Gillen v. Edge

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Gillen v. Edge

217 S.W.2d 926, 214 Ark. 776, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 642

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

DecidedMarch 7, 1949

Docket4-8787

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 217 S.W.2d 926 (Gillen v. Edge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gillen v. Edge, 217 S.W.2d 926, 214 Ark. 776, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 642 (Ark. 1949).

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Opinion

Gteobge Pose Smith, J.

Appellant is the mother of Carolyn Sue Williams, now ten years old. In 1943 appellant consented to an order of the Pulaski Probate Court by which the appellees adopted this child. Carolyn Sue lived with the appellees until they were divorced; she now lives with her foster mother.

On November 18, 1947, appellant petitioned the probate court to annul the adoption order, alleging that appellees have failed to provide a suitable home for the child, that Mrs Edge has publicly abused and beaten her, and that since the adoption proceedings the appellees have been divorced, remarried, and again divorced. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the petition, on the theory that appellant is not the proper party plaintiff. The court reasoned that by consenting to the order the appellant disclaimed any interest in the child’s future and that the Juvenile Court, which had the child’s care at the time of the earlier proceedings, is the proper plaintiff.

We think the court erred in dismissing the petition. Both the statute in force in 1943 (Pope’s Digest, § 263) and the present law (Ark. Stats. [1947], § 56-110) provide that a petition to annul an adoption order may he filed if the adoptive parents fail to perform their obligations. Neither act specifies by whom the petition must he filed, and it is obvious that the natural mother ordinarily has a deeper interest in her child’s welfare than any one else. Appellant’s consent to the proceedings was of course based on the assumption that the appellees would give her daughter proper care. If they have not done so, appellant certainly has the privilege of bringing that fact to the court’s attention. We do not construe Ark. Stats. (1947), § 56-118, as vesting in the Child Welfare Division the exclusive power to seek annulment of an adoption order.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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Gteobge Pose Smith, J.

Appellant is the mother of Carolyn Sue Williams, now ten years old. In 1943 appellant consented to an order of the Pulaski Probate Court by which the appellees adopted this child. Carolyn Sue lived with the appellees until they were divorced; she now lives with her foster mother.

On November 18, 1947, appellant petitioned the probate court to annul the adoption order, alleging that appellees have failed to provide a suitable home for the child, that Mrs Edge has publicly abused and beaten her, and that since the adoption proceedings the appellees have been divorced, remarried, and again divorced. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the petition, on the theory that appellant is not the proper party plaintiff. The court reasoned that by consenting to the order the appellant disclaimed any interest in the child’s future and that the Juvenile Court, which had the child’s care at the time of the earlier proceedings, is the proper plaintiff.

We think the court erred in dismissing the petition. Both the statute in force in 1943 (Pope’s Digest, § 263) and the present law (Ark. Stats. [1947], § 56-110) provide that a petition to annul an adoption order may he filed if the adoptive parents fail to perform their obligations. Neither act specifies by whom the petition must he filed, and it is obvious that the natural mother ordinarily has a deeper interest in her child’s welfare than any one else. Appellant’s consent to the proceedings was of course based on the assumption that the appellees would give her daughter proper care. If they have not done so, appellant certainly has the privilege of bringing that fact to the court’s attention. We do not construe Ark. Stats. (1947), § 56-118, as vesting in the Child Welfare Division the exclusive power to seek annulment of an adoption order.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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Bluebook (online)

217 S.W.2d 926, 214 Ark. 776, 1949 Ark. LEXIS 642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gillen-v-edge-ark-1949.

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