Gill v. Blanke

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided January 6, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00974·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

CHARLES B. GILL, SR. Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-974-pp

JACKIE GUTHRIE FSA, NATALIE BLANKE CFSL, JODY MARCEAU CFSL, and OFFICER BENIKE Corr. Officer, Defendants.

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 14).

Plaintiff Charles B. Gill, Sr., representing himself, filed a complaint alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 by interfering with his free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Dkt. No. 1. Three months after he filed his complaint, the plaintiff filed documents that the court construed as a request for the court to issue a preliminary injunction, dkt. nos. 10, 10-1, and 10-2, and a letter asking the court to compel the prison to give the plaintiff his documents and copies, dkt. no. 11. The court screened the complaint and addressed these documents on November 3, 2020. Dkt. No. 13. The court gave the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint, in the event he wanted to add a claim he referenced in the documents but had not made in the original complaint. Id. at 17. The plaintiff now has filed the amended complaint, which the court screens in this order. 1 I. The Court’s Original Screening Order In its November 3, 2020 screening order, the court dismissed the Wisconsin Department of Corrections because it is not a person, nor is it a separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983. Id. at 8 (citing Louis v.

Milwaukee Cty. Jail., No. 17-cv-113-wed-pp, 2017 WL 3037567 at *2 (E.D. Wis. July 18, 2017 and Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 N.D. Ill. 1993)). The court also dismissed Secretary of the Department of Corrections, Kevin Carr, because the plaintiff did not allege that Carr had any personal involvement in the events that gave rise to his First Amendment free exercise claim. Id. at 9. The court did not allow the plaintiff to proceed on a First Amendment free exercise claim against Jackie Guthrie and Officer Benike

because the plaintiff had not alleged that they knew about or were involved in the May 22, 2020 incident during which the plaintiff was forced handle and cook ham contrary to his religious beliefs on. Id. at 12-13. The court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a First Amendment free exercise claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) against Natalie Blanke because he alleged that she ordered him to prepare ham on May 22, 2020 despite knowing that he was not to handle pork because of his religious beliefs. Id. at 11. The court also allowed

him to proceed on a First Amendment free exercise claim and RLUPIA claim against Jody Marceau under a theory of supervisor liability because the plaintiff implied that Marceau had a responsibility to prevent Blanke from 2 ordering the plaintiff to cook the ham. Id. at 12. The court noted that if, as the case progressed, it became clear that Marceau was not Blanke’s supervisor, the claim against Marceau could be subject to dismissal. Id. The court also addressed the three documents the court had received

from the plaintiff some three months after he filed the original complaint. One document was styled as a court order and titled “Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction.” Dkt. No. 10-2. The second document was a memorandum of law in which the plaintiff stated that after he filed his lawsuit, Officer Benike and Jackie Guthrie retaliated against him. Dkt. No. 10-1. The third document was the plaintiff’s declaration, asserting that Benike falsified a conduct report in retaliation and Guthrie terminated him from his kitchen job

in retaliation. Dkt. No. 10. On September 14, 2020, the plaintiff also had filed a supplement to these documents, detailing the events leading to the allegedly false conduct report that Benike allegedly issued in retaliation for the plaintiff taking extra cheese from the kitchen. Dkt. No. 12. The court construed these documents as a motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the motion because the plaintiff had not demonstrated that absent injunctive relief he would suffer irreparable harm or that he had no adequate remedy at law. Dkt. No. 13 at 16-17. The court acknowledged that

the plaintiff had not yet sued Benike and Guthrie for retaliation and gave the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to add the retaliation claims. Id. at 17. The court specified that in any amended complaint, the plaintiff 3 “must state all the facts relating to his free exercise/RLUPIA claims and his retaliation claims.” Id. The court also stated that if the plaintiff “prefers to proceed on the free exercise/RLUPIA claims against Blanke and Marceau and does not wish to add retaliation claims against Benike and Guthrie, he does

not need to do anything, and the court will require the complaint to be served on Blanke and Marceau only.” Id. at 18. On November 17, 2020, the court received an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 14. II. Screening the Amendment Complaint

A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include 4 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of

the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty.

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