Girard Bank v. Galligher (In Re Galligher)

41 B.R. 410, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5453
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 20, 1984
Docket19-10919
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 41 B.R. 410 (Girard Bank v. Galligher (In Re Galligher)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Girard Bank v. Galligher (In Re Galligher), 41 B.R. 410, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5453 (Pa. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION

WILLIAM A. KING, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

The issue presented in this case is whether the debt owed by the debtors to Girard Bank is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. (“Code”).

Upon examination of the evidence produced at trial, we conclude that the debt in question is dischargeable. Although certain documents supplied to the Bank by the debtors during the loan application process contained information which was inaccurate, the Bank was unable to sustain its burden of establishing reasonable reliance by the Bank on this information or that the misstatements were made with the intent to deceive.

The facts of the case are as follows: 1

The initial contact between the debtor, James Galligher, and Girard Bank (“Gir-ard”) was in the spring of 1981. 2 Mr. Gal-ligher was seeking a start-up loan for his business. Approximately five (5) months earlier, he had formed a financial reporting service business under the corporate name of “C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc.” After several discussions with officers at Girard, Girard approved a loan to the debtors in the principal amount of $15,000.00. Mr. Galligher and his wife, Linda, executed a promissory note and unconditional surety agreement to Girard on June 12, 1981. Subsequently, they defaulted under the terms of the note and surety agreement and filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 5,1982. Girard filed the instant adversary complaint alleging that the debtors had made material misrepresentations concerning their net worth and outstanding debts in three (3) separate documents submitted to Girard during the loan application process.

The alleged misstatements were: (1) a statement on a loan application that C.A. T.R. Systems, Inc. had no outstanding debts; (2) a failure to list $61)298.81 in outstanding debts on the personal statement of Mr. Galligher; (3) a financial statement whérein Mr. Galligher represented his net worth to be in excess of $100,000.00 when $98,624.00 of that amount consisted of customer good will attributable to C.A. T.R. Systems, Inc.

In order to prevail under § 523(a)(2)(B), 3 the plaintiff-creditor must show that the debt sought to be discharged was incurred to obtain money (1) by the use of a materially false statement in writing; (2) about the debtors’ financial condition; (3) on which the creditor reasonably relied; and (4) which the debtors made with an intent to deceive.

*412 The burden of proving the four (4) elements required by § 523(a)(2)(B) is on the party seeking to have a debt declared nondischargeable thereunder. In re Klien, 20 B.R. (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1982).

In the case at bench, there are three (3) documents which Girard alleges contain material misrepresentations made by the debtors. We will examine each of them individually to determine whether the four (4) elements of § 523(a)(2)(B) have been met by Girard.

The first document is a credit application for C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. which was purportedly prepared and signed by Mr. Galligher. 4 Girard alleges that on this application, the debtors falsely stated that C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. had no outstanding debts. The debtors produced unrebutted testimony at trial that this document was neither prepared nor signed by Mr. Galligher. 5 Therefore, we find that the plaintiff, Girard Bank, has failed to sustain its burden of proving that this document contained a material misstatement made by the debtors regarding their financial position.

The second document alleged by Girard to contain materially false information is titled “James A. Galligher, Jr., Personal Financial Staement of April 30, 1981. 6 On page 22 of this document, Mr. Galligher stated that his net worth was $108,800.00. Of that amount, $100,000.00 was listed as the value of his interest in C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc.

Girard claims that the $100,000.00 value assigned by Mr. Galligher to his interest in C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. was intentionally false and misleading because only $1,356.00 of the $100,000.00 figure represented tangible assets. The remaining $98,624.00 was attributable to customer “good will” constituted the bulk of his statement of net worth on April 30, 1981. His testimony focused instead on showing that he did not intend to deceive Girard as to his net worth and that Girard did not rely on this information when deciding to make the loan.

In view of the evidence presented, we find that the figure of $98,624.00 attributed to “good will” in C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. was unrealistic and misleading. It was impossible for a newly formed corporation such as C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. to have accumulated customer “good will” to the extent of almost $100,000.00. Therefore, we also find that Girard has established the first two (2) elements of § 523(a)(2)(B) ... use of a materially false statement in writing respecting the debtors’ financial condition. The two (2) remaining issues are (1) whether Mr. Galligher’s statement of net worth was intentionally made to deceive Girard and (2) whether Girard reasonably relied on this information.

The burden of proving reasonable reliance on Mr. Galligher’s misrepresentation of net worth, the third element of § 523(a)(2)(B), is on the plaintiff, Girard. Girard attempted to show reasonable reliance by offering testimony as to the “usual procedure” followed by the Bank in deciding whether to make a start-up business loan. Charles O’Donnell, the commercial loan officer at Girard in charge of the debtors’ loan, testified at trial that the “usual procedure” was to assess: 7

(a) the purpose of the loan;
(b) the dollar amount of the loan;
(c) how the loan is to be repaid;
(d) prior debts and liabilities of the business and principals;
(e) income of principals apart from potential;
(f) information contained in credit applications and financial statements.

Counsel for the debtors appropriately points out that Mr. O’Donnell did not testify that he applied these considerations to the Galligher loan, although he clearly had the opportunity to do so at the trial. He *413 also could have testified as to which factors, in particular, weighed heavily in the Bank’s decision to act favorably on Mr. Galligher’s loan application. We believe that the absence of testimony by Mr. O’Donnell in this regard is explained by the fact that Mr. Galligher did not go through the “usual” customary loan application procedure at Girard. Counsel for Girard sought to downplay the events leading up to the decision to grant the debtors’ loan application. However, it is clear from the testimony of Mr. Galligher that the Bank was interested in the business potential of C.A.T.R. Systems, Inc. and that this factor, in and of itself, guided the Bank’s decision to make the loan.

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Bluebook (online)
41 B.R. 410, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/girard-bank-v-galligher-in-re-galligher-paeb-1984.