Gilmore v. Benton County

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedMay 9, 2025
Docket4:25-cv-05011
StatusUnknown

This text of Gilmore v. Benton County (Gilmore v. Benton County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gilmore v. Benton County, (E.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 May 09, 2025 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 HUBERT GILMORE, an individual, No. 4:25-CV-05011-MKD 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 9 vs. PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 10 BENTON COUNTY, a Washington political entity, ECF No. 14 11 Defendant. 12 Before the Court is Defendant’s 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on the 13 Pleadings, which seeks judgment on Plaintiff’s race claim under Washington’s 14 Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). ECF No. 14. The Court has reviewed 15 the motion and record and is fully informed. For the reasons explained below, the 16 Court grants the motion and grants Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended 17 Complaint. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party 20 may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard 1 governing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is “functionally 2 identical” to that governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. United States ex

3 rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 4 2011) (citations omitted). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, 5 taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving

6 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. Teng Jiao Zhou, 7 815 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 179 8 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999)). 9 DISCUSSION

10 Defendant moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), seeking dismissal of 11 Plaintiff’s race claim under the WLAD. ECF No. 14 at 2. Plaintiff, in turn, argues 12 that if his race claim under WLAD is dismissed that this dismissal should be

13 without prejudice with leave to file a motion to amend the Complaint prior to the 14 deadline in the Court’s Jury Trial Scheduling Order. ECF No. 15 at 4. 15 A. WLAD 16 Under WLAD, an employee may establish a prima facie case of disparate

17 treatment through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test or direct evidence. 18 Williams v. Bose Corp., No. 65713-5-I, 2011 WL 5867053, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 19 Nov. 21, 2011). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test, a plaintiff

20 must show he: “(1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was treated less favorably in 1 the terms or conditions of his employment than a similarly situated, nonprotected 2 employee, and (3) the nonprotected ‘comparator’ was doing substantially the same

3 work.” Id. (citing Domingo v. Boeing Employees’ Credit Union, 98 P.3d 1222, 4 1227 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)). Under the direct evidence approach, the employee 5 must provide direct evidence that the defendant “acted with a discriminatory

6 motive and that the discriminatory motivation was a ‘significant or substantial 7 factor in an employment decision.’” Id. (quoting Kastanis v. Educ. Emps. Credit 8 Union, 859 P.2d 26, 30 (Wash. 1993)). 9 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege a prima facie race claim under

10 WLAD. ECF No. 14 at 3. Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s 11 Complaint does not contain any factual statements “that he is in a protected status 12 as to race, how he was discriminated against based on race, that others outside his

13 protected status were treated more favorably, or any other facts supporting the 14 allegation that his race was a substantial factor in [Defendant’s] decision to take 15 adverse action against him.” Id. at 3-4. 16 Defendant is correct. The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts in

17 support of a prima facie race claim under WLAD. Rather, the Complaint contains 18 only two mentions of race: (1) “WLAD prohibits employers from discriminating 19 against employees on the basis of race or the presence of any physical disability;”

20 and (2) “Defendant discriminated against [Plaintiff] on the basis of race and 1 physical disability.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5, 6 ¶¶ 40, 44. Even taking these two 2 allegations as true, Plaintiff has not alleged a prima facie race claim under WLAD.

3 Thus, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the race claim under 4 the WLAD. 5 B. Leave to Amend

6 “[A]lthough Rule 12(c) does not mention leave to amend, courts have 7 discretion both to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend . . . and to simply 8 grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment.” Lonberg v. City of 9 Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted).

10 Plaintiff argues that he should be granted leave to amend up until the 11 November 3, 2025, deadline in the Court’s Jury Trial Scheduling Order. ECF No. 12 15 at 4; see also ECF No. 13 at 17. Defendant, in turn, argues that the Court

13 should not allow Plaintiff until November 3, 2025, to amend. ECF No. 16 at 2-4. 14 Defendant has not established that it will be unduly prejudiced by the Court 15 granting Plaintiff’s request for a leave to amend. Defendant only objects to the 16 potential delay, which alone is not grounds to deny leave to amend. See United

17 States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Howey v. United States, 18 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973)) (“[D]elay alone no matter how lengthy is an 19 insufficient ground for denial of leave to amend.”). Therefore, the Court grants

20 1 Plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings, but will require Plaintiff to amend his 2 Complained within 90 days from the issuance of this Order.

3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 12(c) Motion for Partial 5 Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiffs shall file the First Amended Complaint on or

6 before August 7, 2025, addressing his race claim under WLAD. 7 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 8 1. Defendant’s 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF 9 No. 14, is GRANTED.

10 2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint on or before August 7, 11 2025. Leave to amend is limited to the race claim under WLAD; Plaintiff may not 12 add additional claims, parties, or requests for relief without separate leave of the

13 Court. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this 15 order and provide copies to the parties. 16 DATED May 9, 2025.

17 s/Mary K. Dimke 18 MARY K. DIMKE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20

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Related

Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
637 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Hiram Webb
655 F.2d 977 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Lonberg v. City of Riverside
300 F. Supp. 2d 942 (C.D. California, 2004)
United States v. Teng Jiao Zhou
815 F.3d 639 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Domingo v. Boeing Employees' Credit Union
98 P.3d 1222 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2004)
Green v. Hall
8 F.3d 695 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

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Gilmore v. Benton County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilmore-v-benton-county-waed-2025.