Gillespie, Shields Co. v. I. Berman Son

Supreme Court of Alabama

Gillespie, Shields Co. v. I. Berman Son

101 So. 681, 212 Ala. 72, 1924 Ala. LEXIS 91

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

DecidedOctober 23, 1924

Docket4 Div. 153.

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 101 So. 681 (Gillespie, Shields Co. v. I. Berman Son) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gillespie, Shields Co. v. I. Berman Son, 101 So. 681, 212 Ala. 72, 1924 Ala. LEXIS 91 (Ala. 1924).

Pincite

Opinion

BOULDIN, J.

No question of the rights of Jacobs’ creditors in the stock of goods sold him under conditional sale con-' tract, to be disposed of at retail in regular course, is bere involved. The fact that he so held goods and conducted a business in his own name would carry no authority, express or implied, to buy other goods in the name or on account of these defendants. Neither would the fact that defendants bought or guaranteed special bills of fill-in goods confer a general authority to buy on their credit.

If Jacobs was given a general authority to make out orders in defendants’ name, to be thereafter presented to defendants for 'their O.K., and he thus became defendants’ agent to advise wholesalers of this, condition, which he failed to do, a question would arise whether defendants would be bound or es-topped to deny his apparent authority. This question need not be here decided, because ‘of evidence that plaintiffs’ salesman knew or had notice, at the time of the order, that it was subject to such condition.

If defendants received the letters in evidence, this would carry notice that Jacobs had purchased in their name, received the goods,’and incorporated them in the stock to which they held the title. They- would be called upon to promptly speak and disclaim Jacobs’ act. Their silence would be a ratification of the purchase. But there is no ratification without knowledge. This also was an issue for the jury.

Plaintiffs could recover upon a finding that defendants were the real owners of the business, and Jacobs their agent to run it for their benefit, or that Jacobs ba,d general authority to buy for his stock in their name, or that defendants knowingly acquiesced in the purchase of the goods in their name. Under the evidence thesfr were all questions for the jury, and the affirmative charge was properly refused.

In view of the evidence that defendants had guaranteed and*paid several special bills, there was no error in excluding evidence that a named creditor was paid one of those bills. So, evidence that defendants, had paid the account of Ooe Coffee Company was immaterial, unless accompanied with an offer of evidence that it was not one of the guaranteed accounts. The court is not put in erro? by rejecting evidence apparently immaterial, unless its materiality is pointd out. The offer of plaintiffs to prove that Jacobs had never paid up his indebtedness to defendants was refused without injury.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C. J., and SOMERYIDLE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BOULDIN, J.

No question of the rights of Jacobs’ creditors in the stock of goods sold him under conditional sale con-' tract, to be disposed of at retail in regular course, is bere involved. The fact that he so held goods and conducted a business in his own name would carry no authority, express or implied, to buy other goods in the name or on account of these defendants. Neither would the fact that defendants bought or guaranteed special bills of fill-in goods confer a general authority to buy on their credit.

If Jacobs was given a general authority to make out orders in defendants’ name, to be thereafter presented to defendants for 'their O.K., and he thus became defendants’ agent to advise wholesalers of this, condition, which he failed to do, a question would arise whether defendants would be bound or es-topped to deny his apparent authority. This question need not be here decided, because ‘of evidence that plaintiffs’ salesman knew or had notice, at the time of the order, that it was subject to such condition.

If defendants received the letters in evidence, this would carry notice that Jacobs had purchased in their name, received the goods,’and incorporated them in the stock to which they held the title. They- would be called upon to promptly speak and disclaim Jacobs’ act. Their silence would be a ratification of the purchase. But there is no ratification without knowledge. This also was an issue for the jury.

Plaintiffs could recover upon a finding that defendants were the real owners of the business, and Jacobs their agent to run it for their benefit, or that Jacobs ba,d general authority to buy for his stock in their name, or that defendants knowingly acquiesced in the purchase of the goods in their name. Under the evidence thesfr were all questions for the jury, and the affirmative charge was properly refused.

In view of the evidence that defendants had guaranteed and*paid several special bills, there was no error in excluding evidence that a named creditor was paid one of those bills. So, evidence that defendants, had paid the account of Ooe Coffee Company was immaterial, unless accompanied with an offer of evidence that it was not one of the guaranteed accounts. The court is not put in erro? by rejecting evidence apparently immaterial, unless its materiality is pointd out. The offer of plaintiffs to prove that Jacobs had never paid up his indebtedness to defendants was refused without injury.

Affirmed.

ANDERSON, C. J., and SOMERYIDLE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

101 So. 681, 212 Ala. 72, 1924 Ala. LEXIS 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gillespie-shields-co-v-i-berman-son-ala-1924.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack