Giragosian v. Philadelphia

147 A.2d 309, 394 Pa. 476, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 367
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 12, 1959
DocketAppeals, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, and 339
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 147 A.2d 309 (Giragosian v. Philadelphia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Giragosian v. Philadelphia, 147 A.2d 309, 394 Pa. 476, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 367 (Pa. 1959).

Opinion

Opinion by

Me. Justice Musmanno,

This litigation arose out of a series of rapidly happening mishaps which found a City of Philadelphia dump truck leaving its own side .of the highway, crossing over to the wrong side of the highway, crashing into a car traveling in the opposite direction, then leaving the road completely to engulf a parked tractor-trailer, and finally emptying the garbage contents of the truck on to an innocent pedestrian waiting for a bus. Pour victims of the multiple collision — Rose and Sarkis Giragosian, who were riding in the oncoming car; Daniel P. Heatwole, driver of the parked tractor-trailer; and Middle Atlantic Truck Rentals, owners of the tractor-trailer — entered suit against the City of Philadelphia, which brought in an additional defendant by the name of Mrs. Ruth P. Baranack, the driver of a car which ■ had no physical contact with the colliding vehicles, but was charged with being the original cause which set *478 off the vehicular chain-reaction, to be hereinafter described.

In the ensuing three lawsuits (Rose Giragosian and Sarkis Giragosian, together with Garabed Giragosian, husband of Rose and father of Sarkis, all combined in one action), the jury returned verdicts for all the plaintiffs. Mrs. Baranack moved for judgment n.o.v., and a new trial, which motions were refused by the lower court. She has appealed to this Court, asking for a new trial on the basis that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence and that the one in favor of Heatwole was excessive.

From a reading of the printed record of some 350 pages, a studying of photographs introduced at the trial, and consideration of the briefs, plus the oral arguments of counsel, we arrive at the following narrative of the strange happenings on August 25, 1955, on TJ. S. Route No. 1, also known as Roosevelt Boulevard, just north of the line dividing Philadelphia and Buck Counties.

On the day indicated, at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, Clifford Donald, an employee of the City of Philadelphia, was driving a Reo five-ton dump truck, in a northern direction on the above-named Roosevelt Boulevard which is made up of two northbound and two southbound lanes. He had just crossed the bridge spanning Poquessing Creek, doing some 30 miles an hour, when he caught sight of a Nash automobile entering the highway ahead of him, it apparently having just been serviced at a gasoline station which bordered the highway. Fearing a collision with the car, which had now practically blocked his advance, Donald threw on his brakes and swerved to the left. From the frying pan of an apprehended collision with the Nash, he fell into the fire of a collision with a Chevrolet which was being driven by Mrs. Giragosian in one of the southbound lanes- of the highway. As the truck and Chevro *479 let collided, Donald not only lost steering control of the track, but the impact released the dumping device of his vehicle, which was catapulted onto the cab of a tractor-trailer parked by the side of the road. The cab was occupied by Daniel P. Heatwole who sustained serious injuries; and then, as already stated, the contents of the garbage truck were hurled onto, an unsuspecting pedestrian, a Mrs. Sanderson, waiting for a buSj who, although eventually emerging from the rubbish which covered her, enigmatically does not appear in this lawsuit.

Prior to the trial, the City of Philadelphia entered into a settlement with Heatwole, the Middle Atlantic Truck Rentals, Inc., and the Giragosians under the provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The City, therefore, did not appeal from the verdicts, thus leaving as the lone appellant, Mrs. Baranack, who, with maps, photographs, computations, measurements and argument, urges upon us the application of the incontrovertible physical facts rule to combat and overcome the testimony presented in behalf of the plaintiffs. An aerial photograph of the locale, taken shortly after the accident, reveals skid marks in a 90-foot arc beginning just north of the Poquessing Creek Bridge and ending at the point the truck encountered the Giragosian car. The city truck driver Clifford Donald tesr tified that when he saw Mrs. Baranack in her Nash car moving toward the highway ahead of him, he took his foot off the accelerator while moving to the left of the highway, and that “just as I got about 25 to 30 foot from where she was at she shot out to the middle of the highway and blocked both lanes.”

Mrs. Baranack testified that as she left the gasoline station she saw the truck approaching in the northbound lanes at 50 miles per hour and she thus remained stationary facing the highway, but not on it, although *480 the bumper of her car may have projected a foot over the margin of the road. She argues, in the first place, that since her car never touched the city truck she could in no way be responsible for the several crashes. This argument, of course, scarcely needs an answer. A guide who gives wrong directions which send mountain climbers toppling over a cliff is certainly responsible for the resulting disaster. The person who throws a railroad tie into the path of a rapidly moving car, which must swerve in order to avoid hitting it and in doing so overturns, cannot be heard to say that he is without fault because the tie did not touch the overturned vehicle. Any person who, because of a negligent act, causes another person to alter his normal conduct and by that alteration is forced into unforseeable danger and injury, is liable in damages for the injuries inflicted. And this is true regardless as to whether or not physical contact is established between the original actor and the injured person.

It is to the appellant’s credit that she does not press unduly the non-contact argument. However, she does insist that the skid marks in the road show that Donald veered away from the northbound lane of the highway before he had reason to apprehend danger from her car and that, therefore, in effect she was only a spectator to the accident. There were two fuel tanks at the gasoline station. She said she got gasoline from the one furthermost from the Poquessing Bridge — 215 feet away. She argues that the “uncontradicted skid marks” prove her contention that “the Baranack car was over 200 feet from the City truck when the City truck ‘swung to his left to avoid hitting’ the Baranack automobile.”

It is true that these skid marks are as communicable as a book in relating what happened to the city truck, but the book is minus those pages which tell when and *481 where Mrs.' Baranack appeared on the highway. Without those pages, the skid marks, insofar as telling how and why the accident occurred, are as unintelligible as Egyptian hieroglyphics in the dark. The hub of the wheel of the accident, the fulcrum against which the lever of fate upset the truck, is dependent precisely on knowing the moment and the spot that Mrs. Baranack pushed her car into the path of the truck and thereby caused it to deviate its course to the other side of the highway.

If, in point of reality, she was as far away as 200 feet when Donald swung to the left, she would indeed have been only a spectator to the antics of a rabbit-scared motorist. The difficulty about Mrs. Baranack’s contention is that she is superimposing her testimony over the skid marks, but the skid marks do not tell

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Bluebook (online)
147 A.2d 309, 394 Pa. 476, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/giragosian-v-philadelphia-pa-1959.