GILMORE v. DECKER

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 25, 2020
Docket2:16-cv-00209
StatusUnknown

This text of GILMORE v. DECKER (GILMORE v. DECKER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GILMORE v. DECKER, (S.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

AMAR GILMORE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:16-cv-00209-JMS-MJD ) DAVID DECKER, et al. ) ) Defendants. )

Order Following Bench Trial on Federal Tort Claims Act Claim Plaintiff Amar Gilmore brought this action regarding medical treatment he received while he was a federal inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana (“FCI Terre Haute”). He brought Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims via Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against the three Individual Defendants—Registered Nurse David Decker (“RN Decker”), Registered Nurse Sarah Walters (“RN Walters”), and Physician Assistant Genevieve Daugherty (“PA Daugherty”)1—all of whom were medical providers employed by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) during the relevant period. Mr. Gilmore also brought a negligence claim against Defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). For both claims, Mr. Gilmore maintains that Defendants provided him deficient medical care. The Court held a three-day simultaneous jury and bench trial. Mr. Gilmore’s Bivens claims were decided by the jury. The jury found for all three Individual Defendants’ constitutional claims. Mr. Gilmore’s FTCA claim, however, must be decided by the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402. In

1 Physician Assistant Daugherty’s name is now PA Muscatel. The Court uses the former name throughout because that is the name the parties use and the name that appears in the medical records. deciding the FTCA claim, the Court considers the evidence submitted to the jury as well as limited additional evidence that was presented outside the jury’s presence. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires the Court to separately set out its findings of fact and conclusions of law and allows the Court to do so “in an opinion or a memorandum of

decision.” The following are the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52(a). To the extent that any findings of fact are more properly construed as conclusions of law, or vice versa, they should be construed as such. I. Findings of Fact

A. Mr. Gilmore’s Medical History and Treatment Prior to Mid-January 2015 Mr. Gilmore was an inmate at FCI Terre Haute from October 24, 2007 through November 13, 2015. During this time, he was under the care of BOP medical staff. Mr. Gilmore’s had two previous pulmonary embolisms, which are blood clot that travel to the lungs and can be fatal. Because of his pulmonary embolisms, Mr. Gilmore was placed on Coumadin—also known as warfarin—while in BOP custody. Coumadin is an anticoagulation medication designed to reduce the risk of blood clots. A patient’s blood is tested to determine if the dosage of Coumadin is effective. That test is known as an International Ratio (“INR”) test. A patient’s INR is usually tested monthly or less often if the dosage is determined to be in a therapeutic range. A patient taking Coumadin to prevent pulmonary embolisms is considered on a therapeutic dose of Coumadin if the patient’s INR is between 2 and 3. When a patient has an INR that is not therapeutic—that is, lower than 2 or higher than 3—the patient is tested more frequently and his Coumadin dosage is adjusted until the patient’s INR becomes therapeutic. When a patient’s INR is too high his blood is too thin, and the patient is at risk of bleeding. When a patient’s INR is too low his blood is too thick, and the patient is at risk of developing a blood clot. Throughout 2014, Mr. Gilmore’s INR fluctuated, sometimes too high and sometimes too low. Because Mr. Gilmore’s INR was often outside of the therapeutic range, the BOP medical staff tested Mr. Gilmore’s INR more frequently than once per month. Sometimes the tests were done

daily, once a week, or every two weeks. After testing Gilmore’s INR, the BOP adjusted Mr. Gilmore’s Coumadin dosage to get Mr. Gilmore’s INR in the therapeutic range. Mr. Gilmore could generally “self-carry” his medications, including his Coumadin. That meant that Mr. Gilmore was given the medication bottles, and he was responsible for taking the medications as prescribed. However, when Mr. Gilmore’s INR began fluctuating, BOP medical staff suspected Mr. Gilmore was not taking his Coumadin as prescribed. Due to these concerns, BOP staff would occasionally place Mr. Gilmore on “pill line” meaning he could not carry his prescription bottles, but was instead required to get each dose of his medication from BOP medical personnel. The parties dispute whether Mr. Gilmore consistently took his Coumadin as prescribed. It

appears that at certain times Mr. Gilmore did not take his Coumadin consistently, at other times he did, and at other times—such as most of his time in the SHU in January and February 2015, discussed below—he was not provided his Coumadin by the BOP medical staff. As to the latter period, which is when the events giving rise to this action occurred, BOP medical staff was the cause of Mr. Gilmore’s non-compliance and they knew he did not have access to his medication. Moreover, whether or not Mr. Gilmore was compliant with his Coumadin during any given period, Mr. Gilmore’s Coumadin compliance or lack thereof would not and did not alter any of the BOP medical staff’s medical decisions and did not cause the harm at issue here. B. Mr. Gilmore’s Health and Treatment Beginning Mid-January 2015 Mr. Gilmore was under the care of a non-BOP cardiologist, Dr. Thomas Orman, in January 2015. On January 12, 2015, Dr. Orman evaluated Mr. Gilmore due to an abnormal stress test and abnormal electrocardiogram (“EKG”). Mr. Gilmore had coronary artery disease but could not be

prescribed Aspirin because he was on Coumadin. Dr. Orman ordered Mr. Gilmore to return for a follow-up appointment in three months. On January 14, 2015, Mr. Gilmore’s INR tested 2.1. At that time, Mr. Gilmore was considered therapeutic and a physician ordered to have Mr. Gilmore’s INR re-tested in one month. On January 26, 2015, Mr. Gilmore felt pain in his chest that stretched around to the center of his back. He signed up for sick call and was seen by United States employee, PA Daugherty. Mr. Gilmore reported that his chest pain intensified when he took a deep breath and that his symptoms were identical to the symptoms he experienced during his two prior pulmonary embolisms. PA Daugherty took Mr. Gilmore’s vital signs, which were normal, conducted a physical

examination, made a clinical note indicating Mr. Gilmore did not complain of shortness of breath, dizziness, or palpitations, and noted Mr. Gilmore’s history of chronic pulmonary embolisms. PA Daugherty administered an EKG to rule out a heart attack, which read as abnormal but unchanged from his prior abnormal EKG. She also noted that Mr. Gilmore had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Orman, but made no mention of the fact that the follow-up appointment was not for three months. PA Daugherty performed no other testing to determine the origin of Mr. Gilmore’s chest pain, and she provided him with no treatment for his pain. PA Daugherty sent Mr. Gilmore to his cell and told him to alert staff if his symptoms changed or worsened. On January 27, 2015, Mr. Gilmore was moved from his regular housing unit to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). Mr. Gilmore had taken his Coumadin before being moved to the SHU, but he was not allowed to take his medications or his other property with him to the SHU. Around 4:00 a.m. on January 28, 2015, Mr. Gilmore woke up with intense chest pain and

signed up for another sick call.

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Bluebook (online)
GILMORE v. DECKER, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilmore-v-decker-insd-2020.