Gill v. Doehling

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 22, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01400
StatusUnknown

This text of Gill v. Doehling (Gill v. Doehling) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gill v. Doehling, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CHARLES B. GILL, SR., Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-cv-1400-pp

KELLI WEST, JENNIFER MCDERMOTT, MR. HOCEVAR, TRACY L. THOMPSON, LORI DOEHLING, TAMI STAEHLER, LT. MCCLAIN, DOUGLAS HELMRICK, ANNE M. REILLY, OFFICER HEINON, OFFICER MURTEN, KATHY SCHMIDT, CINDY O’DONELL, and BRAD HOMPE, Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 8) AND REQUIRING THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Charles B. Gill, Sr., an inmate at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution who is representing himself, filed a complaint alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Dkt. No. 1. At the same time, he filed a motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. Seven months later, before the court had screened the original complaint, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 8. This order resolves the motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens the amended complaint. I. Motion to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2) The Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this case because the 1 plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. That law allows a court to let an incarcerated plaintiff proceed with his case without prepaying the filing fee if he meets certain conditions. One of those conditions is that the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b).

Once the plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 15, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $8.76 by November 5, 2019. Dkt. No. 6. On October 25, 2019, the court received from the plaintiff a motion for leave to pay the initial partial filing fee out of his release account. Dkt. No. 7. But five days later, on October 30, 2019, the court received the $8.76 initial partial filing fee.

Because the plaintiff paid the initial partial filing fee, the court terminated as moot his motion for leave to pay that fee out of his release account. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No 8) As the court noted, the plaintiff filed his original complaint on September

25, 2019. Dkt. No. 1. He filed an amended complaint on April 14, 2020, before the court had screened the original complaint or ordered it served on the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) says that a party may amend a pleading one 2 time “as a matter of course” if he does so within twenty-one days after serving it or within twenty-one days after the filing of a responsive pleading. Because the court had not yet ordered the original complaint served on the defendants, the plaintiff had a right under Rule 15(a) to amend the complaint without

asking the court’s permission. Because it is “axiomatic that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint void,” Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of America, 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), the court has treated the amended complaint as the operative complaint and has screened the amended complaint. A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or

officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include 3 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793,

798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. Allegations in the Amended Complaint The defendant has sued Kelli West, religious practice coordinator at the

Wisconsin Department of Adult Institutions; Jennifer McDermott, who was, at the time, the warden of Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution; Mr. Hocevar, the acting supervisor of the health services unit at Kettle Moraine, nurse 4 practitioner Tracy L. Thompson; nursing coordinator Lori Doehling; correctional program supervisor Tami Staehler; security supervisor Lt. McClain; Complex C supervisor Douglas Helmrick; RN Anne M.

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