.00 in controversy for these alleged violations. (ECF No. 1, containing 24 Petition for Review, at 9–10.) 25 This number is based on calculations that Defendant owes $22 per hour 26 (average hourly wage for putative class members), multiplied by 123 putative class 27 members, multiplied by eight hours (putative class member’s average workday), 28 multiplied by 30 days (statutory window), totaling $649,440.00. (Id.) 1 Nothing in the FAC contradicts these calculations. In describing the violations, 2 Plaintiff utilizes broad language when describing the alleged violation, such as stating 3 the language “was not a single, isolated incident.” (FAC ¶ 19.) A violation rate 4 described as being more than a “single, isolated incident,” is understood by the Court 5 as being more than one violation. Defendant’s proffered violation rates are therefore 6 not foreclosed by Plaintiff’s language of “not a single, isolated incident,” and thus, the 7 calculations are congruent with the described violations. See Perez, 131 F.4th at 809; 8 see also Chavez v. Pratt (Robert Mann Packaging), LLC, No. 19-cv-00719-NC, 2019 WL 9 1501576, *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (Defendant’s “assumption of 100% violation for 10 unpaid wages [is] reasonable—that is, if every putative class member incurred 11 damages for at least one other claim in the complaint, every class member who 12 departed [defendant company] during the statutory period was due unpaid wages.”). 13 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s proffered amounts are reasonable and 14 justified by the Complaint. 15 6. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide accurate itemized wage 17 statements in violation of Labor Code section 226(a). (FAC ¶¶ 66–73.) In its briefing, 18 Defendant states that Plaintiff’s allegations put $928,650.00 in controversy for these 19 alleged violations. (ECF No. 1, containing Petition for Removal, at 10.) 20 This number is based on calculations of $50 per the first violation per each 21 employee (as provided by California Labor Code section 226(e)(1)), multiplied by 123 22 putative class members, equaling $6,150.00. (Id.) This is in addition to calculations of 23 $100 per subsequent violation per pay period per each employee (as provided by 24 California Labor Code section 226(e)(1)), multiplied by 123 putative class members, 25 multiplied by 25 subsequent pay periods, multiplied by three years (under statutes of 26 limitation), totaling $922,500.00, which Defendant then adds $6,150 to, reaching a 27 grand total of $928,650. (Id.) However, under California Labor Code section 226, this 28 violation is capped at $4,000 per employee. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(1). Therefore, 1 the Court will reduce this amount to $492,000.00, which is $4,000 multiplied by 123 2 putative class members. 3 Nothing in the FAC contradicts these calculations. The Court’s modification of 4 Defendant’s calculations is in line with the described violations. See Perez, 131 F.4th 5 at 809; see also Cabrera v. S. Valley Almond Co., LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00748-AWI-JLT, 6 2021 WL 5937585, *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2021) (“The Court found above that it is 7 reasonable to assume one overtime violation, one minimum wage violation, one meal 8 break violation and one rest period violation per week for each putative class 9 member. It follows that each of the bi-weekly wage statements Defendants issued to 10 putative class members during the period in question contained an error of some 11 sort.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the modified Defendant’s proffered amounts 12 are reasonable and justified by the Complaint. 13 7. Total Amount in Controversy 14 The Court finds that the total amount of permissible calculations are as follows: 15 (1) Failure to provide minimum and straight time wages ($2,996,693.28); (2) Failure to 16 pay overtime wages ($2,406,175.20); (3) Failure to provide meal breaks ($0); (4) 17 Failure to authorize meal and rest breaks ($2,706,000.00); (5) Failure to timely pay 18 final wages at termination ($649,440.00); (6) Failure to provide accurate and itemized 19 wage statements ($492,000.00). In total, these amount to $9,250,308.48. This is well 20 over the $5,000,000 threshold for removal under CAFA. 21 Simply stated, Plaintiff’s pleadings do not allege the size of the proposed class 22 or the total amount in controversy. Defendant therefore acted properly by assessing 23 from its own data whether the requirements of removal under CAFA are satisfied. The 24 thirty-day window for removal began once Defendant learned that CAFA’s removal 25 elements could be satisfied, not from the date of the initial pleadings. Defendant’s 26 proffered amounts are largely reasonable, and even with striking improperly 27 calculated amounts, it is clear that the $5 million threshold has been met. 28 1 Plaintiff seeks to rebut Defendant’s proffered amount by arguing that it is 2 overbroad. For example, Plaintiff posits that Defendant’s calculations improperly 3 account for the entire class worked during the entire four-year window the class would 4 be open. (ECF No. 14 at 9.) But Defendant’s explanation — that the full putative class 5 size could actually be up to 214 members, but that because not all those members 6 worked full time, it estimated the full-time equivalent to be approximately 123 putative 7 class members and used that number for calculations (see ECF No. 14 at 14) — is not 8 irreconcilable with the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC. (See ECF No. 16 at 9.) ”[A] 9 removing defendant may rely on some assumptions to establish the amount in 10 controversy.” Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. Defendant’s numbers, while possibly inflated, 11 have not been shown to be unreasonable in light of the allegations in the operative 12 complaint, especially given the lack of other number or evidence provided by Plaintiff. 13 Finding that Defendant is the only party that has submitted a proposed amount 14 in controversy, and that that amount is at least tenably supported, the Court finds that 15 Defendant’s proposed amount-in-controversy over $5 million is acceptable. 16 B. Plaintiff Has Not Sufficiently Demonstrated That the Local Controversy 17 Exemption Applies 18 A party seeking to remand a matter back to state court after it has been 19 removed under CAFA may do so under the local controversy exemption. 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1332(d)(4). As relevant here, to avail of this exemption, Plaintiff bears the burden of 21 proof showing that the following factors are satisfied: 22 (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in 23 which the action was originally filed; 24 (II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant 25 (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class; 26 (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis 27 for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 28 (cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action 1 was originally filed; and 2 (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the 3 State in which the action was originally filed.

4 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i); Benko v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 789 F.3d 1111, 1116 5 (9th Cir. 2015). 6 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied this burden. As to the first factor, 7 the proposed class consists of “All persons who worked for any Defendant in 8 California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the period 9 beginning four years and 178 days before the filing of the initial complaint in this 10 action and ending when notice to the Class is sent.” (FAC ¶ 25.) While it may well be 11 that many of these class members are citizens of California, Plaintiff provides no 12 evidence to support her assertion that two-thirds of this proposed class are California 13 citizens. See Mondragon v. Cap. One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A] 14 burden of proof usually requires the party bearing the burden to present evidence 15 upon which the district court may rely to find that the party has met its burden.”). She 16 merely asserts that “on information and belief, greater than two-thirds of the members 17 of the class” are California citizens. (ECF No. 14 at 17.) The Court cannot rely on mere 18 assertions to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of proof for this element. See Mondragon, 736 19 F.3d at 884 (“A complete lack of evidence does not satisfy this standard.”). Plaintiff 20 recognizes that her assertions may not be viable and preemptively asks the Court to 21 allow for “jurisdictional discovery tailored to proving that more than two-thirds of the 22 putative class are citizens of California.” (ECF No. 14 at 17.) However, Defendant 23 counters that “[a]lmost half of the putative class is no longer employed with Defendant 24 and neither Plaintiff or Defendant has knowledge of these class members’ location.” 25 (ECF No. 16 at 17–18.) In light of this, the Court determines that discovery between 26 the parties would not readily produce information as to the number of California 27 citizens in the proposed class. 28 1 Finding that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof for establishing that a 2 | sufficient number of class members are California citizens, and that this deficiency 3 | would not be remediable with additional discovery, the Court determines that the 4 | local controversy exception does not apply. 6 The Court finds that this matter was properly removed under CAFA and that the 7 | local controversy exemption does not apply. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8 | 14) is DENIED. 9 10 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 11 | Dated: _June 3, 2025 “Daal A CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 | DJCS5 - Gist-Reed224-cv-03282.MTR 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16