[Cite as Gillett v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2024-Ohio-3014.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RUTH GILLETT, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : No. 113391 v. :
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 8, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-22-968557
Appearances:
Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer L.L.P., Joshua R. Cohen, and Ellen M. Kramer, for appellants.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew D. Greenwell and Matthew T. Fitzsimmons IV, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Ruth Gillett, Christine Alexander, Cassandra
Robertson, Robert Staib, and DoraRae Vactor (collectively “the appellants”), appeal the trial court’s decision dismissing their equal protection claims. We
reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 9, 2020, the Ohio Governor Mike DeWine declared a state
of emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and later, the director of the
Ohio Department of Health issued an order for government employees to stay at
home from work. Because of the pandemic, Cuyahoga County (“the county”)
expected to have a $74 million deficit for the 2020 fiscal year as a result of tax
revenue loss. On April 3, 2020, in response, the county declared a fiscal emergency
and implemented a mandatory furlough for non-bargaining county employees.
The purpose of the furlough was to cut expenses and require the employees to take
ten furlough days through March 2021, that amounted to 80 work hours.
{¶3} The appellants were county employees that were mandated to take part
in the furlough. The appellants’ employment ended in April 2021, when the
furlough ended. However, before the appellants’ departure, the county docked
each of their paychecks 80 work hours of pay. Although the county projected a
20% decrease in sales tax revenue and a 10% decrease in property tax revenue, it
overestimated the monetary deficit because sales tax revenue decreased by only
2% and no property tax revenue deficit occurred. Additionally, the county received
$215 million from the federal government in pandemic aid. Thus, the county
experienced no monetary deficit and actually increased their revenue. {¶4} On April 13, 2021, Cuyahoga Cty. Ord. 02021-0004 was enacted to give
current bargaining and non-bargaining employees who participated in the
furlough a bonus of up to 80 work hours based on their hourly pay. However,
employees who were no longer working for the county, but were mandated to
participate in the furlough, were not eligible to receive bonus pay. The county
retained the money from the former employees, thereby incurring a windfall.
{¶5} On September 12, 2022, appellants filed a complaint and then on
November 28, 2022, appellants filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment alleging the county violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing to
provide reimbursement of pay lost by former employees pursuant to its mandatory
furlough program. The appellants brought this case as a putative class action,
representing themselves and all bargaining and non-bargaining former county
employees who were not eligible to receive the Ord. 02021-0004 bonus.
{¶6} On February 6, 2023, the appellants filed consolidated motions for
class certification and appointment of class counsel, but the trial court did not rule
on the motions. On May 3, 2023, the county filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. On November 13, 2023, the trial court granted judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the county. The appellants filed this appeal assigning one
error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings to Cuyahoga County on the Equal Protection claims alleged by the appellants in their complaint. II. Standard of Review
{¶7} “‘Appellate review of a judgment on the pleadings involves only
questions of law and is therefore de novo.’” Berryhill v. Khouri, 2021-Ohio-504,
¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group
Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851 ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Edn. Comm. for
Foreign Med. Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18. “Motions for judgment on the
pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C), which states: ‘After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings.’” Id.; Civ.R. 12(C). “‘In order to be entitled to a dismissal under Civ.R.
12(C), it must appear beyond doubt that [the nonmovant] can prove no set of facts
warranting the requested relief, after construing all material factual allegations in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in [the nonmovant’s] favor.’”
Id., quoting State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 95 Ohio St.3d 73, 74
(2002). “When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the court may consider the complaint, the answer, and any material attached as
exhibits to those pleadings.” Id., citing Jordan v. Giant Eagle Supermarket, 2020-
Ohio-5622, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Schmitt v. Edn. Serv. Ctr., 2012-Ohio-2210, ¶ 9
(8th Dist.).
III. Law and Analysis
{¶8} The appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting judgment on
the pleadings on their Equal Protection claims. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause in art. I, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution “provide individuals with
equal protection under the laws and apply the same analysis to determine whether
a statutory classification violated the equal protection clauses.” State v. Jones,
2022-Ohio-1169, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 29-30.
{¶9} “‘In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [courts] apply different levels of scrutiny
to different types of classifications.’” Aalim at ¶ 30, quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988). “We use the same analytic approach in determining whether
a statutory classification violates Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.” Id.,
citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 530 (2000).
{¶10} “The first step in an equal-protection analysis is to determine the
proper standard of review.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007-
Ohio-6948, ¶ 64. “When legislation infringes upon a fundamental constitutional
right or the rights of a suspect class, strict scrutiny applies.” Id. “If neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, the rational-basis test is used.”
Id.
{¶11} In our instant case, from the face of the pleadings, the trial court is to
determine if there are enough facts to ascertain if the ordinance infringes upon a
fundamental constitutional right or if the appellants are classified in a suspect
class. “A ‘suspect class’ is defined as ‘one saddled with such disabilities or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’” Id.
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[Cite as Gillett v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2024-Ohio-3014.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
RUTH GILLETT, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : No. 113391 v. :
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 8, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Case No. CV-22-968557
Appearances:
Cohen Rosenthal & Kramer L.L.P., Joshua R. Cohen, and Ellen M. Kramer, for appellants.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew D. Greenwell and Matthew T. Fitzsimmons IV, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Ruth Gillett, Christine Alexander, Cassandra
Robertson, Robert Staib, and DoraRae Vactor (collectively “the appellants”), appeal the trial court’s decision dismissing their equal protection claims. We
reverse the trial court’s decision and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 9, 2020, the Ohio Governor Mike DeWine declared a state
of emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and later, the director of the
Ohio Department of Health issued an order for government employees to stay at
home from work. Because of the pandemic, Cuyahoga County (“the county”)
expected to have a $74 million deficit for the 2020 fiscal year as a result of tax
revenue loss. On April 3, 2020, in response, the county declared a fiscal emergency
and implemented a mandatory furlough for non-bargaining county employees.
The purpose of the furlough was to cut expenses and require the employees to take
ten furlough days through March 2021, that amounted to 80 work hours.
{¶3} The appellants were county employees that were mandated to take part
in the furlough. The appellants’ employment ended in April 2021, when the
furlough ended. However, before the appellants’ departure, the county docked
each of their paychecks 80 work hours of pay. Although the county projected a
20% decrease in sales tax revenue and a 10% decrease in property tax revenue, it
overestimated the monetary deficit because sales tax revenue decreased by only
2% and no property tax revenue deficit occurred. Additionally, the county received
$215 million from the federal government in pandemic aid. Thus, the county
experienced no monetary deficit and actually increased their revenue. {¶4} On April 13, 2021, Cuyahoga Cty. Ord. 02021-0004 was enacted to give
current bargaining and non-bargaining employees who participated in the
furlough a bonus of up to 80 work hours based on their hourly pay. However,
employees who were no longer working for the county, but were mandated to
participate in the furlough, were not eligible to receive bonus pay. The county
retained the money from the former employees, thereby incurring a windfall.
{¶5} On September 12, 2022, appellants filed a complaint and then on
November 28, 2022, appellants filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment alleging the county violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing to
provide reimbursement of pay lost by former employees pursuant to its mandatory
furlough program. The appellants brought this case as a putative class action,
representing themselves and all bargaining and non-bargaining former county
employees who were not eligible to receive the Ord. 02021-0004 bonus.
{¶6} On February 6, 2023, the appellants filed consolidated motions for
class certification and appointment of class counsel, but the trial court did not rule
on the motions. On May 3, 2023, the county filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. On November 13, 2023, the trial court granted judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the county. The appellants filed this appeal assigning one
error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings to Cuyahoga County on the Equal Protection claims alleged by the appellants in their complaint. II. Standard of Review
{¶7} “‘Appellate review of a judgment on the pleadings involves only
questions of law and is therefore de novo.’” Berryhill v. Khouri, 2021-Ohio-504,
¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group
Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851 ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Edn. Comm. for
Foreign Med. Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18. “Motions for judgment on the
pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C), which states: ‘After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings.’” Id.; Civ.R. 12(C). “‘In order to be entitled to a dismissal under Civ.R.
12(C), it must appear beyond doubt that [the nonmovant] can prove no set of facts
warranting the requested relief, after construing all material factual allegations in
the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in [the nonmovant’s] favor.’”
Id., quoting State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 95 Ohio St.3d 73, 74
(2002). “When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the court may consider the complaint, the answer, and any material attached as
exhibits to those pleadings.” Id., citing Jordan v. Giant Eagle Supermarket, 2020-
Ohio-5622, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Schmitt v. Edn. Serv. Ctr., 2012-Ohio-2210, ¶ 9
(8th Dist.).
III. Law and Analysis
{¶8} The appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting judgment on
the pleadings on their Equal Protection claims. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause in art. I, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution “provide individuals with
equal protection under the laws and apply the same analysis to determine whether
a statutory classification violated the equal protection clauses.” State v. Jones,
2022-Ohio-1169, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 29-30.
{¶9} “‘In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [courts] apply different levels of scrutiny
to different types of classifications.’” Aalim at ¶ 30, quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988). “We use the same analytic approach in determining whether
a statutory classification violates Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.” Id.,
citing State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 530 (2000).
{¶10} “The first step in an equal-protection analysis is to determine the
proper standard of review.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 2007-
Ohio-6948, ¶ 64. “When legislation infringes upon a fundamental constitutional
right or the rights of a suspect class, strict scrutiny applies.” Id. “If neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, the rational-basis test is used.”
Id.
{¶11} In our instant case, from the face of the pleadings, the trial court is to
determine if there are enough facts to ascertain if the ordinance infringes upon a
fundamental constitutional right or if the appellants are classified in a suspect
class. “A ‘suspect class’ is defined as ‘one saddled with such disabilities or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’” Id. at ¶ 33, quoting Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). Absent a fundamental right or a
suspect class, the appellants’ equal protection claim is reviewed under a rational-
basis test.
A. Rational-Basis Test
{¶12} “Pursuant to the rational-basis test, courts uphold statutes that are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Jones, 2022-Ohio-1169,
at ¶ 41, citing Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, at ¶ 34. “Substantial deference is given to
the General Assembly and its predictive judgment.” Id., citing State v. Williams,
88 Ohio St.3d 513, 530 (2000). Additionally, the county does not bear the burden
of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the
appellants must negate every conceivable basis before an equal protection
challenge will be upheld. Id. A legislative decision to treat individuals differently
is invalidated only when it is based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the
pursuit of the county’s goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify it.
Id., citing Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956 at ¶ 35. The overriding question is whether
Cuyahoga County Ord. 02021-0004 is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.
{¶ 13} Appellants argue that they alleged sufficient facts in their complaint
that, if proven, would establish that the county’s decision to arbitrarily exclude
former employees from Ord. No. 02021-0004 was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. They contend that the county’s stated purpose
for enacting the law — to reimburse employees who participated in the mandatory
furlough due to the fact that the county never experienced the expected fiscal
emergency that necessitated the furlough in the first place — applied equally to
current and former employees.
{¶ 14} The county argues that the mandatory furlough order was lawfully
enacted, and the appellants do not suggest or argue the contrary. The county further
argues that the ordinance is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
purpose of wanting to maintain current staffing and operational levels. The county
states that because the appellants retired or separated employment with the county
before the ordinance was enacted, they did not receive the one-time bonus payment.
The trial court must determine if appellants beyond doubt can prove no set of facts
that the county’s decision to treat the current employees different from the former
employees is totally unrelated to the pursuit of the county’s goals.
{¶15} The framework for the rational-basis test is as follows:
[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.”
Sherman v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 2020-Ohio-4960, ¶ 5, quoting
McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 2005-Ohio-6505, ¶ 8. {¶16} Thus,
“[t]he rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. We must first identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational. A statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court will not invalidate a plan of classification adopted by the General Assembly, unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus, provided that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it will be upheld.”
(Citations omitted.) Id., quoting id. at ¶ 9.
{¶17} A review of the record indicates that after construing all material
factual allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences, the trial court
abused its discretion when it determined that the appellants could prove no set of
facts related to its failure to be reimbursed funds despite no longer being employed
by the county.
{¶18} “According to the rational-basis test, lawmakers may create
distinctions that bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”
Andreyko v Cincinnati, 145 Ohio App.3d 365, 368 (1st Dist. 2001). The burden of
proving that the law is unconstitutional would rest upon the appellants. Id. And
they may only satisfy this burden by showing that the distinctions are based solely
on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the county’s goals and only if no
grounds can be conceived to justify them. Id. B. Similarly Situated Employees
{¶19} The county also argues that the appellants are not similarly situated
to the current employees who received the bonus because one group is current and
the other former. Although employees do not have to show an exact correlation
between themselves and other similarly situated employees, they are required to
show that the proposed comparators were similar in all relevant respects and had
engaged in acts of comparable seriousness. Smith v. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc.,
2015-Ohio-313, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).
{¶20} In our instant case, the trial court must determine if the facts in the
pleadings shows a distinction between the two groups. The pleadings alleged that
both groups were subjected to the mandatory furlough and had to forego pay for
an equivalent of 80 work hours. It further alleges that the county paid restitution
to the current employees but did not pay the former employees despite receiving
funds from the federal government to cover any monetary loss. On its face, we
determine these facts are sufficient to show that the appellants are similarly
situated.
C. Judgment on the Pleadings
{¶21} “Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
restricted solely to the allegations in the complaint and answer, as well as any
material attached as exhibits to those pleadings.” Edwards v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-
2933, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569 (1996); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Purchase Plus Buyer’s Group,
Inc., 2002-Ohio-2014 (10th Dist.). “In order to be granted a dismissal pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(C) ‘it must appear beyond doubt that [the nonmovant] can prove no set
of facts warranting the requested relief, after construing all material factual
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in [the
nonmovant’s] favor.’” Mundy v. Golightly, 2022-Ohio-83, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting
Berryhill v. Khouri, 2021-Ohio-504, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).
{¶22} We have determined that the trial court erred when it determined
that the nonmovant, the appellants, can prove no set of facts warranting the
requested relief pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).
{¶23} Therefore the appellants’ sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶24} Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., CONCURS; MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY