Ginder v. Farnum

10 Pa. 98
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided February 19, 1848·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

Coulter, J.

The position taken by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, and so earnestly maintained by him, is conceded. Every circumstance and fact necessary to make the execution of the will valid, under the act of Assembly, must be proved by two witnesses. In this case, however, the execution of the will was proved by two witnesses. One of the subscribing witnesses, being the scrivener who wrote it, proved the execution; and the partner of the deceased, who was perfectly acquainted with his handwriting, testified to the genuineness of the signature of the testator; the other subscribing witness, Eliza Somers, also proved her own signature, and stated that the deceased requested her to put it there, and that she saw the signature of Mr. Knight, the other witness to the paper, who was in the room when she was called in. The execution of the will was therefore legally proved, and competent to go to the jury. It is not necessary that the factum or body of the will should be proved by two witnesses; that is, that the devises and legacies should all or severally be proved by two witnesses; for if that were the law, no will could be valid unless two witnesses had heard it read to the testator, and heard him declare that it was his will. Whereas it has never been doubted in Pennsylvania, but that proof of the handwriting of the deceased who signed the instrument at the end thereof, was sufficient evidence of the execution. Our statute does not require that the witnesses should be subscribing witnesses; and the signature at the end of the will being genuine, raises the legal presumption that the testator was acquainted with the contents of the instrument. The matter alleged by the plaintiff in error, in avoidance of the will, is matter subsequent to, and not connected with, the execution. Whether sheets of paper or leaves have been substituted or added, must depend upon proof of facts and circumstances, and the countenance and appearance of the paper, and the character of the chirography, and is in fact a question of fraud, to be submitted to the jury upon the whole evidence of the case.

[101] The real question here is, whether a fraud was committed after the execution of the paper.

Eliza Somers, one of the subscribing witnesses, testifies that she was called in after Mr. Knight, the other subscribing witness, had signed. And Houston, the testator, requested her to sign that paper as a witness, which she did, as requested. That she saw Knight’s signature, but did not see that of the testator. She was sure there was but one sheet of paper in the instrument she witnessed, and that was entire. It was not like the paper produced as the will. If her testimony is correct, the sheet must have been separated into two leaves, and no part of it but the last leaf composes part of the instrument now produced as a will. The last leaf of the paper is admitted by the plaintiff in error to be genuine, as well as all the signatures. The will produced consists of a number of leaves, strongly attached at the top by tape, on the last of which are the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, Eliza Somers proving her signature to be genuine. So far as the countenance and appearance of the paper goes, I would say without hesitation that the whole of the will was written by the same hand, and at the same time, the chirography being distinctive, and rather peculiar.

The jury found the whole instrument to be genuine. The fact of the identity of 'the instrument produced, with the will executed by the testator, and the weight and value of the conflicting testimony, and the credibility of Eliza Somers, and the question of substitution, were fully and distinctly submitted by the court to the jury, for their consideration and determination. It is assigned, however, as the first error, that the court erred in permitting the will to go to the jury. They did not, however; for the execution of the paper was legally proved by two witnesses, independent of Eliza Somers. The will was properly admitted in evidence, and the question of fraud, or substitution, was properly referred to the jury on the evidence.

It is also contended that the court erred in not instructing the jury, as requested, that, in order to have made the will valid in this case, it ought to have been signed by the testator, at the bottom of each leaf.

It is true that such precaution might be useful, together with an assertion at the end of the will, that each sheet or leaf had the signature of the testator. I would recommend such precaution in practice, to prevent doubt or uncertainty. But it is not a statutory requirement, and this court cannot make it essential. The statute [102] requires that the will shall he signed at the end thereof. If it were an essential element of a valid execution, then each signature would have to be proved, according to the statutory requisition. Many wills have been written on separate leaves attached at the top by tape, or tacked, with but one signature of the testator, to wit, at the end of the will, and one probate. If this court wore to declare such wills invalid, independent of and without proof of fraud, to be determined by a jury, vast mischief would follow, many estates be disturbed and unsettled, and the direct words of the statute would be disregarded.

In the case cited from 3 Mod. 263, one of the judges incidentally observed, that where a will was on several sheets of paper, none of which had been seen, by any of the subscribing witnesses, but that on which they put their signatures, it would be void under the English statute.

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Ginder v. Farnum, 10 Pa. 98 (Pa. 1848).

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