Gilliam v. Speier (In Re KRSM Properties, LLC)

318 B.R. 712, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2034, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7281, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 27, 2004 WL 3016347
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 1, 2004
DocketBAP No. CC-04-1113-KMAN, BAP No. CC-04-1191-KMAN, Bankruptcy No. RS 03-22439-MJ
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 318 B.R. 712 (Gilliam v. Speier (In Re KRSM Properties, LLC)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gilliam v. Speier (In Re KRSM Properties, LLC), 318 B.R. 712, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2034, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7281, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 27, 2004 WL 3016347 (bap9 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This appeal turns on differences between a limited liability company (LLC) and a sole proprietorship. The sole owners of the debtor, a California LLC, appeal orders requiring tax collectors to refund to the LLC’s chapter 7 trustee LLC funds that were used to make estimated tax payments on behalf of the individual owners. Reasoning that the LLC, unlike a sole proprietorship, is a separate legal entity with its own chapter 7 estate, we AFFIRM.

FACTS

The debtor, KRSM Properties, LLC, is a limited liability company organized under California law, whose sole “member” owners are appellants, Michael and Stella Gilliam.

The Gilliams are, themselves, also debtors in a separate joint chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

In April 2003, KRSM sold real property in California, receiving net sale proceeds of $146,513.25.

During May and June 2003, KRSM issued checks totaling $136,000 to the United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and the California Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) that were used to pay estimated personal income taxes on behalf of the Gilliams, at least some of which presumably would result from capital gains taxable to them on account of the KRSM sale. The funds drawn upon are traceable to the sale proceeds. KRSM did not itself owe taxes to either the IRS or FTB because the Gilliams had elected “pass-through” taxation by having KRSM disregarded as an entity separate from them for tax purposes.

Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases were filed by the Gilliams and by KRSM on August 20, 2003. Appellee, Steven M. Speier, is trustee of the KRSM estate. The Gilliam estate has a different trustee.

Although the KRSM schedules suggest that it has no creditors, a Gilliam creditor filed a proof of claim, to which they have objected on the basis that KRSM does not owe the debt.

Noting that KRSM funds had been used for estimated payment of the Gilliams’ taxes, the KRSM trustee demanded that the IRS and FTB return the funds to the estate.

The IRS and FTB agreed to return the funds on court orders obtained on motions, rather than the adversary proceedings required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(1).

Although neither IRS nor FTB opposed the ensuing motions, the Gilliams objected.

The bankruptcy court ordered the funds turned over to the trustee. The IRS and FTB complied.

The Gilliams’ appealed both orders.

*715 JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).

ISSUES

1. Whether the member-owners of the LLC had standing to oppose the motions to recover property and have standing to appeal.

2. Whether estimated tax payments made by a single-member LLC to the account of personal tax liabilities of its owners are property of the LLC estate subject to turnover.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Standing is an issue we may raise sua sponte and resolve de novo. Menk v. LaPaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 903 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). We review statutory interpretation questions de novo. Com-1 Info, Inc. v. Wolkowitz (In re Maximus Computers, Inc.), 278 B.R. 189, 194 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

DISCUSSION

This appeal involves a straightforward issue that arises out of a puzzling situation.

It is straightforward in the sense that LLC funds were used to make estimated tax payments on behalf of future tax liabilities of its owners and thus can be recovered by the LLC’s chapter 7 trustee. The puzzle is why, if it had no creditors, the LLC’s case ever was filed, or why the owners’ individual case was not adequate to deal with their bankruptcy problem.

We begin, however, with the question of the standing of the owners of the LLC to have opposed the motions and to appeal.

I

The standing of the owners of the LLC subdivides into the matter of what right they had to oppose the LLC trustee’s efforts to recover . LLC funds and whether they have appellate standing.

A

The ersatz procedure employed in the bankruptcy court complicates the analysis of the problem of whether the owners should have been entitled to try to block the LLC trustee from recovering LLC funds from the tax authorities.

If the adversary proceedings required by Bankruptcy Rule 7001(1) had been filed, 1 then the court presumably would have focused on whether the owners should have been joined as parties or allowed to intervene under Civil Rules 19, 20, or 24. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19, 20 & 24, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7019, 7020 & 7024. A formal joinder or intervention under those rules necessarily would have been premised on factors that are consistent with the existence of standing.

The procedure used, however, was the contested matter procedure governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014, which does not, without a specific order that is not present here, incorporate Civil Rules 19, 20, or 24. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9014(c). 2

*716 The most we can infer is that the court implicitly added the owners as parties, perhaps under Civil Rule 21, which does apply in both adversary proceedings and contested matters. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7021 & 9014.

We are left, however, to assess standing without the benefit of the specific views of the trial court.

Since the owners are third parties to the LLC trustee’s claims against tax authorities, we look to whether the standard test for third-party standing is met: (1) “injury in fact” to the owners; (2) close relationship between owners and trustee; and (3) hindrance to the owners’ ability to protect themselves. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Wasson v. Sonoma County Jr. Coll., 203 F.3d 659, 663 (9th Cir.2000); Houston v. Eiler (In re Cohen), 305 B.R. 886, 900 (9th Cir. BAP 2004).

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318 B.R. 712, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2034, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 7281, 44 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 27, 2004 WL 3016347, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilliam-v-speier-in-re-krsm-properties-llc-bap9-2004.