Gilliam v. D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-CV-0460, 24-CV-0404 & 24-CV-0462
• Status: Published

Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 24-CV-0460, 24-CV-0404 & 24-CV-0462

MAYA GILLIAM, et al., APPELLANTS,

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, et al., APPELLEES.

Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2024-CAB-000339, 2024-CAB-000346 & 2024-CAB-000345)

(Hon. Carl E. Ross, Alfred S. Irving, Jr., & Danya A. Dayson, Trial Judges)

(Argued June 4, 2025 Decided September 25, 2025) Ryan E. Griffin, with whom Emily R. Postman was on the briefs, for appellants.

Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the briefs, for appellee.

Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and THOMPSON, Senior Judge.

MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellants Maya Gilliam, Julia Washington, and

Jakeline Ruiz-Reyes filed separate petitions in the Superior Court seeking judicial

review of orders of the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA) upholding the 2

termination of their employment by the District of Columbia Department of Forensic

Sciences (DFS). Those petitions were all filed after the applicable thirty-day

deadline for seeking judicial review had passed, see Super. Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1(b),

but appellants argued that the untimeliness was the result of excusable neglect and

therefore the petitions should be decided on the merits. In separate orders, the

Superior Court dismissed the petitions as untimely. We hold that Agency Rev.

R. 1(b)’s thirty-day deadline can be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect.

We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s petition

for failure to show excusable neglect. We vacate the judgment of the Superior Court

dismissing the petitions of Ms. Gilliam and Ms. Washington and remand the latter

two cases for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Except as noted, the following appears to be undisputed. Appellants were

terminated from their positions at DFS pursuant to a reduction in force. Appellants

appealed to OEA, which upheld the terminations in separate orders issued by OEA

hearing examiners in August 2023.

Decisions by OEA hearing examiners become final thirty-five days after the

date of issuance, unless further review is sought within OEA. D.C. Code

§ 1-606.03(c). Once final, such decisions may be reviewed by the Superior Court. 3

Id. § 1-606.03(d). Requests for Superior Court review of an agency decision must

be filed within thirty days after notice of the decision is given, “[u]nless an applicable

statute provides a different time frame.” Super. Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1(b)(2). No

applicable statute provides a different time frame for seeking review of OEA

decisions.

OEA gave notice of the decisions on the day the decisions were issued.

OEA’s decisions thus became final in October 2023, and appellants were required

to file their petitions in November 2023.

Over two months after the filing deadline, appellants sought Superior Court

review of OEA’s decisions. Each appellant also sought an extension of time, citing

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B) (“When an act may or must be done within a specified

time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the

time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”), and Super.

Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1(i) (incorporating Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6, “[e]xcept where

inconsistent with a statute or with this rule”).

In support of their motions for extension of time, which are substantively

identical, appellants submitted a declaration from the general counsel of the National

Association of Government Employees (NAGE), Sarah Suszczyk. The declaration

states the following. Appellants and seven other terminated DFS employees were 4

members of NAGE. NAGE assigned an attorney to represent that group before

OEA. After OEA upheld the terminations, Ms. Suszczyk authorized that attorney to

seek review in Superior Court. In January 2024, that attorney informed Ms.

Suszczyk that the attorney had not filed such petitions and that the deadline for doing

so had passed. Ms. Suszczyk retained new outside counsel to represent the group

and notified the group to “connect them” to new counsel so that new counsel could

file requests for review and motions for extension of time.

DFS opposed all three motions for extension of time and moved to dismiss

appellants’ cases. DFS argued that no extension of time could be granted because

the thirty-day deadline in Agency Rev. R. 1(b)(2) is mandatory. DFS also argued

that in any event appellants had not made sufficient showings of excusable neglect.

In all three cases, the trial court granted DFS’s motions to dismiss. In Ms.

Gilliam’s case, the trial court ruled that the thirty-day deadline was mandatory and

no extension could be granted even for excusable neglect. In Ms. Washington’s

case, the trial court agreed that the thirty-day deadline was mandatory but also ruled

in the alternative that Ms. Washington had failed to show excusable neglect. In Ms.

Ruiz-Reyes’s case, the trial court did not decide whether the thirty-day deadline was

mandatory, instead ruling that Ms. Ruiz-Reyes had failed to show excusable neglect. 5

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The “correct interpretation and application of [court rules] is a legal question

that we review de novo.” Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 195 (D.C. 2013)

(citation modified). We review trial-court findings as to whether there was

excusable neglect for abuse of discretion. E.g., Snow v. Capitol Terrace, Inc., 602

A.2d 121, 124 (D.C. 1992) (“This court will not reverse a finding of excusable

neglect absent a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citation modified).

Appellants contend, however, that the ultimate ruling as to whether excusable

neglect exists is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo. We

disagree. We have never characterized excusable neglect as a mixed question of law

and fact, nor have we ever indicated that our review of such determinations is de

novo. To the contrary, as one of the cases cited by appellants confirms, we have

consistently reviewed excusable-neglect rulings for abuse of discretion. See

Savage-Bey v. La Petite Academy, 50 A.3d 1055, 1061 (D.C. 2012) (reversing

agency’s excusable-neglect ruling because the ruling “was an abuse of discretion”).

The other case upon which appellants rely, Brewer v. D.C. Office of Employee

Appeals, 163 A.3d 799 (D.C. 2017), does not address the specific issue of excusable

neglect. See id. at 804 n.9. Rather, Brewer addressed the broader doctrine of

equitable tolling. Id. at 804. Although appellants initially appeared to be invoking 6

equitable tolling more generally, they later clarified that they are relying exclusively

on the argument that the Superior Court rules establish an excusable-neglect

exception to the filing deadline at issue.

B. Interpretation of Court Rules

Agency Rev. R. 1(b)(2) states that Superior Court review “must” be sought

within thirty days and does not itself state that the thirty-day deadline can be

extended upon a showing of excusable neglect. Id. Agency Rev. R. 1(i), however,

generally incorporates several listed Civil Rules, including Civ. R. 6. Agency Rev.

R. 1(i). Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B) provides that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within

a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made

after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” At

first blush, it thus would seem that there is an excusable-neglect exception to Super.

Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1’s thirty-day deadline.

Agency Rev. R. 1(i), however, contains an exception to the general

incorporation of the listed Civil Rules: such rules are not incorporated to the extent

that they are “inconsistent with a statute or with” Agency Rev. R. 1. Id. DFS argues

that Agency Rev. R. 1(i) does not incorporate Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B) because the latter

rule is inconsistent with Agency Rev. R. 1’s mandatory thirty-day deadline. DFS’s

argument is not unreasonable, but on balance we are not persuaded. 7

At bottom, the issue is whether Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B)’s excusable-neglect

provision is better understood as an exception that the Superior Court intended to

incorporate or an inconsistent provision that the Superior Court did not intend to

incorporate. We conclude that the former understanding is the better one.

It does not appear that explicit, specific exceptions have generally been

understood to be “inconsistent” with the more general provisions they qualify. See

generally Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 1A Statutes and Statutory

Construction § 20:22, at 151-55 (7th ed. 2009) (discussing exceptions and similar

provisions without suggesting that exceptions are inconsistent with general language

limited or qualified by exceptions); Robertson v. Robertson, 68 So. 52, 54 (Ala.

1915) (“[B]oth the general expression and the particular exception . . . were intended

to operate as harmonious expressions, each with an effect not inconsistent with the

other.”).

Thus, we do not view Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B)’s excusable-neglect provision as

inconsistent with the many other provisions in the Civil Rules that impose otherwise

mandatory deadlines. See, e.g., Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(a)(1) (time limits to file

responsive pleading). It follows that Civ. R. 6(b)(1)(B)’s excusable-neglect

provision should not be viewed as inconsistent with Agency Rev. R. 1’s deadline but

rather should be viewed as an intended exception to that deadline. 8

This conclusion finds further support from the fact that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)

includes a specific list of provisions to which the excusable-neglect provision does

not apply, such as Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b), but Agency Rev. R. 1(b)(2) is not

included in that list. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(2).

In support of a contrary conclusion, DFS makes two principal arguments.

Although those arguments have some force, we do not view them as sufficient to

outweigh the considerations pointing against DFS’s view. First, DFS points out that

another provision of Agency Rev. R. 1 sets a filing deadline that can be extended on

a showing of good cause. Super. Ct. Agency Rev. R. 1(e)(3) (motion to intervene

must be filed within thirty days after petition for review is filed unless court extends

time period for good cause). It is a fair point that, if Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(b)(1) is

applicable to agency-review proceedings, it becomes unclear how that provision and

Agency Rev. R. 1(e)(3) interact. In our view, however, the force of that point is

substantially undermined by the fact that the same issue arises with respect to several

Civil Rules as to which Civ. R. 6(b)(1) is clearly intended to apply. See, e.g., Super.

Ct. Civ. R. 12-I(n) (deadline for filing motions may be extended for good cause).

Second, DFS argues that we should not infer that the Superior Court intended

to permit excusable-neglect extensions of the time to seek review in Superior Court

of agency action, because permitting such extensions would be contrary to the 9

interest in finality. Other provisions, however, authorize excusable-neglect

extensions in order to permit judicial review of final decisions. See, e.g., D.C. App.

R. 4(a)(5) (permitting thirty-day extension of time to appeal upon showing of

excusable neglect).

It is true that Civ. R. 6(b)(1) has no fixed cap on the possible length of an

excusable-neglect extension, whereas D.C. App. R. 4(a)(5) has a thirty-day cap. We

do not view that difference as justifying a conclusion that the time to seek Superior

Court review of agency action can never be extended for excusable neglect. We

note that the excusable-neglect standard applied under Civ. R. 6(b)(2) takes into

account finality concerns, such as the length of the delay and the prejudice caused

to the opposing party by the delay. Specifically, under a test for excusable neglect

taken from Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.

Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993), we have held that courts should consider

“the danger of prejudice to other parties, the length of the delay and its potential

impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was

within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good

faith.” In re Estate of Yates, 988 A.2d 466, 468 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified). 10

In sum, we hold that the time period within which to seek Superior Court

review of agency action under Agency Rev. R. 1(b)(2) can be extended upon a

showing of excusable neglect.

C. Whether Excusable Neglect Was Established

The trial court in Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case ruled that Ms. Ruiz-Reyes had not

established excusable neglect. The trial court explained that (1) the seventy-eight-

day delay was significant; (2) Ms. Ruiz-Reyes did not establish good cause for the

delay because she was represented at the time of the deadline and no explanation

was given for the attorney’s failure to file; and (3) Ms. Ruiz-Reyes was served with

OEA’s decision but no information was provided regarding her own efforts, if any,

to ensure that her petition was timely filed. The trial court concluded that there was

no indication that Ms. Ruiz-Reyes acted in bad faith. The trial court was not

persuaded that DFS was prejudiced by the delay. Balancing those considerations,

the trial court declined to find excusable neglect.

We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s careful balancing of the

relevant factors in Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case. We therefore affirm the trial court’s

dismissal of Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case as untimely.

In Ms. Washington’s case, the trial court ruled in the alternative that Ms.

Washington failed to show excusable neglect. The trial court first determined that 11

DFS was prejudiced by the delay in filing, stating that DFS could “reasonably rely

on the final decision” and emphasizing the importance of “efficient administration

[with respect to] employees of District of Columbia agencies.” The trial court also

found that (1) the delay was significant and “subvert[ed] the purpose of the stated

deadlines”; (2) there was insufficient explanation for why Ms. Washington’s prior

attorney failed to comply with the deadline; (3) Ms. Washington had not alleged that

she was “an unsophisticated client” or that she “was assiduous in pursuing” her

claim; and (4) there was no indication that Ms. Washington acted in bad faith.

We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that DFS was prejudiced by

the delay in filing. The trial court did not identify any concrete respect in which

DFS relied on the final decision to its detriment, and DFS has not identified any such

prejudice. Cf. generally, e.g., Diggs v. United States, 28 A.3d 585, 598 (D.C. 2011)

(declining to give weight to claims of prejudice that “are too speculative to show

actual prejudice”).

Ordinarily, we remand for reconsideration of a discretionary ruling that rests

in part on an erroneous factor. See, e.g., Bolton v. Bernabei & Katz, PLLC, 954 A.2d

953, 964 n.13 (D.C. 2008) (“The parties are entitled to have the trial judge exercise

[the trial judge’s] discretion, unfettered by erroneous legal thinking; they need not

settle for the substituted judgment of an appellate court that would sustain the ruling 12

on a plausible, alternative ground without benefit of all the data that inherently go

into a discretionary ruling.”) (citation modified). DFS argues that remand is not

necessary, however, because Ms. Washington failed as a matter of law to establish

excusable neglect. Ms. Washington disputes that argument. We view the parties’

arguments on these points as raising some unsettled issues, and we elect not to

address those issues at this time. Rather, we choose to remand the case to the trial

court for a new excusable-neglect ruling that does not rest on a conclusion that DFS

was prejudiced by the delay in filing.

In Ms. Gilliam’s case, the trial court relied solely on the conclusion that the

time period for filing could not be extended based on excusable neglect. “Mindful

that we are a court of review, not of first view,” Johnson v. United States, 302 A.3d

499, 500 (D.C. 2023) (per curiam) (citation modified), we vacate the trial court’s

order dismissing Ms. Gilliam’s case and remand the case for further proceedings.

In sum, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Ms.

Ruiz-Reyes’s case, vacate the judgments of dismissal in Ms. Washington’s case and

Ms. Gilliam’s case, and remand the latter two cases for further proceedings.

So ordered.