Giovenco v. Abeshouse
This text of 136 A.D.3d 744 (Giovenco v. Abeshouse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered April 23, 2015, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Lillian DeRosa which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendant Lillian DeRosa established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her by demonstrating that her vehicle never made contact with the plaintiff Amber Giovenco (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable is *745 sue of fact (see id. at 324). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of DeRosa’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
136 A.D.3d 744, 24 N.Y.S.3d 531, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/giovenco-v-abeshouse-nyappdiv-2016.