Ginger Johnson Days v. in Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedSeptember 3, 2025
Docket3D2025-0212
StatusPublished

This text of Ginger Johnson Days v. in Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown (Ginger Johnson Days v. in Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ginger Johnson Days v. in Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown, (Fla. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 3, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0212 Lower Tribunal No. 23-1079-CP-02 ________________

Ginger Johnson Days, et al., Appellants,

vs.

In Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria de Jesus Santovenia, Judge.

Simon, Reed & Salazar, P.A., and Brian S. Jacobson, for appellants.

No Appearance, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Appellants Ginger Johnson Days and Caster Derrell Johnson, the

personal representatives of the estate of their mother Dorothy Brown,

challenge a January 16, 2025 probate court order that was entered, sua

sponte, by a successor probate court judge. The challenged order vacates

a predecessor probate court judge’s October 27, 2023 order, determining

that, pursuant to the decedent’s will, the decedent devised her homesteaded

property to her three children (the “Homestead Order”).

We agree with Appellants that, because the Homestead Order was a

final, appealable order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.170(b)(13), which was neither appealed nor otherwise challenged, the

successor probate court judge was without jurisdiction to vacate the

Homestead Order. Whipple v. Dawson, 322 So. 3d 1214, 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA

2021) (“Appellant’s appeal from the order determining homestead status of

real property is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the final order was

not timely appealed.”); Steele v. Brown, 197 So. 3d 106, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA

2016) (“[T]he trial court did not have inherent authority to set aside the 2007

homestead order as if it were a non-final order. The 2007 homestead order

in this case constituted an appealable, final order.”) (internal citation

omitted); see In re Estate v. Clibbon, 735 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA

1998) (“Probate cases differ from lawsuits in that there is usually only one

2 final judgment at the end of a lawsuit, while in probate there can be a number

of orders entered at different times on contested issues which finally

determine the rights of interested persons.”).

We therefore quash the challenged January 16, 2025 order.

Order quashed.

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Related

In Re Estate of Clibbon
735 So. 2d 487 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1998)
Ernest Steele, as personal Representative of the etc. v. Pansy Brown
197 So. 3d 106 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2016)

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Ginger Johnson Days v. in Re: Estate of Dorothy Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ginger-johnson-days-v-in-re-estate-of-dorothy-brown-fladistctapp-2025.