Gillen v. Reynolds Metals Co.

49 F. Supp. 1006, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 186, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedApril 16, 1943
DocketCivil Action No. 225
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 49 F. Supp. 1006 (Gillen v. Reynolds Metals Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gillen v. Reynolds Metals Co., 49 F. Supp. 1006, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 186, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791 (D. Del. 1943).

Opinion

LEAHY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs ask damages1 for contributory infringement of Claim 1 of their patent No. 2,018,061, issued October 22, 1935. The claim relates to the combination of a particular type of transparent pouring lip closure with a “relatively heavy” glass wall milk bottle. Not a milk bottler, defendant did not itself use the combination. However, it is contended and substantially conceded that defendant did manufacture bottle hoods of the type used in the combination, so that it is guilty of contributory infringement if plaintiffs’ patent is valid.

Claim 1 claims a combination. It reads, in part: “In combination with a milk bottle of the type having [four elements describing the ordinary milk bottle in most common usage for many years] ; a pouring lip closure for covering the said pouring lip [of the bottle] and preventing contamination thereof. * * *” The claim then describes the pouring lip closure in minutiae. It includes a transparent, cellulosic cup held within an inverted annular thin sheet metal cup, which is so made that the central portion of the cellulosic cup is uncovered. After the two are placed on the bottle, the metal cup is collapsed to conform to the shape of the pouring lip, to hold the cellulosic cup in tension, and to depress it substantially within the mouth of the bottle, but not sufficiently to come in contact with the primary paper disk closure of the bottle.

I. Obviously, this is not a patent of a milk bottle. Neither is it a patent of a hood closure for a milk bottle. To be found valid, this claim must be sustained as a combination claim. A combination claim is not a claim of the elements but solely of the combination thereof, Rowell v. Lindsay, 113 U.S. 97, 5 S.Ct. 507, 28 L.[1007]*1007Ed. 906; Carter Mach. Co. v. Hanes, 4 Cir., 78 F. 346; St. Louis Car Coupler Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co., 6 Cir., 87 F. 885; Overweight Counterbalance Elevator Co. v. Improved Order of Red Men’s Hall Ass’n of San Francisco, 9 Cir., 94 F. 155; Myers v. Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co., 6 Cir., 10 F.2d 56; because elements and subcombinations, which are themselves patentable invention, must be claimed separately and not in combination. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 20 L.Ed. 860; Case v. Brown, 2 Wall. 320, 17 L.Ed. 817; Evans v. Kelly, C.C., 13 F. 903; Babcock v. Judd, C.C., 1 F. 408; Larabee v. Cortlan, Fed. Cas. No. 8,084; and Stevens v. Pritchard, Fed. Cas. No. 13,407. In short, to sustain a combination claim, invention must be found not in the elements but in the combination of elements, old or new, to perform a new function or to perform an old function in a new manner.

The parties have devoted a trial and many scores of pages in their briefs to the question of whether the hood or pouring lip closure was a patentable invention in the light of the prior art. But the paramount issue here seems to me so simple that its statement is its solution: Did plaintiffs’ invention disclose a new combination of elements or a means of performing a new function with an old combination of elements when they combined a pouring lip closure with an ordinary milk bottle. Manifestly, they did not.2 Claiming as they do that defendant is a contributory infringer because it manufactured and sold one of the elements of the patented combination for use in the combination, plaintiffs can sustain the instant action only by showing that they created a patentable invention by combining a milk bottle with a new kind of hood or bottle closure.

The Supreme Court had before it an exactly analogous situation in Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549, 58 S.Ct. 662, 664, 82 L.Ed. 1008, where it had to decide whether the seller of certain headings or nipples for automotive lubrication was guilty of contributory infringement of a claim which used such heading or nipple in combination with other old parts. Justice Roberts said: “The invention, if any, which Butler made was an improvement in what he styles in his specifications the ‘chuck’ and in his claim a ‘coupling member’. * * * but we think he did no more than this * * * having hit upon this improvement he did not patent it as such but attempted to claim it in combination with other old elements which performed no new function in his claimed combination. The patent is therefore void as claiming more than the applicant invented.”

Similarly here, the invention, if any, which plaintiffs attempted to make was an improvement in the “pouring lip closure”. They, too, failed to patent what they had actually invented, but attempted to claim it in combination with other old elements which performed no new function in their claimed combination. I must accordingly hold, as did Justice Roberts, that “the patent is therefore void as claiming more than the applicant invented.” In reaching this primary conclusion I disregard, for the moment, the question of whether the closure itself performs any new function. Certainly the claimed combination of the elements — the ordinary milk bottle and the hood or lip closure — does not.

The functions of transparency, protection from foreign substances, depression of the cellulosic cup to attain pressure, are all functions of the closure itself, not of combining the closure with the bottle. All references in the specifications to combination are: P. 1, col. 1, line 9, “* * * The closures which have been employed to cover the pouring lip of a milk bottle, in addition to or in combination with the paper disc usually inserted inside of the pouring lip have not been satisfactory because * * p. 1, col. 2, line 3, “Fig. 3 is a top view of the closure combination of Fig. 1”; p. 1, col. 2, line 27, “By constructing the pouring lip in this manner it will most effectively receive the combined transparent cellulosic closure and metal ring”; p. 1, col. 2, line 31, “The combined transparent cup and the metallic annular closure are shown assembled with the milk bottle in Figs. 1, 2, and 3”; p. 2, col. 1, [1008]*1008line 3 “The combination as shown in Fig. 4 3 may be positioned directly upon the top of the milk bottle”; p. 2, col. 2, line 18, “The entire combination 21-224 may then be readily removed.”

This leads me to confess that plaintiffs’ approach to this entire matter is inscrutable. Not only throughout the specifications of their patent but also throughout the Patent Office proceedings, as disclosed by the file wrapper, all mention and discussion of the combination is not to (1) a pouring lip closure and (2) a milk bottle, but rather to (a) a cellulosic cup and (b) an inverted annular thin sheet metal cup.

Hence, the combination claimed, as I read the patent, is palpably invalid in that there can be no invention in combining a secondary hood or pouring lip closure with an ordinary milk bottle.

II. If it be said that I have misread and misconstrued the combination claimed by the patentees, non constat the completely unambiguous manner in which the claim is directed to the combination of a hood closure with a milk bottle, I do not think my ultimate finding of invalidity should be changed.

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Bluebook (online)
49 F. Supp. 1006, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 186, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gillen-v-reynolds-metals-co-ded-1943.