Giotto v. US Department of Homeland Security, Acting Secretary

District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided July 1, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00453·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Robson Xavier Gomes

v. Civil No. 20-cv-453-LM Opinion No. 2020 DNH 111 US Department of Homeland Security, Acting Secretary et al.

O R D E R

In this case, a group of detainees being held by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Strafford County House of Corrections (“SCHOC”) challenge their confinement in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and class complaint (doc. no. 5) alleging that respondents have acted with deliberate indifference by subjecting them to a substantial risk of severe injury or death from COVID-19. Petitioners seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including release. In a prior order, the court found that detainees with medical conditions placing them in a high-risk category with respect to COVID-19 are entitled to bail hearings. See Doc. no. 123. The court left open the question whether detainees without such medical conditions (“lower-risk” detainees) are also entitled to bail hearings. This order answers that question. LEGAL STANDARD As the court has held, a habeas petitioner is entitled to a bail hearing if he demonstrates a substantial claim of constitutional error and extraordinary circumstances exist that make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. See Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 230 (2d Cir. 2001));

Glynn v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972). A habeas petitioner demonstrates that he has a substantial claim of constitutional error by showing he is likely to succeed on the merits of his habeas petition. BACKGROUND In its May 14 Order, the court summarized the relevant

facts and procedural history in this case. Doc. no. 123. The court assumes the reader is familiar with that history. In that order, the court concluded after a day-long evidentiary hearing on May 1 that it was a close call whether lower-risk detainees were likely to prevail on their constitutional claims, especially given the absence of any reported COVID-19 cases within SCHOC. Doc. no. 123 at 55. The court held that portion of its ruling in abeyance and scheduled a further evidentiary hearing for May 29. The court instructed the parties to address specific questions about respondents’ measures to reduce the risk of COVID-19 entering and spreading

at SCHOC. The court also ordered the parties to immediately notify the court if anyone at SCHOC tested positive for COVID- 19. The next day, on May 15, an asymptomatic member of SCHOC’s medical administration staff tested positive for COVID-19. She was tested as part of a Strafford County initiative which provided monetary incentives for county employees who agreed to

receive a COVID-19 test. The staff member stayed out of work until she tested negative on two subsequent COVID-19 tests. On May 16, an ICE detainee who had been transferred from another ICE detention facility two days prior tested positive for COVID-19. This detainee exhibited mild COVID-19 symptoms at intake and was immediately isolated and tested. On May 19, a second ICE detainee tested positive for COVID- 19. The second detainee entered SCHOC on May 14 after being arrested in Connecticut. He did not exhibit COVID-19 symptoms at intake but was tested at a hospital when he was admitted for diabetes management. SCHOC isolated the five individuals who

had been exposed to the second detainee and administered COVID-19 tests, none of which came back positive. No additional staff members, detainees, or inmates have subsequently tested positive for COVID-19; however, testing has been limited.1

1 Based on information contained in respondents’ weekly status reports, fifteen COVID-19 tests have been administered to detainees at SCHOC between May 14 and June 3, no tests were administered from June 3 to June 24, and five tests were The court held its second evidentiary hearing about the conditions of confinement at SCHOC over two days on May 29 and June 1. Four witnesses testified at this hearing: Jairo Ruben Hernandez, an ICE detainee at SCHOC; Alan Greenbaum, an Assistant Field Office Director for ICE; Christopher Brackett, Superintendent at SCHOC; and Tracy Warren, Medical Administrator

at SCHOC. Based on the evidence adduced at both evidentiary hearings and the arguments in the parties’ pleadings, the court concludes that lower-risk detainees have not demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on their claims. They are not entitled, therefore, to bail hearings pending a ruling on the merits of their claims.

DISCUSSION In its May 14 Order, the court laid out the two standards that could apply to petitioners’ deliberate indifference claims. One is the standard applied when the plaintiff is a convicted prisoner: government officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they act “with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health.” Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011); accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); see also Leite v. Bergeron, 911 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2018). This standard has a subjective component; to

administered from June 24 to July 1, 2020. Doc. nos. 151, 171, 185, 192, 205, 208, 216. satisfy it, the petitioners “must provide evidence that the [respondent] had actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable, and yet failed to take the steps that would have easily prevented that harm.” Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The requisite mental state is said to be “characterized by obduracy

and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,” and “has been likened to ... criminal recklessness.” Leite, 911 F.3d at 52-53 (quotation marks omitted). A second possible standard emerges from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, where the Court concluded that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389, 397-98 (2015). Since Kingsley, some courts have applied an objective standard outside of the excessive force context and have concluded that a civil detainee can establish a due process violation for unconstitutional conditions of

confinement by showing that a government official “recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the [civil] detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.” Charles v. Orange Cty., 925 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Banks v. Booth, No. CV 20-849(CKK), 2020 WL 1914896, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2020) (holding a civil detainee “need only show that prison conditions are objectively unreasonable in order to state a claim under the due process clause”); Estate of Vallina v. Cty. of Teller Sheriff’s Office, 757 F. App'x 643, 646 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that Second,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have “adopted an objective test” requiring “reckless disregard,” while the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Kingsley does not extend to detainee medical care claims).

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Giotto v. US Department of Homeland Security, Acting Secretary, (D.N.H. 2020).

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Related

Coscia v. TOWN OF PEMBROKE, MASS.
659 F.3d 37 (First Circuit, 2011)
Mapp v. Reno
241 F.3d 221 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Zingg v. Groblewski
907 F.3d 630 (First Circuit, 2018)
Leite v. Bergeron
911 F.3d 47 (First Circuit, 2018)
Charles v. Orange County
925 F.3d 73 (Second Circuit, 2019)