Gina Gonora v. Frederick

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedApril 22, 2026
DocketA-2205-24
StatusUnpublished

This text of Gina Gonora v. Frederick (Gina Gonora v. Frederick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gina Gonora v. Frederick, (N.J. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2205-24

GINA GONORA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

FREDERICK (ERIC) GONORA,

Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________

Submitted February 5, 2026 ‒ Decided April 22, 2026

Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-2097-12.

Frederick Gonora, self-represented appellant.

Gina Gonora, self-represented respondent.

PER CURIAM Defendant Frederick Gonora appeals from the March 14, 2025 order and

the March 21, 2025 amended order granting plaintiff Gina Gonora's application

to increase the payment of child support arrears to $400 per week. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1995 and divorced in December 2012. The

judgment of divorce incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). Under

the MSA, the parties shared joint legal custody of their twins, born in 1998.

Plaintiff was designated as the parent of primary residence.

Pursuant to the MSA's child support provision, effective January 1, 2013,

defendant was initially required to pay $1,800 per month in child support. This

obligation increased to $2,000 per month when defendant's combined gross

income reached at least $70,000 per year, and further increased to $2,400 once

defendant's combined gross income reached at least $100,000 per year. The

parties agreed child support would terminate in January 2024, irrespective of

whether the children had matriculated from college.

On April 27, 2015, the parties entered a consent order requiring defendant

to become current on all child support arrears within seven days. A second

consent order was entered on October 5, 2015, again directing defendant to pay

all outstanding child support arrears.

A-2205-24 2 In 2016, defendant sought a modification of his $2,200 per month child

support obligation. On March 3, 2016, However, the court denied the

application, finding he had not met the procedural requirements. Although

defendant submitted a case information statement (CIS), he did not provide the

required attachments, including his: prior CIS, recent tax returns, W-2, 1099s;

and three most recent paystubs. Additionally, he did not demonstrate a

substantial change in circumstances to warrant a modification.

By January 2022, probation's records showed the total child support

arrears were $80,759.57. On January 11, 2022, the court granted plaintiff's

unopposed application to enforce litigant's rights. The order directed defendant

to continue paying child support at $2,337 per month through probation via wage

execution until January 2024. In the event defendant missed two consecutive

child support payments, the court would issue a bench warrant for his arrest.

The January 2022 order also directed defendant to continue providing medical,

dental and vision insurance, and other related expenses for the children in

accordance with the MSA.

Plaintiff moved to increase the arrearage payment after child support

terminated in January 2024. By then, defendant owed $80,759.57 in arrears and

was paying $45 per week toward the arrears. Following a hearing at which both

A-2205-24 3 parties appeared self-represented, the court granted plaintiff's application and

modified the arrearage payment to $400 per week, payable through probation.

On appeal, defendant argues the Family Part court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to modify the child support order without providing notice and an

opportunity to be heard. He contends the court abused its discretion by

increasing the arrears payment. Defendant also contends the court breached its

fiduciary duty as a trustee and did not consider his express preferences as a

beneficiary in the administration of trusts, which were not raised before the

judge.

Our review of a Family Part order regarding child support is limited.

Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 587 (App. Div. 2016).

"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its

'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J.

Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412

(1998)).

We review the denial or grant of application to modify child support for

abuse of discretion. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). The "court's

'award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or

clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'"

A-2205-24 4 Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J.

Super. 109, 116 (App. Div. 2012)). However, "all legal issues are reviewed de

novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese

v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

We reject defendant's contention the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's application. When the Family Part entered the

final judgment of divorce and established child support, both parties were

residents of New Jersey, thereby conferring both personal and subject matter

jurisdiction. The Family Part retained subject matter jurisdiction because

defendant continues to reside in this state. Defendant provides no legal support

for his assertion the Family Part lacks authority to modify the child support. As

we have held "a court that enters an order establishing child support retains

continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order, and that court's orders

remain the controlling child support orders for purposes of enforcement ." Lall

v. Shivani, 448 N.J. Super. 38, 46 (App. Div. 2016).

We likewise reject defendant's argument he was deprived of notice and an

opportunity to be heard. His contention is unsupported by the record. Plaintiff

served a copy of her post-judgment motion by priority and certified mail on

defendant in accordance with Rules 1:5-2 and 4:4-4. Service was deemed

A-2205-24 5 completed under Rule 1:5-4(a), (b) when the motion sent by certified mail to

defendant was delivered on February 19, 2025, and the priority mail was not

returned. Defendant filed a "petition of abatement" and participated in the

hearing. The record, therefore, demonstrates defendant received notice and

participated in the hearing.

The motion transcript reflects defendant was ordered to pay arrears at $45

per week and sporadically complied with the order. Defendant acknowledged

he paid $2,337 per month until December 2024 and satisfied his ongoing child

support obligation. However, he did not provide evidence demonstrating he paid

the arrears in full.

It is well-settled a court has the inherent authority to enforce its own

orders. Joseph Harris & Sons, Inc. v. Van Loan, 23 N.J. 466, 469-70 (1957).

Likewise, it is well-established that "the enforcement, collection, [and]

modification . . . of unpaid arrearages in . . . child support payments are matters

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