Girard Bank v. Board of Governors

748 F.2d 838
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedNovember 27, 1984
DocketNo. 84-3262
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 748 F.2d 838 (Girard Bank v. Board of Governors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

SEITZ, Circuit Judge.

Girard Bank (“Girard”), Heritage Bank National Corporation (“Heritage”), Mellon National Corporation (“Mellon”), and Heritage Bancorporation (“Bancorp”) petition for review of an order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”). This court has jurisdiction to review the Board’s order pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1848.

I.

Heritage is a national bank that has ninety branches in New Jersey and one branch in Pennsylvania. It is owned by Bancorp, a bank holding company principally conducting its operations in New Jersey.

Heritage was engaged in interstate branch banking prior to 1927, the effective [840]*840date of the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36. The MeFadden Act, as a general matter, confined national banks to intrastate branching. Heritage is one of only two national banks, however, that had branch banks in more than one state prior to the Act, and were permitted to maintain interstate branches under the Act’s “grandfather clause.”

Girard is a Pennsylvania state-chartered bank. It is owned by Mellon, a bank holding company that does not conduct business in New Jersey.

Girard, Heritage, Mellon, and Bancorp (“Petitioners”) entered into a merger agreement. For present purposes, we may characterize the merger as a two-stage transaction. First, Girard would merge into Heritage, with Heritage as the resulting bank. Girard stock, owned by Mellon, would be converted into and exchanged for newly issued Heritage stock. At the same time, the Heritage stock owned by Bancorp would be cancelled, leaving Heritage as a wholly owned subsidiary of Mellon. Second, Bancorp would be merged into Mellon. The shares of Bancorp would be converted into a right to receive Mellon securities or cash.

Because Heritage is a national bank, petitioners filed an application with the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States (the “Comptroller”) for approval of the Gir-ard-Heritage merger under the MeFadden Act. In addition, the Board requested that the petitioners file an application for approval of the entire two-stage transaction under the Bank Holding Company Act, which regulates the ownership of banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50. Petitioners, reserving an objection to the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction, complied with the Board’s request. Ultimately, the Comptroller approved the Girard-Heritage merger, but the Board denied approval of the entire two-stage transaction, holding that it was prohibited by the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d). Only the Board’s order denying approval of the two-stage merger agreement is before this court on petition for review.

II.

The Board asserts jurisdiction over this transaction under three separate subsections of the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(a)(2), (3) & (5). We need only consider section 1842(a)(3), which states:

It shall be unlawful except with prior approval of the Board ... for any bank holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares of such bank____

Since Mellon would acquire 100% of the voting shares of Heritage if this transaction were consummated, the transaction falls squarely within the terms of § 1842(a)(3).

Contrary to the unequivocal terms of § 1842(a)(3), petitioners contend forcefully that the Board is without jurisdiction. They make essentially two arguments to support this contention. First, petitioners note that a different jurisdictional provision permits the Board to review transactions in which “any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, ... acquire[s] all or substantially all of the assets of a bank,” and that the emphasized language creates a “bank merger exception” to that provision. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(4) (emphasis added). Petitioners then argue that Congress intended this bank merger exception to prevent “duplica-tive review” by the Board over all transactions, including this one, that are within the Comptroller’s jurisdiction. The necessary implication of this argument is that the bank merger exception in § 1842(a)(4) should be read into § 1842(a)(3). The Board counters that there is no danger of duplicative review in this case since the Comptroller only has jurisdiction over the Girard-Heritage bank merger whereas the [841]*841Board has jurisdiction over the entire transaction.

We need not resolve the question of whether the Board’s jurisdiction is duplicative in this case. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the proper exercise of the Board’s statutory authority may sometimes duplicate certain functions of the Comptroller. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 250-51, 99 S.Ct. 505, 514-15, 58 L.Ed.2d 484 (1978). Section 1842(a)(4) clearly demonstrates that Congress, when it intends to, knows how to draft an exception which avoids such duplication. Under the general rule of statutory construction that an exception limits only the matter which directly precedes it, we do not read § 1842(a)(3) as if Congress had included an exception for bank mergers in that section as well. 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.11 (Sands 4th ed. 1973). We do not read Gatliff Goal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 882 (6th Cir.1944) as calling for a contrary result here.

Second, petitioners argue, even assuming that § 1842(a)(3) would, as a pure matter of statutory construction, appear to give the Board jurisdiction over transactions of this sort, the Board has consistently disclaimed jurisdiction in analogous situations. Therefore, they conclude, its review should be precluded in this case as well. The Board argues that the cases cited by petitioners are distinguishable and that the Board has never disclaimed the power to review transactions of this kind.

Petitioners have provided examples of past transactions that the Board has declined to review, that would have been within the Board’s jurisdiction under our interpretation of § 1842(a)(3)’s clear language. Even assuming arguendo, however, that the Board consistently has declined to assert jurisdiction in such situations, that fact is of little assistance in determining the proper scope of the Board’s jurisdiction, which is statutory. Petitioners have not cited any judicial precedent which directly recognizes that a particular transaction is within the terms of § 1842(a)(3) and yet holds that the Board may not assert jurisdiction over that transaction. We decline to be the first, and hold that the Board does have jurisdiction over this case.

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