Gill v. Middleton

105 Mass. 477

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: November 15, 1870
• Status: Published

Opinion

Ames, J.

In the ordinary contract between landlord and tenant, there is no implied warranty on the part of the former that the demised premises are in tenantable condition. He is under no obligation to make repairs, unless such a stipulation makes a part of the original contract; and any promise to do so, founded merely on the. relation of the parties, and not one of the conditions of the lease, would be without consideration, and for that reason would create no liability. But although a gratuitous ex-ecutory (ontract of that kind would not be binding upon him, he would place himself in a very different position if he should see fit to treat it as binding, and actually enter upon its fulfilment. He is at liberty to repudiate or to perform it, at his option; but if his choice should be to perform it, he comes under some degree of liability as to the manner of its performance. It is well settled, that, for an injury occasioned by want of due care and skill in doing what one has promised to do, an action may be maintained against him in favor of the party relying on such promise and injured by the breach of it, although there was no consideration for the promise. Benden v. Manning, 2 N. H. 289. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84. Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143. Shiells v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158. Balfe v. West, 22 Eng. Law & Eq. 506.

In this case, the landlord was told that the building was in an unsafe condition; and what he undertook to do, at the request of his tenant, was to make it safe. He not only assumed to do the work, but he notified the tenant when it was done, and invited him to make use of the building, assuring him that it was perfectly safe. Under these circumstances, it was correctly ruled by the presiding judge, that if on trial it proved to be unsafe, by reason of the want of ordinary care and skill on the part of the defendant in the workmanship or in the selection of the materials used, he might be held responsible in damages.

It is argued, that upon a gratuitous undertaking of this nature the defendant could only be held responsible for bad faith or for gross negligence, and that it was therefore an error to instruct the jury that he was liable for want of ordinary care and skill. But in assuming to make the repairs at the request of the tenant he must be considered as professing to have the requisite skill as a mechanic, and as undertaking to select and furnish the kind and quality of materials appropriate to the accomplishment of the desired object. It appears to us that this is one of the cases in which there is no practical difference between gross negligence and the want of ordinary care and skill; and that the omission of what Baron Rolfe calls a mere vituperative epithet is not a valid objection to the judge’s charge. The true question for the jury was, whether the defendant had discharged the duty which he had assumed, with that due regard to the rights of the other party which might reasonably have been expected of him under all the circumstances. His undertaking required at least the skill of an ordinary mechanic, and his failure to furnish it, either because he did not possess or neglected to use it, would be gross negligence. Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469. The law furnishes no definition of gross negligence as distinguished from want of reasonable and ordinary care, which can be of any practical utility. The question of reasonable care must always depend on the special circumstances of each case, and is almost of necessity a question of fact rather than of law. The degrees of negligence, so often spoken of in the text books, do not admit of such precision and exactness of definition as to be of any practical advantage in the administration of justice, without a detail of the facts which they are intended to designate. Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469. Chandler v. Worcester Insurance Co. 3 Cush. 228. Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113. Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co. Law Rep. 1 C. P. 600. The jury under proper instructions have found the defendant guilty of culpable negligence, and accordingly the

Exceptions are overruled.