Gina Silva v. Attorney General United States of America

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2933 ___________

GINA PAOLA SILVA; GUSTAVO ALFONSO MEDINA ACOSTA; M. M.S., Petitioners

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Nos. A240-844-470, A240-844-471, A240-844-472) Immigration Judge: Maria Akalski ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 6, 2026 Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 8, 2026) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

The petitioners are native citizens of Colombia, and they petition for review of the

final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) that

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. dismissed their appeal from the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ denied

the applications of Gina Paola Silva, the lead petitioner, and her husband and daughter,

for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We will deny the petition for review.

I.

Silva, her husband, and her daughter entered the United States without

authorization. The Department of Homeland Security charged them with removability as

noncitizens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Through

counsel, the petitioners conceded the charges and applied for asylum, statutory

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. They sought asylum and statutory

withholding of removal based on persecution on account of their asserted membership in

two particular social groups (“PSGs”): 1) family members of Silva’s former husband; and

2) family members of Silva’s son. Silva testified in support of their applications at a

hearing before the IJ.

The IJ issued a decision denying the applications. Among other things, the IJ

found that the petitioners failed to establish that they were or would be harmed on

account of their family ties. The petitioners, through counsel, appealed to the Board. The

Board dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s determination that the petitioners did

not establish past or future persecution on account of their familial relationships with

1 Silva listed her husband and daughter as derivative beneficiaries of her application, and these petitioners also filed separate applications for relief based on the same facts as those in Silva’s application. 2 Silva’s former husband or Silva’s son. Particularly, the Board explained that the

petitioners did not sufficiently address the IJ’s specific factual findings or legal analysis

on the nexus issue, and that the “general nature” of the petitioners’ arguments on appeal

did not establish clear error in the IJ’s nexus analysis. The Board also determined that the

petitioners did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of protection under the CAT,

and that the issue was waived on appeal.

The petitioners, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for review.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the Board’s decision,

and we review the IJ’s decision to the extent that the Board relied on it. See Singh v. Att’y

Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 2016). But where, like here, the Board relies only on

some of the IJ’s grounds for denying relief, we review only those grounds. See Myrie v.

Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017). We review de novo whether the Board

applied the correct legal standard for nexus, and we review the Board’s factual findings

for substantial evidence. See Tipan Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 142 F.4th 162, 170 (3d Cir.

2025). Under the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard, we will set aside a

factual finding “only if a ‘reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.’” Alexander-Mendoza v. Att’y Gen., 55 F.4th 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

The petitioners challenge the denial of their applications for asylum and statutory

withholding of removal. To make out a prima facie case for asylum, an applicant must

show that he was persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, “on account of” a

3 statutorily protected ground, including membership in a PSG. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A);

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). To be granted withholding of removal, an applicant must prove “that

he would more likely than not be persecuted on account of” a protected ground, including

PSG membership. Thayalan v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2021); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). In both instances, the protected ground must be “one central reason” for

the persecution. See Thayalan, 997 F.3d at 142.

The petitioners contend that the agency ignored evidence and failed to consider the

possibility of mixed motives in its nexus determination. As the Government explains, the

petitioners did not adequately exhaust those arguments before the Board. See Aguilar v.

Att’y Gen., 107 F.4th 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation omitted) (explaining that we “must

enforce” the exhaustion rule where the Government “properly raises it”). The petitioners’

counseled brief in support of their appeal to the Board did not take issue with the IJ’s

legal standard for nexus, or its application of that standard. Instead, the petitioners

mostly challenged the IJ’s determination that they did not sufficiently prove past

persecution or the well-founded fear of future persecution.

To the extent that the petitioners preserved any nexus challenge, substantial

evidence supports the Board’s determination that the petitioners’ general arguments did

not establish clear error in the IJ’s factual findings. Particularly, the record supports the

IJ’s findings that there was insufficient evidence presented as to why Silva’s former

husband was killed, and that the petitioners were threatened because Silva’s son refused

to join a criminal organization. Accordingly, we will not disturb the agency’s decision on

the petitioner’s applications for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.

4 The petitioners also challenge the agency’s denial of relief under the CAT. But as

the Government correctly points out, the petitioners did not raise this issue before the

Board. Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in deeming the issue waived. See

Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 147 F.4th 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2025).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.